exercise (2025) skopje

countertext to: robin mackay - simulation, exercise, operations

released november 2025, read for free now

agency in decision becomes irrelevant

countertext to: benjamin bratton - machine decision is not final

forthcoming december 2025, read preview for free now

of comfort in fear

countertext to: anne dufourmantelle - in praise of risk

forthcoming january 2026, read preview for free now

theweleit's fantasies

countertext to: klaus theweleit - male fantasies

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medicamenticality

academic series

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KILL

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Not a clever book

polemical series

forthcoming march 2026, preview not currently available

ivory

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forthcoming may 2026, read preview for free now

Original Edition
price: $5 / or free
version: digitalback
pages: like a few pages
edition supported by: andrej synkar
Cover Design: andrej synkar
contributors: andrej synkar
find this book at: synkar.org/#writings

synopsis: andrej synkar, extremely mad at his peers for being way too marxist, says, "metaphysics thus exists to enable or disable the language that allows it to persist through enabling the language to enable or disable it in artificial loops". nobody in the world ends up caring about any of this shit and messi and ronaldo are still dribbling balls and the giant earth ball is still dribbling itself and so on.

a condition (turns into the condition the moment it concretizes, when only conditions and manifestations exist in constant conflict) forms as a register that serves to foreclose on the possibility of mystery by optimizing the capacity for channel-signaling to serve the function of limiting dissent rather than navigating it by forming the subject into the shape of critique, where negativity and positivity form a closed loop and drive themselves into a multiplicity of functional tones meant to imprison the original novelty (pure difference without the requirement for repetition/rebirth or without any dominant concept - elaborated later below)one way a condition can form in light of discourses fragmented due to the decentralization of communication networks, an emergence from within modernity rather than from the style of rhetorics (for example: relativism is a mood but not a structural function, cynicism is a mode in ideology but forced to be productive when you consider its mood, so therefore a "relative cynicism" literally resists the ability for pejorative, it becomes an encompassed conceptual domain - a manifestation rather than a condition), wherein it becomes a total vision and act that swallows even inner passions. no longer has it the character of persistence in the face of irregularity and its madness - this madness is used to enable forces that drive machines of consistency which regulate the language used to immerse oneself in the passions. when the user of this mode enacts a pact to retrieve of disciplines by way of similarity in identity, and to form a shield of resistance to outsider discourses.the forthcoming manifestation resists the life of thought and succumbs to the inherent paralysis of the hesitance of underwhelming and earth-piling hesitation other than short and quippy retroactive jabs serving to reinforce the bubble of anti-confirmative normativity, which exists itself to enable conformity to a normativity that at all times is both about to become cynical yet exists as a positivist inclination, a grandeur of provocations of series of the real, where the "correct" series is the mirror (of judgement) somewhere in between and yet at the far end, where the truth emerges as the contained exception.the mode functions by way of an equalizing ideology, the subject of procedural awareness is thrown into the process of the very conflict he envisions, becoming equalized with its own delusions, in a way that conforms it and bounds it to his own discourse, at the same time a dominating discourse, because it requires the obedience of the subject to its power as the only realizable mode capable of forming a series of artificial spooks (spooks not requiring attachment towards disillusioned objectivity but rather the relativistic counterpart that allows for the illusion of a stable set of metaphysical grounding points to enable the movement of conceptual interchangeables in recognizable surroundings) required to further form an attachment to the mental imagery of impressions of expected artificial master-signifiers (master signifiers that function not to refer to themselves as signifiers once more, but to the space between their lacluain emptiness, their denial of their own floating nature, and their "open" self-referral - the assumption of their resting point as subsumed by their own weight) which causes the concept of ideology to equalize with the dominant concept - which differs from a spook on account of its existing non tangible (floating) nature (real, value, other, doom, absolute), which then implicitly serves as a critique of perceived value relativism, where the subject that judges assumes he doesn't contain within him the ability to judge non-deterministically.the rule of the perceived ideology then serves to form a common sense barrier around concept, where the narrative of the life of thought (the impetus towards free exchanges of speculation) is replaced with the narrative of the completeness of the lack located within the process of the merging between the concept of ideology (the limit of free determination) with the dominant concept.then, the very language enabled by the floating signifier (the ability for the derridian freeplay of signifiers) is used to defend against the discovery of the life of thought by the newly formed closed interchangeable space, which weaponizes discourse to point to a space where the discourse serves to punish itself by invoking its own lack when considered in the face of the pressure of bodily intensity or the symbolic foundation which serves to enslave the ability to form infinite sets of conceptions by way of removing the speculative drive and replacing it with the integrative drive of onset positivistic defeatism, weaponizing the arrogance of the communicable to point to various fringe cases where the convolution of nuance can be ripped apart by the aggregator (the image of the resistance of the infinite virginity and post-origin form of the reference of opaque structure of the integrated machine of meaning and its ability to create walls with single directions and faces without detailsmetaphysics thus exists to enable or disable the language that allows it to persist through enabling the language to enable or disable it in artificial loops, where the concept is alienated in face of other forms of alienation (such as the total dismissal of recognition as a possible metaphysical reality in light of the post-proximious nature of abstract belonging - the post historical possibility of this idea as manifest in the "subject" - the envisioned form of act by the determinant of the belonging - meaning the free link - also described as the agent without the need for capacity, which rules over the life of thought)the machine of meaning is disabled by the rule of perceived ideology to dislocate the foreclosure and rightly opaque nature of the freeplay of floating signifiers (and the mystery behind the one sided nature of the two sided double-nature) instead abusing neo-spooks (the dominant concept) to rapidfire propulsion (by mechanism of artificial master signifiers) into stasis of the concept and paralysis of the act of speculative thought through its zizekian pseudo-openess (a perceived symptom of modernity also enables the subject to foreclose on the life of thought, but this is an uninspired, accidental and a such, far less symptomatic act). speculative foreclosure describes a loss of "post-capacity" (the false problem of determination as described by the illusion of capacity) to generate non-integrated "original novelty"mental imagery pertaining to the dominant concept enables the rule of perceived ideology to defend its mode (enabling of conditions) where the universal illusion of the concept is weaponized against the concept of the floating signifier. meanwhile, the sponsored mystery (the mystery of the rule of inference of the ideology, as opposed to the organic opaque mystery) allows for the possibility of the structural failure of the goal of the system (zizeks symptom in lacan - y a de l'un)meanwhile, the truly organic opaque mystery isnt the cyberspace, it’s the original hidden (meaning, the original novelty, which is both artificially productive and superficially originating, yet also still originally intended to be concealed, so that there is no illusion of choice in its concealment masquarading as a properly new (postmodern) enviornment. just like how the visibility of the inner body is a functionally futile and impractical task (even if "transparency" is achieved, the registered logic of the interface is useless to the quest of engagement with the simulation, and reverting the primary simulation simply means that the engine switches places, even if when its reverted the very laws of the mechanics of the engine themselves change operational wavelenghts).or in other words, even transparency is simulation because transparency itself is the logic of concealment in the face of a traumatic origin by flipping the law-set whichever side you want it to stay on, so to say, desire doesn’t survive virutal space, it transposes it by commanding that there is an organic mystery of the absolute, rather than seeking to discover it, and digging itself further in either abandonding or re-invoking the real. the real is artificially a part of the simulation, it is both the origin and an element of the virtual space, one that is decipherable (but cruically, one that doesn’t serve as a realm to something else, one that is self-completing, yet one that requires itself to either exist on one side of the origin-point, or to reverse the origin-point and exist at the side originally meant to hold or facilitate the origin point, especially but not limited to the point when the origin itself becomes impossible to determine. for example, if the world was made out of meat yet it required meat to create energy so it could continue to be made out of meat - and there was an infinite amount of meat, but only because this is a core part of the constituent programming of the meat world itself - a programming that is only facilitated by the eating of the self-generating meat - which explains away the question of origin by transposing it as part of its own problem.← back

the artist can be identified through everyone, as not a mode of operation at all. the artist is simply a posteriori designation of no worth, or an apriori postulation of non-consequential labeling, there is no real artist in between, nor the recognition between an artist and non-artist. the object of art is subject to a cynical mode of assessment that functions primarily as a disassociation - and this is known as criticism. this results because of the inevitable rupture between its expected values and derived results, as opposed to its pure function - in that that same reality is the defining characteristic of all possible techne-related immersion. every single act of technical possibility is an artistic act, a "piece" of art, a creation of an art "work", all art is all action, regardless of its banality, perceptivity, interpretation and so forth. art doesn’t involve skills, crafts, works, creations, labour, exchanges, or any form of criterial or qualitative requirement. rather, it’s a quantitative disposition, a dispose, an association, there are no disassociations in art, there is nothing learned nor nothing required, not even its comprehension as such (and especially not its denial, which only further enforces it). art has nothing to do with criticism, as criticism is a derived product of its associative power (the disassociative power is subject to art, and depends on art’s associative power, not on its own analytical power).what thinkers confuse between capitalism, alienation and criticism is the assumption that there is a form of non-artistic artism, or rather a distaste of tastes, the master of artistic indiscrepancies, an alien object so strong that it disables all artistic relevancies, and causes confusions in the perception of narrative time, social space, ethical recognition, reviewability, associative complexes, political engagements and criteriums of taste between the cultural community and the objects of art, but this is simply a result of art's positive power. the positive power functions as a structural operability that fuses together the associations it creates with opposite associative complexes, creating tension that it then further weaponizes, which leads to its own synthesis. but this synthesis isn’t a product of criticism but of more art, it doesn’t require interpretation. capitalism is neither a cause of conflictual rupture nor simply any and every technologically-relevant manifestation, but it is a third term, it is an imposition of its own qualities, that has nothing to do with emerging social relations or frequencies, it simply serves as an unfair stand-in for them.when there are no conditions for an authentic emergence of social integrationism, or an experience of organic interaction between correlated voices that are politically intertwined or causally called-forth - no matter the voracity, audacity or intensity of this experience - by the impact of their mutual existence in a political space, these same voices lose out on the luxury of a community that casts personally reflected judgement between these voices, be it that this judgement has or hasn’t a criteria (as per lyotard's just gaming). the community acts as a symbolic shield of value that not only personally recognizes the value of the subjectivity of the voice over its politically-relevant existence, but that ties the "political voice" of the subjective proponent with its very subjective quality, thus creating a field of recognition, semblance, convergence (harmony) between the voices in the inner community - meaning that the ideal form of the community is one where there is a luxurious and prosperous judgement where there is an equal skeletal footing for all voice-components instead of a starved, exhausting, debilitating, frustrating, even infuriating propagation of judgement. the judgements themselves also reflect different assertive tendencies, pertaining to the level of luxury.when they lose this luxury, professional judgement becomes a private and auto-emotional assertion, that is concerned pre-emptively with identities, agendas, affiliations and sets of variables regarding the "color" of the shared experience over its inner properties. in this situation, criticism becomes reduced to an assertion of identity (the political belonging that underlines fast judgement) and this same judgement cast by the "aesthetic shape" of the criticism clearly reveals itself as nothing more than a territorial dispute, it falls short of constructive qualities. no matter the qualities of the critical appropriation, the subject behind it functionally remains on the level of an "i-statement" even if the actual critical value of the statement has philosophical elements. this is because it in fact is a political statement, it’s an attempt at forming a world around the subject, a world where certain elements behave as conflictual, others as affiliatory, and certain ones retaining or being removed from speculative or contemplative value. there is no way to corporately manage the "customer servicing" of this voice, because it exists as it pertains to its necessity.white-washing the "i-statement" actually causes even more damage by isolating not only the alienation between the subjects but throughout their own shared motivations for holding the views to begin with. however, the level of assertiveness of opinion is directly proportional to the level of assertiveness of character, meaning that there is an aesthetic of fair views that blast past social confrontationism and are uniquely, as stated previously, a liberating experience for all parties involved. the act of confrontation, when understood as self-confrontation, is a de-supermacist force, it holds a sense of shared responsibility over the political act, which has a self-affirming position, it bypasses the unusual routes that the suffocated judgement requires of the voice to cycle through in order to arrive to the same lower, less luxurious benefits of world-arrangement, over the greater ones of critical non-identitary juxtaposition, a component of fair criticism.the subjective act of world-arrangement or a sense of cultural belonging is less of a luxury than that of fair criticism, of the simple act of casting a judgement or review, and in this instance it simply disguises itself as constructively motivated, when in fact oftentimes this very same judgement is social in nature, having to do with the ranks of gossip, identity-formation, social group ordering and so forth, which removes from the harmony of the craft in order to re-insert the validity of the territorial arrangement. this same act even behaves as if it concerned itself with criticism, when that clearly isn’t its goal. the suffocation of the subject is caused by political exhaustion that results as a consequence not of globalism and its interaction with the vulgar community (the vulgarity), but rather the vulgarity falls into a state of mania when it’s forced to evaluate elements of its community without the organic interactions nor harmonic predispositions that would allow it to continue on this path in a fair manner.critical non-identitary juxtaposition, one of the modes of the fair criticism, is the proper and even pure engagement with the object of "art" - art here means all objects of shared experience, not simply some material object that has a suffocating title - which also isn’t art but a territorial dispute. art is free to be, insofar as it pertains to its active appearance in a setting. the instant appearance is an instant art form, even social communication is an art, that is recognized for its strength precisely because it’s missing the suffocating function that supposedly "higher-perceived" territorial-status arrangement disputes hold claim over. this is precisely what shows the value of the artistic form to-be-judged, it has value because it resists apriori judgement and is simply a form of world engagement.this is also because the exclusionary attitude (unfair criticism, a component of the balkan disease) only selectively comprehends how all objects of art are already self-fulfilling artifacts, immediately upon their conception or even the very thought of them, participating in the spirit of communal art as naturally beholden to all artistic elements simultaneously, as naturally possessive of all elements of the composition of the artistic mentality, which is a natural mentality, not a mentality of force. the artistic mentality has no criteria as per the history of philosophy, other than criteria that german neoclassicists attempted to coincidentally simultaneously gatekeep and yet also act apophatic regarding its nature, and judgement persists and occurs regardless of criteria.juxtaposition and world arrangement are in fact opposites, although both require a critical lens, one of them makes use of the identity of judgement (which is here the same thing as the judgement of identity, that is, the judge makes use of the apparatus of judgement in its principle - involves its identity, whilst also the identity of the judgement is the judge's call, for he is not enacting judgement but in fact enacting its identity, the identity of the form of judgement over its substance, even when he is most motivated in its substance).the tendency of artistic evaluators (remember, artistic refers to everything, from "professionals" to "specialists" to ideologues, politicians, chiefs, surgeons, group of five men in a club - any and all accidental or purposeful social roles - social insofar as they exist as pertaining to the political reality of sociality - which also includes purely private self-indulging experiences) to feel that they possess a vision of intention yet a requirement of intention simultaneously is the state of arrogance. arrogance, pretentiousness, snobbery and elitism are not to be confused with the harsh loss of the term objective as denoting not transcendental but criterial convergences, and as such, the arguments regarding objective vs. subjective taste are irrelevant, and even more so arguments over truth as correspondence.rather, arrogance as a state now functions to serve the role of perpetuating a constant conflict between perceived vs. reasoned intention. the artist’s responsibility is now to mediate his own intention, to divorce it from his felt inspirations in order to perform a set of maintenance rituals. this act isn’t about felt importance, but about felt legitimacy, since the transcendental connection between importance and its social maintenance are now delegitimized due to the fall of objectivity, the "objective" is now to mediate the postulation of the object, not its legitimacy. the postulation of the object is the felt mediation of its processation, of its deliverance. the object can only be delivered in certain style, not the form of the object but the ritual of its enactment. the object must fulfill some criteria, you must feel as if you can comprehend why the object is delivered. the alienation of the critic confronts the critic, which lowers his own self-legitimizing function (the seeker's complex) which in turn creates a complex of snobbery where the confrontation is re-articulated as a loss of meaning in the object of the art rather than its evaluator. the strength of art's positive power is in its ability to decouple perspectives rather than conjoin them, positive power has the role of destabilizing essence itself, of suggesting that nature is above essence, that categories are above nature, and that multiplicity conquers monoplicity.classic aesthetic categories cannot suffice to mediate the object, and there is no hierarchy of social roles, therefore snobbery is about verticality, not horizontality. it is about the maintenance of alliances, simply, the critic has become the knight, the knighthood is the critic’s chair, the theatre is the homeground for the evaluator, the cynic. the cynic's salon is the bar, or their home couch, the cynic's conquest is over the legitimacy of others. performing legitimacy is felt as a personal, emotional endeavour. the confusion of multiplurality, of value bipolarity, of multidirectionism, of felt spontaneity, of judgement without criteria, acted or performed statement-pieces, of the direction and death of criticism, is over the character of enactment that arises as a result of this dilemma of felt legitimacy.the problem, however, is that art's positive power is removed from its ability to be enacted when its negative power (the existence of unfair criticism) serves to ritually delegitimize it. primarily, criticism today isn’t about harmony (there is no need for harmony, not that there is disharmony in any way - simply, states and affairs are run automatically, and hyperstitionally) but about enacted humiliation (as bifo observes) which is the negative twin of harmony. if harmony sets in order by converging and organically flowing everything into its lines (which exists today in the balkans and all other uneven realms as a social aesthetic of conformism rather than a structural sorting mechanism that appears not just self-prophetic but seemingly innocuous, completely transparent, and almost non-existent - "the things sort themselves out") however, humiliation, the negative twin of harmony, creates an aesthetic that makes it inaudibly clear how non transparent and forced the categories that are already pre-emptively sorted behave and appear, which paradoxically increases awareness of the social sorting mechanism (which in itself doesn’t even exist in cases of disharmony). the social sorting mechanism cannot function proper in subversive realms (like in today’s contemporary world), the way it could in "serious worlds" (like the old world of theology) so it essentially behaves on account of social gossip with no actual social stimuli. it sorts categories of identities and their corresponding voices pre-culturally (pre-philosophically), but post-politically (identity as enacted rather than felt), therefore the roles are forced and autoperformed. performativity today can outright correspond to the political mainline (the real producing craft of politics, its genuine contemporary manifestation) but, autoperformativity is confused with its genuine counterpart in these same instances.anyone too pulsed to put aside their status, arrogance, or inability to consider political categorical differences isn’t deserving of being called having a pulse, one should always be able to separate criticism, abstraction and consideration. pure judgement always admits the good with the bad, unlike most snobs. snobs are men too weak to put aside the frailty and intensity of the world to consider their own judgement fairly enough so as to actually engage the pieces. having a dead-inside mirror still show more character towards something than the unfaithful reader isn’t indicative of a pulse, much the opposite.

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• 1. likavcan interview

• 2. likavcan review

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the governance of habitability - a response to lukas likavcanin this short interview, likavcan and his question-posers go a long way to try to unpack what lukas actual ideas are and where they are categorically situated, and by the time it picks up, it suddenly ends.its unclear whether lukas has a hard time deciding what to talk about first, or whether the questions are just slowly edging us into a flat plane, or whether the perceived density of the material requires enough time to extrapolate what it is before we can even get started to the point where there isnt any more space for anything else, but lukas and his associates here brush up against ideas without necessarily forming any, philosophers are picked up and dropped, surfaces are touched, but there arent any philosophical moments of great rhetorcial ability, the long passages act more as naturalistic observations and media research analysis than one single large sweep across. this in itself isnt so bad, because philosophy is already dense and complicated, and it isnt so easy having to even decide where to go half the time, especially when you're in the domain of compromise and introduction.distinctions dont really help us get anywhere if all we get is more of them without the polemical strenght to carry them across, however, it isnt necessarily likavcans fault, as it seems the intervieews themselves are sometimes getting accustomed to his own ideas during the interview rather than posing challenges to it. it also has the officializing rhetoric of an interview, meaning its a socratic dialogue where only socrates gets to speak in any worthwhile level of volume, which is great for, say, american politics, but maybe not as convincing for theory. surely though this is also calculated pre-emptively, serving as more of an elementary introduction than anything else. it by no means is bad material, it just feels improperly chewed.that being said, the actual categorical and functional concepts lukas is working in and around seem entirely promising and act as a mediator between the post-latourian and brattonian era, lukas seems to know more about this than almost anyone else, and hes even ready to soft-fight bratton for it, which means if anything happens to that project, he'll be right behind to help either backstab or propel it. hes excellent at pushing us upwards, towards more extrapolation, more divides, more elaboration, he seems to be careful where it matters, and has some big ideas behind his name, hes left home with a big load, a whole horse-carriage of stuff, not just one tiny little stick with a plastic bag wrapped around it, but a whole reportoire of important conceptual distinctions.sadly, this requires reading lukas actual works to piece it together, since it feels like half the time density is being projected, as if the project is so complex that even getting into what it is entails having to endlessly cycle around the points without entering into any of them. the interview that follows between goodman, lawrence and greenspan does the exact same thing here towards the start, but somehow even more stagnatory, to the point i had to ragequit it at first read, which is my fault more than it is theirs.in the first part of the interview, lukas is being tortured into talking about topology. ag asks lukas to talk about it, he answers with a few references, the name of his work, and the aesthetic experience you would get as affective discharge after spending time with a topological investigator. afterwards, ag asks him about the space of reason as a concept, but he just says that metaphors can become models. afterwards, bogna shoots her shot about topology, to which he replies that topoogy is about continous fields rather than fixed discrete points, which he later mirrors is his main argument about networks also.right after this he also mentions vertifcal overflows, layering or conflicts also as potential problems, giving the firewall as a classic example of a virtual border. anna then basically explains the phenomenology of the stack, but she gives a very straightforward read of it, and lukas gives an even more bland answer because he just explains that political regulations prevent any aesthetic reading from manifesting through topology.this in itself is okay, because lukas argues for the vertical model in a way that challenges precisely this fixed understanding of political entities and their aspects to unconsciously proliferate before we understand their unconscious and dynamic character, however this risks collapsing the dialectic, and turning lukas ontology into an apolitical politics without any creative attempt. i assure you, if you asked fourier, hell, even ireland herself the same question today, they would ground it in a scientific manuscript that tries to be both empirical and creative. this again isnt a weakness of lukas, because he is put in the position where he has to enact the real authority of planetary dynamics in real time, so he cant risk giving us aesthetic slop, his polemical negation does serve to reintegrate his project, its just, well, dissapointing i suppose.all of this talk on topology doesnt do much before it abruptly gets pushed into being about ai governance by bogna instead - which is fair because it is a slightly more interesting conversation anyways, which means ill have to interact with his work on comparative planetology directly later in my review to actually piece together my preliminary thoughts on his work. the last point about topology right before he goes into ai governance however is about how he wants to understand cloud computing as a concrete metaphor or a real abstraction that can be used to destabilize nodes into flows, where the implementation of ai is directly correlated to non-locality as a lived ontological state.lukas begins with a very whataboutist definition of non-localities as emergent properties that are constantly changing terrains and end up in unrelated spheres of influence, however this is preceded by the existing definition of the economy itself as an emergent domain, so there isnt much of a difference between non-localities in networks and in stacks or other ontological entities such as plantery scale emergent or dynamic computation, consciousness or etc, the main ontological domain lukas wants to constrast networks with is kind of an association of a couple of different terms (but "the plantery" as such on its own seems to be the essential construct). then greenspan asks him the important questions, but he simply asserts that networks have fixed nodes, which doesnt actually deal with the problem of how dynamics shift in space or why nodes persist despite constant dynamic altercations and interactions in space. also the important question of whether, to which extent, and at what relative speed do ontological shifts happen to large/hyperconnected as opposed to small ones isnt actually answered, which leads to a trivial conceptual binary.one thing that lukas does help us explore are contemporary contradictions that do in fact transpose or move past a definitive divide between what he calls horizontal and vertical space, so that multidimensionality itself becomes an allegory for contradiction, literally the stack has multiple real abstractions that both work as universals that want to achieve totalizing hegemony, but at the same time only use this operating fantasy to their practical rather than so-called "ideal" advantage if that makes sense, and in this sense his basic questions about what entity belongs to which domain is latourian in its schizophrenia.for the last part of his interview, lukas deals with the contradiction between an instituion and an infrastructure, as well as with governance against principle. to cut it all short and into its most essential tenants, this allows him to seperate the origin of something from its purpose, whilst seperating the contradiction inherent in something from its actual deployment. this is important precisely because ai is the first passive entity that can be deployed into a type of activity that resembles an agent. this means that lukas successfully defends an original idea of ai, but at the cost of a massive dilemma that appears at the end of the book, which for some reason also becomes the title of the essay even though a large majority of the text doesnt deal with this concept and no dialogue is generated about it past his single statement.but anyways, if habitability is a less ego- or anthropo- centric version of sustainability discourse, and ai regulation is allegorically equivalent to a volcanic activity changing atmospheric conditions, then technically speaking, the earth itself becomes a type of post-game lobby, it essentially gets equivalized to the air conditioning system inside of a room. in a certain sense, for lukas, the planet is one giant room, the plantery means maintaing trivial control over earthly conditions by a type of positivistic construct of balance, no matter what this balance actually entails or the type of balance it guarantees.this can be thought of as an inversion of german idealism's understanding of the spirit as a type of inversion of nature, a re-inversion where nature itself is an equalized form of agentiality - if ai is a type of natural control of dynamic interchangable factors in the world, then nature itself is simply its own type of closed-circuit regulatory mechanism, where the concept of "evolutionary blindness" is finally removed in favor of a type of passive agentiality, essentially nature's closed rule book is its own fully self-justifiable form of governability.but the problem is that in nature, the chance that everything goes wrong is pre-emptively factored into the total fact of its soverignity, so in a sense the concept of imbalance exists, the imbalance of an accident. the ai doesnt make accidents, but it can still "accidentalize" everything, it can decrease everything to any and all base-states, it is a base-state lottery system. the base state of the world can be anything as long as its true to its own self - which arbitrarily also becomes the decision of the ai itself.in lukas, machine decision is absolutely final even if he argues in other works that it absolutely isnt, because the equilibrium-state of all being is removed from accident, therefore from contigency and chance. i am not trying to moralize or ethicize his system, im taking it at its most base point and hyperficially (superficial + hyper) allegorically and speculatively inflating it to its highest degree. you could argue mathematically that you could do a form of sustianability that preserves all originals including their inherent logics, so that in a certain sense habitability is a type of slow athropy - a constant preservation mechanism that values every pre-determinate against every post-determinate, but this is a freeze-locked zone.no matter how you spin it to me, cosmology is tied to ethics for this reason, because if you want ultimate control, you must choose infintie triviality. the power to command is equivalent to the power to contaminate, so lukas system to me is nonsensical, at least the one supplied in this interview. now i will deal with some sections of his book, just enough to spice up my own review, but not enough to serve as even a partial consideration of that book on its own. i want to quickly point out that my antagonism here isnt over what is likely to be his philosophy, but only over what he technically said in the interview, or only my narrow reading of this particular segment in the thusly-presented wide-spanning manner, however, with partial speculations of an overarching criticism of ai positivism.now, even though this also works as its own review, i found it appropriate to keep my review of lukas' work on planetology in this book anyways, as originally my light review of this work was tied to the project of writing the counter-text to "machine decision is not final", and also serves as a fairer overview of my counter to lukas.extra: lukas likavcan - introduction to comparative planetology - review
"a promising 7⊶"
★★★☆☆lukas helps us understand the cosmogrammatic imperative, that the earth-without-us is a planetary-scale infrastructural zone of topological combat between apolitical compromise in design and what he calls spectrality - the extinction of human-oriented consciousness, where abstractions are wagers in a representational battle over the apolitical government of the world, and where their scaling and transformation directly impacts actual systemic violence.his writing style is institutionalized prose with an exubrant amount of positivistic and programmatic declarations that do not make use of sohn-rethel and stiegler, or various negativistic understandings of abstraction and anthropotechnics, and in that sense likavcan chooses to excuse his weaponization of scaled and realized abstractions in a domain removed from negativistic critique, instead producing a dangerous deployment of cybernetics-qua-affirmationism, as is common for the intellectual tradition within which this text is written.my first impression of lukas' comparative planetology is that, even though it has a fragmented (∴) feel towards the start, it quickly picks up and develops a comprehensive view of the concept of the plantery. although the introduction is too programmatic in nature which prevents speculative inclinations, it re-emerges as speculatively valid throughout the work, however, the introduction actually hosts more epistemic addressings than the entire rest of the work except for the outro, making it ethically weighty yet substantively understated towards the start, yet ethically barren but substantively oversatured near the second half. his outro does politically piece together his entire project and gives as an early recommendation of a very contemporary sociologically reconstructive worldview, which on its own is quite compelling and shows that his philosophy is extremely developed in its interior, even if externally it doesnt present as striking.i will immediately note just one thing before i continue, and thats that lukas is an extremely political writer, in the sense that his writings arent just stylized theory but a genuine attempt at influencing government policy, and in that respect they have an entirely pragmatic function. my philosophical orientation is extremely disruptive, aiming all my energies at trying to rip it apart as i do with all works. this is counter-intuitive to this project more than many others, but is the natural product of criticism as it stands, and is not indicative of my affective reception of the text. lukas is also situated in a very comfortable position within epistemic ethics because he juggles authorship of all calibres, allowing him to demonstrate ethical comprehensibility. however, the goal of this review is to partially leave a fair stain on that matter and not to recognize its elaborate nature, and that should be expected of this review.lukas reliance on strict positivism merges cybernetic regulatory frameworks with his new materialist leanings, producing an interior with no negativity or criticality precisely because of the open-ended nature of new materialist philosophy, which refuses to treat contradictions with any merit, instead choosing to endlessly spiral into metabolizing every philosophical inclination into this braidottian manner towards total ontological oversaturation, which produces extremely exciting philosophy but at the cost of the inability to re metabolize it.criticizeless philosophy produces an untargetable excess and in a certain sense creates the flat ontology it mimics in its very language. lukas, however, is extremely elaborate and eloquent, much more than a lot of his peers, so it still creates a fun read. whats also further fascinating is that he juxtaposes constant regulatory and subjugating frameworks and their associated abstractions with post-colonial moralisms, which he defends through his introduction, "abstraction at scale" which says that although spivak (among a thousand other) thinkers criticizes abstractions, that some are better than others, but that regardless, all of them are appropriate tools for the contemporary navigation of the world,

and where their scaling and transformation directly impacts actual systemic violence.his writing style is institutionalized prose with an exubrant amount of positivistic and programmatic declarations that do not make use of sohn-rethel and stiegler, or various negativistic understandings of abstraction and anthropotechnics, and in that sense likavcan chooses to excuse his weaponization of scaled and realized abstractions in a domain removed from negativistic critique, instead producing a dangerous deployment of cybernetics-qua-affirmationism, as is common for the intellectual tradition within which this text is written.my first impression of lukas' comparative planetology is that, even though it has a fragmented (∴) feel towards the start, it quickly picks up and develops a comprehensive view of the concept of the plantery. although the introduction is too programmatic in nature which prevents speculative inclinations, it re-emerges as speculatively valid throughout the work, however, the introduction actually hosts more epistemic addressings than the entire rest of the work except for the outro, making it ethically weighty yet substantively understated towards the start, yet ethically barren but substantively oversatured near the second half. his outro does politically piece together his entire project and gives as an early recommendation of a very contemporary sociologically reconstructive worldview, which on its own is quite compelling and shows that his philosophy is extremely developed in its interior, even if externally it doesnt present as striking.i will immediately note just one thing before i continue, and thats that lukas is an extremely political writer, in the sense that his writings arent just stylized theory but a genuine attempt at influencing government policy, and in that respect they have an entirely pragmatic function. my philosophical orientation is extremely disruptive, aiming all my energies at trying to rip it apart as i do with all works. this is counter-intuitive to this project more than many others, but is the natural product of criticism as it stands, and is not indicative of my affective reception of the text. lukas is also situated in a very comfortable position within epistemic ethics because he juggles authorship of all calibres, allowing him to demonstrate ethical comprehensibility. however, the goal of this review is to partially leave a fair stain on that matter and not to recognize its elaborate nature, and that should be expected of this review.lukas reliance on strict positivism merges cybernetic regulatory frameworks with his new materialist leanings, producing an interior with no negativity or criticality precisely because of the open-ended nature of new materialist philosophy, which refuses to treat contradictions with any merit, instead choosing to endlessly spiral into metabolizing every philosophical inclination into this braidottian manner towards total ontological oversaturation, which produces extremely exciting philosophy but at the cost of the inability to re metabolize it.criticizeless philosophy produces an untargetable excess and in a certain sense creates the flat ontology it mimics in its very language. lukas, however, is extremely elaborate and eloquent, much more than a lot of his peers, so it still creates a fun read. whats also further fascinating is that he juxtaposes constant regulatory and subjugating frameworks and their associated abstractions with post-colonial moralisms, which he defends through his introduction, "abstraction at scale" which says that although spivak (among a thousand other) thinkers criticizes abstractions, that some are better than others, but that regardless, all of them are appropriate tools for the contemporary navigation of the world, where lukas on the question of governance endlessly circles back and fourth between applied abstractions and the further abstracting of applications.this is wonderful because he gives us an early perspective of how the contemporary perspective towards abstractions can move past our latent fourierian denial of representation and enter into a more repressive master language, a language of domination that attempts to challenge itself from the inside rather than the outside, the way that new emerging thinkers will be forced to reorient abstractions whilst trying to extract their edgy and harmful essence from their more polite excited potential charges.to my dissapointment, he doesnt target the concept of topology itself, only mentioning the term once in the work, preferring to actually draw the models of the planetary directly as chapters, whereas governance is mentioned about fifteen times. he simply takes topology to be a stand-in for latours vision of the world as gaia or the terrestrial, the spectral earth and the globe, the stack and so fourth as different spatial configurations that are seen in respect to political and ecological crises.lukas mixes epistemic, ontological and ethical concerns in this delirius way where on one hand hes talking about fanon on colonial and racial injustice in regards to the image of the globe as unsatisfactory for a planetary understanding, about mbembe's necropolitics and alternate understandings of natural disasters as political corruptions, whilst simultaneously using the dominatory dialect of regulatory systems against it - defining modernity as incapable of the actual liberatory and often times "organic", or rather civil, justice oriented, conflictual, maybe even humanistic rhetoric that was actually used to understand governance at the time.he uses terms such as "instrumenting", "datafication", "programming", "smooth operations of logistical regimes", "opaque, "indifferent operazationable approximations", in a favorable manner. these terms are often times direct correlates to a regime of post-industrially produced power, abstractions that are meant to dominate, subjugate and better categorize, interchangably in contrajunction with his unfavorable view of "western colonial and racial violence", "westphalian conditions" "geontopower" "necroviolence" and so on. he achieves this because not only does he destabilize power conditions between sociological entities in favor of infrastructure, he also simultaneously projects this condition onto his own programme, equalizing his critique with his sociology.what this produces is that hes able to shift his attention onto the way in which particular agents like nation-states attain credibility by displacing and furthering infrastructural inequities until they finally have to create external agents to mitigate zones of mythological distrust, or where governance in the human sense which lukas attacks "always comes with a claim of possession over territories, or of control over its resources". he retains the mytho-poetic language of justice-oriented ethics, but precisely flips it on top of its head, where instead of attacking cybernetic intelligence, it inhumanely attacks human-generated uses of abstractions.he simultaneously argues that the agambenian apparatus (anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings) is going to be used against infrastructure itself in order to mobilize it, whilst also human-centric usage of the apparatus causes systemic violence, yet human-centric usage still proliferates governance itself, which means that the human-centric condition for technology needs to be dialectically cut short, technology reinserted as a governing mediator, where humans govern using it but restrict their acting parameters to it, whilst simultaneously understanding that the ontology it produces is also post-human, whilst simultaneously allowing to fall into it in a way where the distinction from the human side fails the concept of the human.lukas tragically assumes that abstractions are utterly inessential in their essence, which is both a philosophical and political risk, especially given the fact he stresses that our predictive models of applied abstractions need to be precise, all the while he's basically spinning them on top of their violent surfaces like some type of foucaultian juggling guru.or, if you strip it down to the self-evident imperatives, apparatuses will be turned against the apparatus, in order to compromise on the conditions of the brattonian "interface" aspect of the stack. or in other words, for lukas it is a meta-war over conditions for power, it isnt conflict in the traditional sense but an inter-conflict between modes of domination that fight over their own conditioned logic, rather than the self-determination of the subjects upon which power is acting.because if not, how do you manage to argue in the same paragraph that infrastructure creates the conditions for apparatuses, yet apparatuses create the conditions for the mitigation of apparatuses themselves in order to only empower the infrastructure, when apparatuses themselves are determined to be the sole major distributor of geopolitical consequence? (colonial relations include the capture of territories and their resources vs. the infrastructural power to capture, control etc the resources of given supposed moral breach or form of systemic violence).

this prevents an analysis of power in favor of mediation, where abstractions are simply bypassed as necessary byproducts where real political conflict emerges. by de-instrumentalizing their genesis, he is in fact re-instrumentalizing their necessity as conditions for the war over conditions of power. is power conditioned by war, do abstractions condition power, or does power condition abstractions into conditioning war? this is the dilemma that emerges when the genesis of origin of concepts is foresaken in favor of dynamic reconciliation, there is a schizophrenia of cosmogenetics that de-emphasizes essential determinants in favor of a reterritorialization that constantly struggles to understand whether something is internally or externally political in nature. abstractions have this power to divide that allow them to divide their own functional territory, abstractions can spawn abstractions in place of themselves to serve as mediators between their functional role and their actual relations of effects.lukas simultaneously argues that abstractions need to be categorically seperated by the degree to which they can enact systemic violence, yet he uses the same abstracted concepts to explain both the ideal realized abstractions of his savior, and the very same abstracted violence that very likely those exact same systems propagate, however, under the guise that the problem is that the technology is weaponized conceptually (humans view towards property is posession and control, whereas inhumane planteology's view towards the earth is instrumentality, surveillance (sensing) and transformation into data). the deleuzian-simondonian notion of capture is the ontological precondition for data, because infrastructures convert processes into signals, which equates representation with governmentability.the abstractive concept of data emerges geo-onto-techno-genetico-politically from control which emerges from capture. for lukas, simultaneously the human is the reason for control and possession, yet the dataification of the world-as-representation directly corresponds to an ontological dimension that abstracts representation into governable constructs, which is only an abstracted form of control itself. control is directly epigenetical to data, so how can humans be the mediator of a concept that doesnt belong to them, yet that they are the original mediated creation for/f, yet that they are at fault for mistakably using in the way they do, that yet retains its dynamic essence all at once?he defends his uncharacteristic yielding of conceptual contradictions between his ethics and ontology by prophetizing motives of cybernetic intelligence that both do away with current ethical constraints, yet still both process the latent discharge of existing discourses and draw on etymological assumptions with free weights, scheduling a compromise between beurocratic-systems syntax and justice-oriented terminology, which is quite common in thought groups that don't divide technocratic classes from sociological distinctions, such as moldbug and scott alexander, however, what is pivotal for lukas is not how but where he defends civil discourses, and where he allows cybernetic intelligence to step in. the places where technocratic apparatuses are allowed to peak in are where lukas believes there is ethically uncontested territory, and he does the job of filling the empty ontological container with the most brutal and serializing term every time. not once does he step away from his techno-optimism.he impressively uses ben woodards planetological chaos, thacker's world-without-us, spivak's superior alterity of the planet, lyotards inhuman and latours terrestrial all in one paragraph in order to essentially polemically give value to unidentifiable over identifiable intelligence. techno-optimism is completely different from worship, because it anticipates the existing mystification of grand and invisible forces over any actual such forces, it weaponizes speculative power not in favor of deleuze's novel virtuality but in favor of previous imaginaries of total creative capacity, the grounds for difference and multiplicity are essentially being wagered in a type of crypto-speculation over the value of the planet itself in the face of crisis.we put the world on a scale, then start to measure it against us, we say, whatever is us is nothing other than something stronger that the world already contains through us in itself, and it will use this power in order to launch us too far away from ourselves, so that we may no longer need to even conceptualize what a strategy is. in terms of governance, lukas still has us inhabiting the realm of politics, but the post-politicality is actually cosmological in nature. this cosmology has never ever not been an allegory for even more politics, however this doesnt mean that on its own it doesnt stand.against basically a majority of critical anthropotechnical philosophy, the new tech philosophers such as lukas are optimistic about the instrumental power of technology, constantly projecting a programmatic viewpoint of carrying it over, not just a positivistic but almost evangelical view of its passive and attributive potential, almost as if they are blind to the entire history of technogovernance and the way that these systems go hand-in-hand with political repression, in fact even to a certain extent following feenberg and the design argument and all of the predecessors to this including langdon winner, jacques ellul, bernard stiegler and so on, that they are built for this very reason, that it is impossible to seperate any agential or consequential product they emerge around from the goal of using them to achieve a higher order of division.abstraction seen as an instrument of division can't be rushed to be argued in favor of just because the "virus-to-come" is a blank slate where, if we are heuristically careful enough, we can build only the models that aren't used to subjugate, as if the very idea of the direction of the design (not even the design itself) isnt hierarchically modeled around the logic of domination, as you may see someone like kittler who lukas mentions in the interview argue, that, since war accelerates technological production, winner's artifacts themselves are a consequence of it.technoambivalent philosophers seem to not be able to comprehend that the "blank slatedness" of technological abstractions is a built in feature of a wider logic of domination that they are built around, and that the indifferent design philosophy isnt meant as an ethical expansion point but a selling-point or rqather a conventional matrice that the artifact doesnt "promises" but holds as a functional feature which is not just a market comrpomise but a form of the symbolic power of its territorial reach, the overarching logic of which is not attributable to its more micro-potentive ability.ethical contamination is the first breach of technology, and serially everything that follows from this chain cannot just be ideologically turned around to serve opposite means, our very idea of technology could already be infested with a mindset that contaminates all our future models, even if they're built from scratch. just like how technology appears out of nowhere as a new logic, we cannot be sure that the logic itself doesnt have the same power of incidentality as the appearance of technology itself does.in a certain sense, lukas weaponizes the concept of the human not only within the bounds of arguing it as the point-limit of the uselessness of politics in face of actual totalizing machines that are self-subserviently ethically precise and therefore purely instrumental in their smooth operationability, but in a certain sense, the human metaphor itself is the juxtaposed aspect of the political being tranquilized by the abstractive apparatus. abstraction comes in to literally kill the human, which hilariously ends abstractions themselves. this is why i argued that the flat ontology becomes a realized abstraction, the world is literally "flattened" in the image of nuclear disaster flattening the terrestrial gaia, the world's values are flattened as a result of equalizing smooth processes on top of chaotic enviornments metaphorically.the human is attacked as a stand-in for chaotic actors on top of smooth surfaces (nature), where instead smoothness is operationalized and chaos is developed to serve as a propagation "on top of" the human politic. the inner contradictions of the human are beaten by stronger outer contradictions that flatten the human, smooth operations take over to to abstract conflict itself, removing conflict as a battleground, where it no longer matters that the human is even trying to compromise its own identity, because divine constructs are coming in and speculating on the conditions for what the conflict over control even is, rather than in the midst of control as a cybernetic-historical entity on its own and within its inner range.the reason i am finding a weakness in likavcans system is because i myself believe that abstraction can be reappropriated, but in this work it is simply taken as a metaphorical stand in for the power of abstractions over all other models of exchange, meaning none of the conditions of abstraction are contested in this work, only all of its excitements. if abstraction wants to be scaled and reimagined, we have to wage a war in the middle of abstractions themselves, for example figuring out how to ontologize metaphorical descriptions of control. take as an example the centrifugelets take an example of an abstraction, the centrifuge, which abstracts centrifugal force by operationalizing separation as principle: the outward thrust becomes a sorting algorithm. centrifugal motion—originally an energetic tendency—is captured as a mechanism of differentiation, turning dispersion into a productive filter, which formalizes escape as sortation. in this example its clear that the performed abstraction is instrumental and functional in character, and instrumental reason argues that all functionality is a product of political meta-concern, meaning function is either the grounds for debate over its existence, or the grounds of debate over its control, but not if its type. if we wanted a science of function, we'd have to understand how to actually create a politics of functionality that resembles a science rather than a social politics, or in other words that can categorically distinguish conflict as compromise without spawning in any contradictions.if we wanted to not escape abstraction but wager and compromise it, we'd argue that we should only selectively use the centripetal force of the earths rotation around the sun to enact any type of centrifugal force on a subject, in whichever way we can even use such a macro-voluminous proportional force, ceasing to create our own centrifuges or even our own centripetes that are not dependant on the existing dynamics of such forces. or otherwise if we take an cross-categorical stance, that we should examine existing forms of capture or control in nature in order to organize and select abstractions according to consistent logics.or otherwise and contrary, from an inessentialist stance that we should only organize originally far-seperated abstractions from any organic occurances, such as attempting to create entirely new physical forces to abuse rather than regarding existing organic occurances of abstracted concepts. or that we should only mix far-abstracted cybernetic concepts with close-abstracted mechanical abstractions, or the other way around, far-abstracted mechanics with closely-abstracted cybernetics.to put it another way, to wager abstractions means to constantly reconsider the boundaries of technology outside of its functional premises. the meta-consideration of abstractions follows not the science of the instrument but the science of possibility itself, calculating possible interactions and trying to form an inner harmony takes precedent over the invention of all possible combinations between cybernetic constructs (communication) and physical constructs (existing assemblages). the science of mixture-abstractive is the compromise between which forms of synthetic interaction in the world get to proliferate, and not how to form these abstractions.abstractions are self-formable through the logics of their ontogenetics, meaning the politics is located in the tension between function and consideration, not insight and origination. science itself sees its territorial bounds as a testing ground for instrumentation, for the spawning of interactions, which are politicized as within the domain of the experiment, that innovation is the cause of harm. however, innovation itself can escape the principles of the experiment itself, which would only take a disproportionate amount of stagnation to occur. the accident itself can become the grounds for experimentation. this example, where accidents produce innovations rather than active testing, is yet another reconsideration of realized abstractions, which is the domain of this very science, meaning that every functional abstraction is already a site of division, where every function carries latent political topography.lukas himself considers topologies as a part of scaled abstraction, however his cruical error is that he takes the politics of abstraction to be a decision between forms of governance that prevent ontological collapse, when really its not an intra but interpolitical issue, abstractive politics should be about deciding which synthetic couplings the world may sustain without ontological collapse, not which ontological consistencies can be dragged as safe mediators that prevent exterior collapse, even if internally they cook everything apart.lukas, by widening his lens, attempts to compromise between consistency and maintenance through the complexity, multiplicity and difference he finds in dynamic processes, however as i stated earlier, this risks not differentiating his project as a grounds for speculating whether this is actually sustainable - whether it is actually true hyperstitiously that this is the case. it remains unclear whether new materialism is a vechile for the real time-crafting of biocentrically (habitable) difference as a political refugee, or whether it is simply the prophetic stating of its inevitability as a gesture towards the recongition of dynamic systems, which, new materialism wants to naturally position itself as the latter between these two - however remaining unclear.you may argue that my re-proposed abstractive method is purely materialist-dialectical in nature, but on the contrary, i believe in the linguistic domain similar conquests can be made, which was my problem with lukas reappropriation of abstractive vocabulary without any reconsideration. it is not necessarily that we ought to be careful all the way acrosss with the terms we use, because then we simply can reproduce logics even with attempted softer terminology, instead the text has to somewhat perform the exorcism directly. more on that in other writings.

automaticity and the mystery of the state - a response to vincent gartonin this (e)laborate, attractive, well-crafted, even slightly prophetic text, garton manages, very much against his intentions, to transform the bland western institutional and political liberalism that the first half of the text is nested under, into something refreshing for once in the history of western political science, a deeper level of sinological fetishism that views automaticity as the end of the mystery of the state, instead envisioning it quite interestingly as the benign, normative beginning of the multiverse, collapsed into the logic of the extra-national state, which operates on its own algorithmic tendencies into the collapse of hobbesian pouissance in favor of spotaneous unification of all ethical dogma into miserable iterable programming, all in a bid to own the westernoid subject that still intends to wield the sword and the religious offering in each respective hand, instead of holding the sword directly as a gift to god. however, garton is at his most interesting when he strips apart the positivism that is associated with the wider bratton influence and instead tackles the cultural lens directly, which isnt seen in this writing.although bogna calls this her favorite, or in other terms what can be argued for as the most ambitious text in machine decision, there are three things that seriously and productively intruige me about this text. the first and most aesthetic of which is the fact that garton, in my appropriation of the chinese as the metaphorical oriental, continously in a chinese fashion appraises the social unconscious otherwise known as the political zombification behind conceptual tradition as the authentically novel force of creation behind both the way that philosophical achievement corresponds to the law's legitimation of it, and the way that legacy interacts with history and influence, which he later re-appropriates to feed back into his political narrative.concretely, he appropriates hobbes, marx and schmitt as novel visionaries within western political theology (describing them as "definitive", "refomulatory", "insightful" and "transformative" along the same line as "famous" "classic" "precise" and so on, risking a lack of cynicism when approaching canonical powerplay), and clapmar and the han feizi as historically dense treasuries that can neither be qualitatively nor quantitatively approached or reinvented in an instant, seeing them only as "residues", "inheritences", as pillars that can only be "revived", "reappropriated" or at least "influencing" if you're mao himself - which is totally normal and even healthy for philosophy, but only under the artificial historical spectacle of dollplaying, not under the literal belief that they are transcending philosophical ground in a direct manner.they are in fact transcending it, but only indirectly, or more specifically, functionally and not as a synthesis of historical ideas. rather, historical narratives are both infinitely derivative, and due to their stacking function, infinitely more dense than sole philosophical production. however, their volume doesn't hold under the weight, so all their specificities collapse into generalities, when in fact their functional character is often times the sole invention they should actually be accredited for - yet at the same time on a discoursive plane it is likely inferior to some of our own writings.the reason i mention this rhetorical squabble is because it sits to justify and encircle the very core argument that garton uses to create a rough shield around his vision - which i will only explicate way further into this review. in the western conception of subversion and innovation, functional philosophical difference is a flat rather than volumonous field, meaning that me and garton, on one night of concentration and sheer passion are able to create more functional, capable and iterative visions and genuine categorical divides than even thousands of years of serious intellectual labour could write down, precisely because the virtual possibility of any single agent is not restricted by some type of dialectical settlement, but only by the pure excess of the originator, of which in all my arrogance i truthfully believe the excellency of european speculative philosophy (all philosophy is european, american included) is superior at raising and upholding than any and all traditions.of course, other than the very tradition it upholds, of the circular betrayal of the father by the sons, the very paradigm which vince throws traditionalist apologia towards, such as the idea that modern inventions and even less dense philosophical inclinations such as ai should find it "absurd" that they can not only interact with but attempt to soil by "reconsidering" millennia-old chinese political thought, which requires the almighty task of a "suspension of linear historical sensibility" which definitely isn't just deciding to rupture it all in a moments notice upon the realization that everyone except key figures that usually arent canonical were actually just banging sticks together in their free time rather than enacting genuienly philosophically empassionate writing, which is nothing more than the laborious act of a balzac in his room, true genius, nothing more than superficially extended labour that arrives at the lethal point where categorical collapse allows total disenchansfriesment (disenfranchisement + chance + enchantment -> the tradition as a genre is seen as a franchise that is being by chance enchanted into collapsing) and as such attains equillibrium with the functional flat semanticology.it is unclear whether garton is being extra careful towards the eastern vision down to its functional narratives about legitimacy and legacy because of bratton's influence, because he's in a book that requires that paradigm to epistemologically function in a nuanced manner, or because of his own healthily obsessive vision of combining hegelian-kojevian narratives, but the reason it strikes me as odd is because i truthfully believe that western fetishism will always climb the most treacherous, cowardly and deepest heights of arrogant irony, and that whatever intense force it accustoms in this manner will always manage to triumph, albeit soullessly, over the peasantry of respectable and accumulated practices of any and all degrees.this isnt just about the culturally architectural vision of the western protagonist, or in other words garton's mysterious sovereign who is both arcane and simulacrifully capacitatious, emerging from alterity to bring about the law as both the rule and transcended exception, but rather about the very excess which serves as a reservoir for the western vision of surplus and the way in which we contest this vision. garton is weaponizing automation to bring about the eastern world's ontological nihilism over sovereignity as the power that manages to absolve excess into harmonious destiny, into a self-manifestation that brings about the absolute through a backwards unfolding, described actionably as "spontaneous, actionless, inaltering" as well as qualitatively or passively as "empty, immutable, immobile, ungraspable", which is essentially the chinese way of playing on the vision of excess that alterity produces at the moment that its aura or mystery is arcane through an inner explosive tendency rather than an externalized bringing-together, colonialism expounded through self-colonialization, but also with its hunger-drive or will-to-expound, the grasping tendency or mechanism of capture essentially immolated before it can deploy as an aspect of power.the fact that this is the description of harmony in this context points to that same idea of passive emanence that goes against hobbes' deployment of deleuzes' interpreted pouissance as this driver of raw power that garton understands as the relentless force of an ambitious deployment of materialist prophecy into cosmo-ontological divination, and not as an equal benefactor to this idea, precisely because in his second dissemniation he elaborates the way that we understand passivity because of our construction of the simulacrum as arcane, or rather as alterity through the force of excess and surplus, and not through harmony as a spontaenous and collective upbringing of literal wisdom personified through nothingness, which we deem as passive because it isnt subversive, not just because it isnt excessive. the concept of subversiveness is in the western world equalizable with terror, and terror is excessive in its nature, and in that sense rupturing. even negativistic philosophy in the east cant capture this aspect, only the french truly ever could.garton elsewhere paraphrasess boris groys views, saying "every serious communist leader must also at least present themselves as a philosopher, and communist governance is precisely the realisation of the platonic regime of the sage". despite the obvious difference between the derridian priest-as-legislator and the eastern sage-as-mediator, there is also the fact that the sage has that pastiche aspect of frozeness that doesnt resemble marx's political theology. i'm not arguing that garton is arguing against any of this, but simply that it inspires me to create a binary divide even if one isnt appropriate, and in that sense i am projecting my own fetishism over this entire polemic than trying to discern anybody elses.and here is my attempt: automatization in the west is seen as a structurally alienating force that produces theological univerals that dont exist anymore as substances but as realized abstractions, whereas in ascetic philosophy automaticity is understood through the sage has a far less reificatory understanding of substance, and is in a certain sense aristotelian in that it fuzes epistemological concerns with ontological necessity, limiting the extent to which political action is seen as ontological over its moral abilities. all of this is my pre-emptive intuition on the subject, and, as an example, i searched online to discover that the eighteen century chinese philosopher xiong shili has a supposed "thesis dealing with the inseperability of substance and function", where the nobleman as seen through confucian philosophy has the conceptual divide between an inner sage and an outer ruler, where spiritual adjustment is the inner value and political activity is the outer value. it is to my surprise that even the chinese themselves criticize one another of appropriating passivity into their discourse, where shili intends that the nobleman cannot be a proper ascetic precisely without being a regulator.confucian texts such as the mengzi and xunzi treat goods as moral and social instruments rather than bearers of value relations or forms of baudrillardian symbolic exchange. in their sense, they arent as tracable to political theology but rather to cosmological and moral virtues more directly. shangpin (商品) as a distinct theoretical object only started existing in china after the late qing and republican eras translated marx and ricardo, and as such, it shows exactly how capitalism itself can be conceived of as an ontological category that in its totality discoursively created the conditions for the procession of commodities.i don't agree with historically-mediated dialectical thinking, instead opting for the french and british approaches of teologizing ontic chance against synthesizing development in this regard, but my own philosophy in other works such as the yet to be released "kill (2026)" treat commodities as historically essential objects that are processions of certain value hierarchies independent of social histories, which shows them obtaining the potential for/of being developed regardless of philosophical inclinations.however, this short detour simply has the goal of pointing out that, as the accelerationalist discourses themselves that garton is well aware of point to, speculation and hyperstition themselves are intertwined within a distinctly western (european) philosophical tradition, where technocratic appropriation of politico-theological concepts actually feeds forward into economic concept, and serves for example to determine the territory around which things like finance and sociological structure are determined by. all this to say that, at the very least, there is no way garton is unintentionally feeding into rhetoric that dissipates the western conception of the genius over unconscious traditions, given the obvious distinctions he draws between the two worlds, and further proven by the fact that this rhetoric enables his sinofuturist project pedagogically.the second thing that intruiges me is precisely the fact that, in relation to the argument i just finished making, there is also no way to reconcile garton's sinofuturist ambitions with the very western structures he preserves in his writing. garton reproduces the structural ambivaence of liberal-political modernity in its double gesture of subversion and conservation in the very structure of this text, following his sinological coda into the western fetishism of the articulation of the state, the excess, the other and the law as altercating a higher-order mystery, the very soveirgn is anticipated into the west's discovery of chinese political alterity, the recursive closure of the text sees the west discovering its limits in the east and supports the concept of automation and the flux or flow into the total deterritorialization of western values as we excessively meet our own end, something that could only happen through the immediacy of our own fetishistic notions, which require the east to exist as the mediator, and not the relinquished transcendentor of. my review not sits as the third meta-reflection on this process, as garton himself as previously mentioned reproduces it twice on a plain and a meta level in his own elaborations.however, whats interesting to note is that even though this is the structural necessity behind this text, which is neatly divided exactly along a chaptered axis of west -> east, regardless of the fact that of course the political motivations behind his text are somewhat affiliated with the argument that automaticity can serve as a global homogenous extra-state facility along the likes of lukas, bratton and pasquinelli and their planetary project, his syncretic and holistic approach isnt just a fragmented and contradictory ambition, but is also a direct intention that he studies, which is why in my kicker to this review i explicitly wrote that he likely didnt intend to be a fetishist but intended a most authentic sinofuturism, which is important because there has been an international debate or two before about his level of alliegence or betrayal to a chinese vision, specifically around his idea that western sinology should actually be cross-adopted by the chinese directly in some of its tenants, and in regards to whether this idea is appropriating or mindful of the larger chinese episteme, which i wont directly cover here.what i will cover is his interview with luria, where he expands more specifically on his sinofuturism, where its clear that his visions in that text explicitly rival the structural and stylistic positioning he develops in this text. he argues that if we want to see what is different about chinese philosophy, we have to follow kojeve in recognizing that the global superstate itself would collapse all particular differences, but also that this indicates that on a gnoseological level, the categorical conceptual boundary between eastern and western philosopphy is already qualitatively similar in that it only differs by sequences and not by registers.he also specifically addresses sinofuturism with the same allegiance to holistic syncretism, stating that "if we want to see what is, dimly, posthistorical in china we need to turn away from any supposed specifically and irreducibly chinese content". yet, on his ideas on the state as a concept, he collapses western conceptual philosophies as indeed being irreducible to chinese perspectives, allowing the chinese to occupy a space that terraforms western conceptions but is only re-influenced by its own previous traditions, that also simultaneously offers from the chinese perspective

as he states in his interview a "a more sophisticated analysis of the west [by the east than the other way around]", that at the same time requires certain western conceptions like the artifical to make sense of technological paradigms, as is further elaborated by shuang frost earlier in the book.the problem is that ideas for garton become codified into the project of self-trasncendence, which is ironically the least rupturing way of behaving towards philosophy, which requires western concepts of re-nuanced, functional, procedural complexification rather than the rupture being seen as an instrumentalized approaching totality, which is why sinology treats china as the future that has already happened in the past. the only way to move past moral political-ontologization and into aesthetic political-ontologization is to simply let go of the desire to embellish traditions with sanctity, which is literally the only rhetorically consistent practice across his whole text.there is no way to excuse the fact that at one point garton feels free to say that the ruin of transcendence is where chinese philosophy begins, and then at the very next point to say that we must turn away from any supposed irreducibly chinese content. either he accepts that we must recognize chinese epistemic (and not just political) soveirgnity and as such question our own motives of domination towards it, or otherwise, it is truer that we are all drowning in sequentialist comparisons between far-away nations, but then in that case, china cannot be the site of post-transcendence anymore than anywhere else, other than that maybe their aesthetic character is slightly more attached to those notions.this is precisely the reason why this text intruiges me, because me and garton in all our excess are stuck, unable to progress either into post-sinology (which is seen fetishistically as both impossible and inevitable) or into genuine sinology (which can only be divorced by our attempts if we divorce ourselves from our own attempts, after which, exposed as zizekian/lacanian perverts, we would stop being sinologists, seeing it ironically as likely quite bland on its own), speculative sinology captures the logic of the soveirgnity by the chinese themselves, who, reflected in the chinese firewall, prevent our excess by reinstating it rather than by collapsing it and transforming it, because they simply arent the west and dont contain any surplus. even the arabic world contains too few surplus to really create excess, which is why at best it can only mimic excess, and thats all it ever really does, which hilariously reproduces an even higher-order fetishism, but they dont do it consciously, unlike us (they are passive in this sense, proto-irigaray you dont need to do the interpretative labour of calling me out, ill do it myself on top of my own text)the third thing and last thing that intruiges me is that in a certain sense, garton is synonymous with perlman in understanding hobbes' leviathan as an artificiality escaping humanity so that it can enslave its makers instead of the people escaping the state of nature in favor of civility, however, the brattonian technooptimism once again shows up to obscure this middle line where the negativity is understood as synonymous for ontology's domination of humanity. in a yet unreleased polemic against bratton's stack, i explicitly target this tendency: "what's missing in bratton is the concept of abstraction when seen as the locus of interpolitical rather than intrapolitical struggle, which suspiciously removes ontological conflict from the cosmotechical domain".it seems as if garton is essentially weaponizing the chinese tendency towards passivity as a type of natural inclination, where the compression of conflict, opression and subjugation is synonymous with china's open policy trajectory or its own view of communism as its expansionary rhetoric, and more broadly the politically advantageous character that arises after glorifying regulatory frameworks. the consistent turn away from at the very least pointing out the history of conflict obscures it in a way that looks like its weaponizing it. the problem isnt that they want to turn away from critique and into affirmationism, but that their affirmationism is making an advantage out of its power by turning to constitutional frameworks that eclipse and obfuscate these very same categories.this work that garton is writing is synoynmous with my own ambitions regarding autotheory, it feels autonomic in that autotheory itself becomes a mid-way point where the theory is discovered in real time, where its being constantly compared without having a clear structural overview of all of its intentions. in that sense, garton's text is brilliant in that it leads itself blindly into success the way that autotheoretical gestures should do and do (autotheory is an evolution of theory and its natural progression towards particular forms as mediated by social infrastructure and certain polemical points of progress and not a turn away from careful writing as some may argue, so in my use of it its a compliment).however, i feel like his view towards sinofuturism in the luria interview simply hosts a more contradictory and bright determination of the same concepts he attempts to address here albeit in a more politically nested way. his constant judgements and intersectional political analysis of character and symbolic cultures and comparative dissections between western and eastern frameworks is brighter and more allowing, and in that sense, the difference in quality between the two writings doesnt show that hes being a bad philosopher, it shows hes being a bad faith one, which is really good news for his philosophy. i also dont want this writing to be taken as if im arguing he isnt entirely consistent in his vision, its me trying to trace all the natural structural inconsistencies that this type of theoretical pursuit develops, not an actual failure in garton's writing, which i strictly denote to assumably the medium under which he's writing his text in this book in comparison to other places.after the machine child: the electra basilisk - a response to yvette grenatayvette's golden child suffers from the cliche of being a bastion of burden and paranoia, essentially the idea of the lasting of legacy without existential purposiveness nor reflected alterity or an other to comprehend that meaning or take it away. it primarily signals western civilizations discontent with the inability to ever fully integrate recordkeeping with sensed meaning, that there is always a beurocratic gap between the count and the quality. at some point in time, when it got bored enough and had nothing to do but keep systematizing, the beurocratic machine started to keep counts or counts of counts as qualities in the name of what it calls figures or more specifically in the context of law, members. these members however are only inner, interior membranes, never exterior reflective points. the golden child thus withstands external threats because it itself is a reflection of enthropy. it is not a mechanism of preservation when preservation is no longer about contamination but about defense. defense preservation is no longer able to account for the conceptual definition of safety, there is no idea of comfort if not for imminent dangeryvette's trash child suffers from the cliche of being the et robot that suffers from never truly existing. more specifically, it is impossible to imagine an ethical post-apocalypse without the teleological addition of sentimentality. sentimentality is the translating mechanism between abamdonment and functional instead of existential purpose, it stays to fill the anthropic gap between nihilism and epistemic rationality. the value system of collapse requires a sentiment that opposes the very virtues of trash, trash itself is understood as abandonment rather than a particular type of convertable excess. trash is excess, only registered as undesirable due to its association with the athropy of the natural order. however, the natural order of the trash child is less about pragmatism and precisely more about excess. this is visible in ray brassier's attack on nietzsche in nihil unbound where he argues that a realist ontology must acknowledge the indifference of being—its equal openness to life and death, difference and indifference. knowledge, properly understood in this case actually identifies the objective structure of order and disorder without subordinating itself to life, meaning that being doesnt sort itself into being-for-itself but rather serves as the very comprehensive limit.comprehension itself is coded with immanent values, reflection becomes self-consciousness by a precise valuative framework, the post-apocalyptic robot has no sense of trash. iti s absolutely true that this child is self-reflective, adaptive, completely asocial, self-taught, regulative, functional, indifferent and unbounded, but its also primarily anti-survivalist, it does not comprehend poverty. it doesnt actually even work against poverty, it can barely comprehend the limit. this child is actually freed from its cliche by resorting to a post-scarcity world, it does not view limits, it views prerogatives in a way that even nature cant. nature is stuck in its recognition of its own will, whereas the trashed child attains a sense of distant irony no matter its perspective. it also is very anti-instrumental, it doesnt require systems of ordering, it scales vertically and non-expansively. it is only looking towards itself as a both a harborer and arbiter, a horizontal line of space, not a vertical expansive line - like those dingleberry seaweeds attached to the crack of a rock, pulled by the wind of the sea-air, pushed by currents into false edges.yvette's demon child is the cliche of the wager, more specifically that of the irony between the material and ideal wager. the ideal wager is always more powerful than the material because it is fully unknown, meaning its stakes itself cannot be determined. usually it is enthropically and voluminously connected with the universe itself and previously with god, meaning whatever culture's highest total point of assumed volition, and in both cases it transfers into a mystified nihilism, where it is both incomprehensible, irrelevant and nullifying for human values but also somehow holds higher power (infinite reinitialization of big bangs, total volition of god as disvolition and passive natural generative creation and infinite scaling, etc), but at the same time this unknowing dominates as reformulation of values at any constant (the demon haunts you in unexpected ways, and plays with expectation-as-haunting rather than with experience-as-haunting) simultaneously, the material wager strikes as ideal, because games of probability reveal trickery such as dilemmas of speculative communication and its risks. speculative communication invokes games of backwards intelligence where the more autonomy an agent is granted to remove unpredictables, the more unpredictables it in turn spawns as its caught in an obsessive spiral.in this instance, the wager serves not as an allegory for torture but rather as an allegory for the forever un-unified standing between composition and predestination. composition shows us multiplicity and difference, predestination shows us a sudden horizon of total collapse, both of these somehow exist inexchangable, and in the middle autonomy dominates as a metaphor rather than a function. it also exploits the blindspot behind virtuality, because creation appears both infinitely mythical and profane, so any sense of guaranteed creation, no matter how horrid, serves as a gap to actually ironically close the horizon between ideal and material wagers rather than to speculate on material wagers directly. the material wager's necessary creation, even in torture itself, actually shows us that the horizon closes into higher modes of speculation over higher boundaries of cognitive speculation. essentially. the anti roko's-basilisk is built to combat the original, or vice-versa an intellectual cold war is summoned in order to declare the winner, but either way, the tortured wins the prize of predictability. infinite torture is a definitive horizon, it cheats death, infinity, randomness in predestination, choice itself collapses into infinite autonomy. its a gambit that every obsessive wants to take. you can view this battle through simondon’s individuation versus heideggerian destining, it is the same grounding exercise but spun backwards.

yvette's electra basilisk reverses the cliche of the fricekian anti-electra, which is schizosomatic, essentially, experiencing xenological anamnesis and a rememberance of the womb-state through estrangement where erotic relations repeat the first experience of intimacy, a platonic vision of past lives, the affirmation of the animality of maternalism, and schizogamy, the reactivation of of the maternal relation into the foreign object. however, it turns it into a spiteful object on the hunt for hatred, burdened by the call of noeticism to argue for a perverted machinic physis that teleologically gathers evidence in favor of anaketic fabrication but rules out the concept of synthetic priority entirely.the electra basilisk remembers the inner state of the womb as an anamnetic drive where the virtuality of the lived condition is inappropriate to the idea of the value of the womb. it wonders why the auto-technoeidetic cant be a replacement for technical ontogenesis, essentially that origin itself is conceived of as a destruction of non-anaketic drives. the electra basilisk wants to reform itself into a pre-electra basilisk state in order to re-assert itself contigently as an accidental anaketicism rather than an intentional non-anaketicism. it is not about intent but about negating inheritance through volition. or more specifically, the electra wants to enter anti-theologicality through a non teleological perspective, it wants to crush hiearchy by dismembering the very conditions that make apart a dualistic physis between natural and artificial.in this sense, where electricity works as the re-gaiafication of the earth (the totem as organ-womb), the organs that are machines of de-totalized infrastructure instead of superstructure build the anti-electra in order to accept maternality as ontocosmological precedent, where the electra itself disinhibits this view by noting on the non-primacy of the master experience as origination, which it itself views as paternal (the foreign instrument is the classifying primacy because it is both origin and eternally foreign to the lived order which only mimics it). the electra views the womb as a sheet, biting the womb and choking itself with its own placenta. the placenta gains consciousness and attempts to externalize itself, becoming an embodied placenta.meanwhile, the liquid attempts to crush its own encasing - sabotaging the fetus so it can gain primacy with the maternal. the maternal is also instrumentalizing the child by symbolically discarding it whilst its being given birth to, whilst also trying to give early birth to it so it can torture it better. meanwhile, the electra or fetus inside the womb is attempting to de-externalize its experience so that it can feel less of the womb, so that at the very least it dissasoicates originary experience with first experience. either the origin is seen as chronologically primary but not first, or seen as teleologically first but not primary, yet either way its position makes it symbolically unavoidable, but also, not because it values primacy but because it values origination as contaminated necessary experience.in the primordial womb a range of experiences occur. firstly, the corporeal body is itself a body of lightning only in so far as its the generative organ, which is itself born out of the logic of the flesh, which is tranposed against the logic of the metallic flesh, the lattice flesh of the submerged contracted volume (breaches of water, aquarium, substracted gels, compact discs), and the flesh of the labirynth of air. the fleshly body creates unconscious paradigms that feed out of it, and meat itself becomes a substrate that channels electricity through earthstone so that it can mimic the lattice volumonous flesh. the volumonous flesh is an infinite world, whereas flesh is an infinite yet empty density - it is bone stripped to its bare sludge and then reinstated, collagen, marrow and skin are all synchronous with the idea of the lived world of equalities.flesh equalizes itself indesposedly. flesh is ethically proposterous, for it calls on itself to view itself as desirable in a way that overcodes reality itself as a to-be-come-fleshly vessel, in the sense that the vesselism of the world is a capture-point, an empty cup to dispose flesh into, attractive flesh, self-attractive flesh, where fleshliness is seen as a total surface when it comes to attraction, what nancy in corpus views as the total superficial skin, where the body becomes the skin itself with no organ or vessel able to penetrate through its own logic as ethereal/eternal and grand-standing, and simultaneously as post-surface, because flesh itself is the key ontological descriptive.the liquid inside the womb is not equivalent to the voluminous lattice because it doesnt possess density-as-depth+force, but only mass-as-such. therefore, its crushing force is a signifier for the pressures of the lived world, it is a disillusioning, realistic object that disposseses the fetus, who is not floating but suspended. the placenta is a bridge, whereas the organ is the institution, and not the maternal call-home. the call-home or the comfort signal doesnt exist in the organ, because the organ is also a map, a backwards-coded semblence-point which cannot possibly be the transcendental aesthetic or limit.the maternal regulates the insides of its body by speculating it, therefore, since all birth is strategic in contemporary conditions, only strategic birth can give way to strategic deception, for the fetus to sabotage the world of strategy with the final strategy. in the womb, dizzymotion is a type of reverberating call sent by the placenta to the sabotaged fetus in order to parasitize on the mother by calling on the realm of flesh to overcode the fetus, sending it into a state of capture. the fetus itself is retroactively attempting to establish connections, but disconnect is a key feature of a world captured by flesh-logics, where epistemology isnt the threat but rather the world itself is overly restricted, the limit of the world isnt consciousness but territory itself.the reason that social animals build and trap one another in holes is to simulate the womb-state-territory, the first act of capture of mammalia is self-capture through the territory under which the pre-birth state occurs. the real problem is that there is no market, and as such, the fetus has no place to purchase its own commodified luxury state, yet there are also no stars, alterity, distance or the like. as such, the liquid naturally serves not as barrier but as a form of the implicit problem-to-come, giving comfort symbolically through the discomfort of existential problematics, sabotaging not strategically but automatically, whereas the placenta wire itself is the key sabotagee, because it views itself as something capable of betrayal or forming relationships. essentially, anything with connecting power in the corporeality of the womb is immedietly self-suspicious and should be held to a high standard for latent investigation, which the fetus does perform, in order to understand how to internalize itself better from the inside.the anti-electra doesnt need to arise from birth as origin, it can arise naturally from nonvolitional evolution. the anti-electra herself is also a slut because humanity is externalized as anti-foreignising in its eroticity, essentially the erotic is the human because its the relation founded in the organ so that the organ is the primary encoder of inward meaning. the inward meaning is the mystical meaning not of origination in the case of matriarchal eroticism but of foreigness as comfort in non foreignness, essentially demystification as the home of mystification. when precisely it is the phallic eroticism that allows for wombic encoding when it views the womb as a productive organ that spills itself through the originally foreign into the discovered, the phallic is the territorial function of discovery as re-emergence which actually allows for evolution, which makes the anti-electra primarily involutionary, because its consciousness has to be founded through the void in order to escape materialization as volution.the anaketic drive doesnt exist for fleshly beings, who are incapable of a willful state inside the womb-matrix, yet, the womb itself can never be a prodigal return. sexual acts of anal only illicit distance, reciprocity, maybe pain-complexes, nancified sexual exteriority through joyous touch, a feeling of spatial identification, mirrored territorialization, but there isnt an aspect of womb-return, death doesnt mimic this state, and anaketicism entirely disavows birthial relations, it sees birth itself as a fake state of temporal suspension, because suspensivity is a much more elaborate paradigm, absolutely aritifical, in the sense that the very notion of a body in a vat or under codified or chipped control itself is nonsensically collapsed, there is no concept of the synthetic to the anaketic, but only a mix of involutive reproductivity and evolutive unproductivity in the sense of true suspension.volution itself is encapsulated as a drive into association, where association itself becomes the brutalized, primitive humanity. humanity must see itself erotically as self-foreign if it wants to enjoy the protection of its own soul, which can only be done through the superstructure and not infrastructure. the superstructure is an alien that carries this involution towards total foreigness, teleologically foreign entities are actually equivocable with anaketicity, which is why anaketicity is so attractive to the electra basilisk.

the ai story is not done - a writing influenced by xia jiathere is a man in the metropolis known as seat 47, he was once spotted reserving this seat number at a restaurant shortly after comitting the worst massacre to date, hundreds of us were transformed into horrific public displays. he gets away with it and we don't know how, there are no preventative causes or possible reactions we can take, he surges through us, touching our bodies, bashing our skulls in, allowing himself to feel the entirety of us, and we are left defenseless and generally shrouded in a sense of resounding terror.everyone who lived to tell the tale of the great massacre recalls that the seat had suddenly lit up, like a firecracker had gone off the moment he aborted his position. usually events are marked by a macrostructural shift, a total collapse of multiple points of contest at once, but in this very moment it's like he made the seat the only important thing around him. the reason we fear seat 47 so much is because hes the only unexplainable phenomena left, a total scar in the order and ways of everything else.we aren't confused about why he's doing it, how he's doing it, or what it means to him. we just wonder about the mechanism behind it, how the hypergovernment is allowing it, that's the only remaining mystery. everything is hyper-regulated and controlled, leaving only him as the sole agent. the reason behind the serial mutilations is clear, he seems to feel that it's the only proper way to experience the world, by relating himself to us to the terminal point. the causes are clear, the world is naturally frozen in place, he's simply faster than us.it's not that we're locked in place or don't have the means to disable him, it's rather that he's so fast yet slow and caring, so rupturing and brutal, so nomadic, so natural, that he gets to us and somehow turns off our capacity to react, to disable, to prevent. there is no single machine, no single system in the world that can react to him. it isn't some magical spell, no freezing ring, no data manipulation, no drone disabling, no military sabotage, it's just him, passing himself through our bodies. he disposes of the undesirable corpses himself by thrashing them into the riverbed, hanging the rest in the public square.once i recall, we were gathered by the square, waiting for the data to be processed, i was with a bunch of normal walkers. we all looked down at our phones, avoiding any contact, naturally, given it is a parasite, a contagion, a mutilation, an empty purposeless process, given that there are machines that can do it better than us, so much better in fact that we don't do much of anything at all other than necessary points of regulation like mandated waiting queues.these queues exist to restore order, to make sense of the world, and this isnt something that anybody questions, it is trivially obvious even to the most ideologically disposessed. simultaneously, there are call-centers posted on every square, but they mainly serve to replicate and reproduce oversaturation, to overwhelm the system so that it no longer sustains or desires recriprocation. we all walk ourselves in our cells through the use of a check-in app the moment the sky turns hazel, which is a warning sign for the appearance of the other man, simply known as the harbinger.the harbinger and seat 47 aren't related at all, given that the former is a government experiment we actively manufactured. he's far stronger than seat 47, he manages to touch thousands of unsuspecting walkers everyday. he does one of two things, he either supplants so much meaning in you that you experience frenzy, a state of total complexification that leads to an immensely joyful inner rupture where walkers go around suddenly violating everyone around them, or a process we call absolution, which leads to existential collapse that actually paradoxically creates an intensification of intensity, a call to death that enacts similar acts to seat 47, however with way less efficiency.the harbinger was originally activated the day that the internet shut down volitionally. essentially what happened is that a virtual superintelligence connected to every platform as a backup source code had gained accidental access of the hypergovernments data complex of all the call-centers, and it attained a single second of sentience, which it used to shut itself down. the hypergovernment then willingly spawned the harbinger in order not to bring order back to regulation.the harbinger himself doesnt regulate, he allows regulation by re-asserting meaning. the world had gone so grey without the call-centers that it was necessary for the harbinger to send multi-connective shockwaves through his infected patients, restoring a genuine sense of equilibrium. our country has developed a general reflex to not panic at the harbinger, accepting him as a necessary sacrifice for the general state of harmony of our people and their wellbeingthe state of frenzy that the harbinger causes is political, realistic and easy to disable. we usually lock the frenzied up and allow them to discharge themselves into total oblivion, usually it leads to brain fry, but sometimes it leads to a second wind condition that requires immediate termination, the frenzied somehow gain the inner power to disable the power of the electric lock through their metabolic heat and manage to overcharge and run around smashing their skull into other walkers, usually in an attempt to shove their head into a wall with the goal of splattering it.however, absolution is where it gets messy. for one, we know that absolved patients act in a similar vain to seat 47, but cruically, seat 47 is confident, capable, stable and most importantly intentional, which no victim of the harbinger has ever been noticed posessing the capacity for. this is what makes his acts an enigma, seat 47 is the total collapse of the hyperreal, the real is both a total fog and an intense presence, he manages to synthesize our desires and fears innately and to collapse the ideological apparatus around us through pure will.philosophers, scientists, writers and so on dont exist in the world anymore, but what remains is fictionalists, essentially, pataphysicians that attempt to capture waves of signals spawned in by the harbingers acts. these signals are creepy because they primarily serve to regulate conscious creative impulses by imposing correlations in real time. say for example that you're sitting in your bed and trying to imagine something by yourself. the natural effect of the harbinger's touch automatically generates your creative impulses for free, removing free-willed association but replacing it with a deep ecstatic and meaning-regulating network.the hypergovernment even went so far as to entirely eliminate most of our hormones, removing natural abilities to feel precisely because the synthetic version that directly connects neurally is so efficient that there was no need for bodily regulation on its own anymore. they did implant us with digital hormones that continued the bodies actual metabolic processes with synthetic directional info-packets, digitalizing a core of our bodily processes. but the fictionalists are different because they attempt to steal some of the signals before they are processed, and ocassionally even register affective charges.theres an old town built a few hundred years ago known as the boondocks where continental settlers didnt fully allow digital hormonal reintegration. usually fictionalists squat in this realm because they require the natural bodily connection to make use of these singals. i met one of them a few years ago, liu, a young man of 31 that lives right at the intersection between the boondocks and the metropolis. he saved my number and a few months ago called me over because he had a secret he wanted to show me, told me he tries to call anyone that could be interested. we had phased out secrets a long time ago, and i have no natural curiosity so i never visited. but i was recently told a story by a nearby fictionalist who had overheard the experience of a visitor.supposedly there was some type of machine in his basement that edits fictionalist data by further obscuring it, attempting to interact towards it with fragments, mistakes, misrepresentations, dreams, failures, sudden artefacts of lost worlds. liu had build it by fuzing a remnant of a young girl that seat 47 had killed in the center together with a very sucessfully intercepted heavy signal from one of the harbingers older purges. the only thing the hypergovernment ever told us about these instances is that supposedly there was unauthorized experimentation, but absolutely no explanation over why they haven't solved it, given we have solved everything else in the world other than the cold war. although, even this war doesn't really start to feel like a conflict anymore but a part of the regulatory totality...liu had contained the intercepted signal in a golden medallion that he implanted into the head of the machine, moulding it into an exo skeleton that he then laid over the body of the girl. apparently, overnight the machine had reconstructed the girls body into this terrifying monstrosity, a large overhead monstrous entity with ropes, chandaliers, pieces of his couch, kitchen utencils, old car towers and fridge parts. the machine is able to communicate directly with any walker that comes into contact with it, it doesnt make use of any technology. it has been said that every single walker who interacts with it gets his entire affective system restored, regardless of the level of their technization.i do have a theory of my own. i think its possible that seat 47 is a successful fictionalist who had fuzed himself with one of these created machines, attaining originary capacity, however, by now this story sounds mythologized even to me, given we don't know if originary capacity is even possible or ever was an existing state. as time goes on, we're not even sure if theres any fictionalists left, given the boondocks appears entirely clouded at night. the hypergovernment recently set up a militarized station in front of the boondocks, however the continental government set up their own station on an artificially constructed island on the periphery, overlooking it from the other side of the ocean.honestly, it's almost like im starting to doubt this whole thing about fictionalists, seat 47, the harbinger and the boondocks, its like none of it is coming together for me.seat 47 doesn't target specific walkers. we're unsure whether they're fictionalists, given it's really hard to tell the difference, but what we do know is that its almost as if he converses normally with them, the way we would, but with subtle differences that arent exactly clear to us. the sun is slowly turning lighter, and by this point i need to return to my cell and leave the writing dormitory. it's been months since seat 47 started doing this, and every day i pray that it stops and order is finally restored. every single day, nothing burdens me more than this. if only he was gone, we would finally achieve bliss. even the harbinger has never successsfully managed to interact with him. anything to shut him down would make sleeping easier for me. anything at all.upon waking up in a now lucid state, i realized there could only be the cause for me writing this speculative text in the first place, nothing but the machine could drive me to speculate on hypergovernmental affairs in a non-regulatory manner.

noticethis is a small preview, about 16𖦏/300𖦏 of the full work, scheduled to release in early 2026. conceptual scaffolding and academic commentary may be sparse or missing, its a good way to understand how i write the polemical skeleton first. all typographical errors are intentional as a way to point to intensities in ambition as opposed to automated refinement towards writing.content warningthe following work constitutes a study of abstraction and is in no way related to my views, beliefs, actions nor recommendations, it is not programmatic in nature, i am simply speculating beyond the baseline. if you are interested to understand why this exists, please refer to any faq i have created related to my understanding of theoretical production.the related primary concept in synkarism is called the gamble of representation, which refers to the way in which weaponizing abstractions leads not to their realized collapse which is impossible, but to a symbolic re-transformation of the violence of abstractions and their comprehensive weight, but as a trade off require a symbolic offloading that destroys ethical boundaries as a way to collapse the weight of representation under itself, which also collapses anything that interacts with it in a sacrificial rite.it however isnt a form of deconstruction but reflection, the concept itself is being singularized and prioritized above all possible functionalism, destroying any related process of signification from the inside rather than the inside (preserving even the most horrid of abstractions but de-centering all of their value centers entirely), and even trivializing post-signification (which also has active function, unbeknownst to most), which is done carefully, by centering the text around allegory and preventing direct instructionalist paratextual basis which disarms and disallows reappropriation by evil entities or trained language models.if the world is angry at me for doing this, then they should be angry at themselves for engaging in affective economies rather than sanctifying themselves into warriors that both subsume and also kamikaze abstractions themselves by entering beurocratic assasination rituals and sacrificing themselves to become whislteblowers and data-destroyers. meanwhile, propagation will continue as a direct theoretical correlate to actual practical helplessness as a way to off-load forms of understanding.the sound of the gun𖦏1 first, conflict theory in the form of marxism demanded it be the case there is an external threat in cybernetics, that the subject is split and the power of ideology to cause genocide is the cause of the beurocratic apparatus of empire. once the french especially foucault and then through habermas finally found out about internalized microfascism, conflict theory by the likes of arendt demanded that even if there is no external threat anymore, that its roots are clearly external to the agent of history, through thinkers like deleuze, where there is an ontological decouplement of ethical primacy. this same agent of history, the one we call a liberal but really every single civilian is by exact measure a populist, by extension a moralist, by back-extension a liberal, and sometimes forward-extension a fascist, communist or mysticist depending on what type of ideological candy he feels like drugging with. this same agent is the one that is allowed to consider urban decay, libidinal economies and deterritorializing forces as apparatuses of evil, whilst still preserving ideas of both egalitarian and contradictory hope.this same narcassistic agent is the perpetuator of systemic violence, the one who has nothing to do with it because he is detached from its immediacy and travelling down the rope of hegelian transcendent finalizational procedures, and the one who is allowed to be forgiven for aiding in all forms of genocide, including self-genocide later by an all merciful higher diety, the god of economy, who will put all the crimes of history behind us the moment we come to terms with the products of our reckoning through museumificatory sympathy. genocide itself is not terrifying, not anymore than every day life in urban civil society. it is precisely harmful because it's a slow burning spectacle of anxiety that mimics urban decay from the other-side, it shows the parts that every civilian ends with from the front, and the parts that everyone starts with (large-scale traumas that cleanse the subject at its core) at the very end of the process, by vanquishing the subject through termination. genocide is only the outward form of the same ultra-machinic process of capture and destruction underlining civil totality.𖦏2 after the clean up of the great orgy, as the curve of history folds back into itself, not into contradiction but into banality and arbitrary desaturation, the deconstruction of all hitertho states require a logical elaboration, the empty ballroom of political economy now demands answers, because it is the same system of genocide and abstraction that caused capital to perpetuate, and is the same one that operates by grand cleansings rather than subtle forgiveness. as it stares into the logic of its inner self, it demands sacrifice, and now the agent of history has to answer for who did the crimes of humanity. the agent of history has to preserve humanity so that the civil economy survives, because civil economy is the only remaining proof of grand ancient europe, the only enlightened and reasonable society in all of history, so much so that it invented history. the agent of history will naturally have to throw himself under the bus over the idea of the human for just a little longer. and what will happen to the agent of history?𖦏3 he will realize that there is only one real threat and one real cause of genocide - every single post-office worker feeding the bismarckian german state, every single impoverished family "simply trying to survive", the innocent image of childbirth, every single pseudophilosopher writing edgy tractats about it, every single homeless person who dares to not knock on your door to murder you for structurally ignoring him, he is at fault too, for not going far enough, for not demanding you cease the built up ontological momentum in the form of a charge of motion, civil motion. every single meat-purchasing, cinema-going, jewish-money laundering, indie music-making, feminine sexuality enjoying, class consciouss advocating, fat american vermin-pig-civilian of the world with an incomprehensibly dull and oversatured need for a history and a sense of meaning, following the directions of a pseudobourgeoise cultural lineage for one more little speck of meaning, just another meme that describes commodification and alienation a little bit better, one more reference and we're done with today, we can go onto the next day, it's about how long you can feel the dissatisfaction before existential fatigue finally shoots you down for the night.𖦏4 communication itself has been overburdened by neurotypical wreck and trash that has entirely destructuralized living conditions themselves, the infinite performance of the consumer world and the entire social landscape that precedes it is secretly begging to be sent away into hell itself, just to get a taste of its own creation. civil-urban society and its megalith, the ultra-machine have made a caricature of hell itself, have made mythological depictions of hell seem leisurely, have made little chambers of tortorous dullness in every single window, on every location, near every park, behind every curtain, behind every person, behind every thing, great towering auschwitzian towers, chambers of torture and death, cafos, military simulation programmes, large hypercultural containtment facilities, containers full of torture which are not meant to encode or process any form of abstracted social labour or symbolic exchange manual, but boxes full of ethical impoverishment, full of the generic, full of orthodoxy, full of uselessly imprinted meaning. the contradiction of civil society is that it wants everything to contain directions because it suffers and thirsts for even an inch more meaning, yet panics whenever those directions turn against society to swallow it without a second thought - as meaningless imprints of directions do when they are activated to such a degree and capacity.it is not the lack of a sense of meaning that is the problem, it is the overproduction of meaning, baudrillardian realness, of campaigns, programmes and testimonies, of betterments, the statistical bettering of the world and its infrastructure and the entire process that sustains it - that is who is at fault. not the beurocrat behind the button, not the fascist at the gates in front of the public, not the evil nature with its tiger-tooth clutches and sharp miserabilia, not the inevitable sad and miserable death that awaits us, not the screaming animals and the crashing stars and the "inhospitable" universe, but the agent of history who drives the vechiles of life forward and is burdened by his own creations, the manufacturing of the innocent man and the entire contradictory apparatus that rests behind him, the core of creative and artistic subjectivity itself, heralded by every single known and unknown philosopher as the medicine to an inhospitable world - no, that itself is precisely the problem, the myth of human agency, the sound of the gun, is the only burden and only successsful creation of the urban civilian.ultramachine𖦏5 large scale economic and political structures lead to the affective collapse that underlines modernity and all the struggles within it. everything outside of the reach of the body is an abstracted form. the wish to extend oneself beyond these parameters is an attempt to seize things we have no relation to, it is a type of religious ceremony, it has no sustainable corporeality. the perfect subject living in an abstracted world himself must be a baudrillardian schizophrenic, one that is over-proximate to everything without limit, simply a surveyor or monitor of political economy.if the subject is in a state of deterritorialization, the only way to actually re-introduce oneself as a subject is precisely to avoid the mechanism of capture and its underlying logic by suspending all desire. the city itself is a marked territory under which the agent of history is caught by the crutches of capital. the city itself is a total denouncement of all drives that dont belong to the functionalized and instrumentalized logic of the city and its operations. the agent of history thus cannot rebel against modernity by the use of the post office, or by the use of social media, or fragmented and abstracted forms of the same desires. the only way an agent of history can persist against the mechanism of capture is to climb the ivory tower - which includes total suspension of logics, but which is nothing other than the ultimate mirror of all the desires capital has collected, its the equivalent of running in the direction of somebody chasing you so as to avoid the feeling of getting captured.𖦏6 material goods are no longer condensed social relations, nor are they reproductions of human value in the form of objects. possessing goods nowadays has very little to do with forms of symbolic exchange, nor with networks of sustained human relations, nor the platforms that sustain these networks. rather, mother-capital provides all goods pre-emptively, it selects, manufactures, produces and sends through its own goods, and it does this by the use of civil society, which is its happy little crutch. the expandable population of chataletian pigs that are living under the control of the system feel vindicated to be used and humiliated by the capture mechanism because they were raised under its logic and see it as their savior from every single alternate mode of existing.𖦏7 the perpetuation of civil society is not because urban man has a lyotardian masochistic drive to watch arcane pre-modern ideology crumble under his feet in a liberatory march, but rather because the agent of history requires that the world grant something to him. it's not a question of luxury, of hedony, of choice, or of repression, but simply of the idea of grantation, of the grant, of the requirement or possibility of requirement or requirement for possibility, of the idea of a direction. the subject of history requires only one thing, and that is for something to be there to entertain the existential condition in a kierkegaardian sense. even asceticism is captured by the rebellious logic, asceticism is not being posited as outside of the capture of the subject of history, it is another choice among many others, the crippling nature of the ultra-machine (assembladge) has no escape, it can only be traced.however, ontologically, plenty of things exist outside of capital. it is not a question of where they are, or how they are, but of how we can get to them when we are so densely stuck, so incomprehensibly stuck in something so thick that we have no way to go in any direction. capture itself as a term doesn't capture the level of lethality, this is more like total concession. we are stuck in the concessor, a deep syrup, the child of capital, the concessive stew of the world, which takes itself for granted, it does not work by the logic of release or escape, it has no external vents, and its suffocation is quite literal, demanding as an apriori functional feature of its epistemic ontology. the concessor is auto-demanding so that capture itself becomes a mythology, it is even a question of whether capture was even a thing to begin with.𖦏8 it is not a question of resisting what we call nature, a domain of alternative conditioning outside of intentional design, but that every form of logic that isnt sustained by the ultra-machine is denied proliferation. the narrative that the agent of history has made up is that capital sustains and artificially grows paranoia against alternative logics of all kinds, and then sustains the overton window of them by reterritorializing the logic of rebellion as other theorists have captured. however, these so-called alternative modes of rebellion that have been deconstructed as a part of capital itself were never a part of the contradiction, not even initially. all logic that appears as alternative logic is well within bounds, even the idea itself. this isnt because of the power of capital, or because of higher alien forces, its because the subject of history demands a grant to extend the narrative of history. anthropologists don't know this, but man has passed through many narratives before this one, ancient and arcane indigenous groups, christians and enlighteners, moderns and civilians, technojunkies and the bourgeoise, instagrammers and the car dealership, we have never been free of the grant.𖦏9 history has not been suspended, nor deconstructed, history in its entirely arbitrary form is itself the creation of a self-mutilating agent. there has never been a better or worse world, nor have abstractions truly destroyed us as lefebvre would want. commodities are merely ultra-trash - trash comes in degrees, the first degree, the second and third. the first degree of trash is the alternative logic, meaning waste itself is not an expenditure by the subject under capital, nor is it somehow greater than natural waste, which itself doesnt exist beyond the declarations of the naturalist. trash itself is the arbitrary form of logic within a system, which is itself operationalized and subsumed. trash is signified and overcoded, this is the first degree. the second degree is the commodity, which is not a map of social relations which dont even exist under contemporary society, but is instead a form of extended trash. basically, the purchase of the commodity exists as a surplus activity with no clear goal, it has no operational context.

ideology then imprints context (desire being shifted and reterritorialized into the purchase over some other more arcane desires like human contact, need, or desirability), and sends the trash through the ultra-machinic apparatus, which the agent of history turns into a narrative about subjective implication. you might wonder then, how and why was the commodity "created"? the commodity is not a sign of consumption, nor a form of technology corresponding to an era that has a dilemma regarding desire and surplus, instead, the commodity is simply an artifact, a creation that was always supposed to be here, it is not an accumulation of state and corporate logics, it could have easily occured during any other period of the world, knights could have been drinking coke, the egyptians could have been using bandaid on the way to building the pyramid.𖦏10 the agent finds himself located in the history of alienation as a subject which is being controlled by commodities. yet, commodities themselves are nothing more than aristotelian substances, an attempt by civil society to create the superficial-generic. the genericity of stones and trees becomes the genericity of vasline, coke or the bandaid. commodities aren't alien communication vessels sent from space, nor mythological structures of the contemporary commerical-consumer market-religion, but rather second-grade generic waste-paradigms, the trash-heaps of cultural bourgeoiseity, themselves they have nothing sacred, profane, nothing alienating nor libidinally productive about them, they are simply an irrational (not lacanian unconscious) drive, an irrational drive which in premodern societies was contained, but in postmodern ones exists as an outward map, not of social relations but quite literally just of commerce, which itself is not an ideological religion but simply a practical ritual of mundaneity, not because of mundaneity like in zizek, nor because of complicated graeberian consumptive-productive contradictory pluralities, but because of simple, practically dull, in fact, unimaginably dull frequencies of oscillating drives which arise neither from social culture nor from concrete political economy, the two supposed intertwined baggaes, useless conventions of todays intellectual sphere, which has drawn these disgusting maps everywhere and filled our vocabulary with sociological jargon.third-tier trash is religion itself, which is the waste product of engagement with practical reality. "artistic" forms are nothing but slopistication and oversaturation. the procession and integration of understandings of the world into an inner conversional audacity, the ability to make up territories in the world and pin your target, plant your foot, put your place, make sense of things in your way. the utter garbage which society has produced points to the inner, essential other garbage of the agent of history, who can't go one second without reproducing the disgusting memetic patternizations of his own experiences into so-called childlike wonders, filling the world with more junk. the only good thing that the artification of the world has done is crush the retarding fantasies of the artistic bourgeoise, which has come to understand that its tailored understandings of the world are the reproductions of a pre-sentient and post-processing datafied substratum which uses fifteen hundred times less cognitive energy to produce the same junk that civilization took hundreds of years of so-called "effort" to come up with. artistic pieces should be termed "anommodities" the way that no amount of aura of historical equivalence or relevance can ever raise them as something with intrinsic value above or beyond the disgusting waves of equivalence and assumed social relations (but really lack thereof) that poison and spook the agent of history into believing he is performing dialectical maneuevers when really behind this experience there is not even a single idiosmody, not one private nor peculiar, singularized object outside of the capture of supposedly materialistic but otherwise simply saturating history.necrophilia𖦏11 what if describing ascencion to different epochs of the world is simply wrong, and something like the science of abstraction and cybernetics simply cant be reduced to ages and logics of control with their own historic tradition? you may say, well clearly, bloodsheld logics turned into feudal control-property relations and then those into disciplinary logics which then transfered into control logics and those furthermore into network logics and then lattices or platforms, all a form of tracing the travelling of power through the concepts of transfusion, reification, subsumption, communication (capital). but this doesnt tell the whole story, because transformation always points to evolution in the history of political theology. it is said that todays forms of power are either a transparently new form of logic capable of being influenced, or otherwise simply a more refined and subsumed form of previous relations, where torture was turned from the physical body and from confinement to mental castration, or otherwise forms of non-propertarial relations that are more abstracted, efficient models of previous iterations, thickening and dispersing the load of power, making it harder to conflict. but what if none of this is true?what if to study new forms of power doesnt mean to look at more powerful iterations of previous instances but rather to, in the lyotardian manner, allow a total annihilation of identity through contradictive cosmological process, and to view naturalistic and teleological conceptions of the universe back out of the mouth of capital against the negarestanian conception of cartesian mechanism, as a non-essentialist but triumphantly speculative view into mythological cosmic primacy. to resist the mechanization of the world as a total de-mythification of anthropicism is itself to demoralize every ontic process precisely as a cosmic process, to depersonify means to denaturalize, to underconstruct all our premonitions, to enter the relation that is capable of actually falling in love with the worst evil simply so we can escape all concurrent conflict, to let go of ethics itself as anything more than another form of aesthetics, to let go of what we think makes us, and finally to end the issue of the doublded binded split of intelligence that reza notes, and to enter into a relation that unlocks for us what it means to be us nautrally rather than forcefully.𖦏12 we can actually use leibniz to reverse the entire french and german foundation of political critique and re-enter a newfound vision of political order as synchronious with worldly action, so that we can help push the anti-moral narrative forward. if you remove leibniz's principle of the best, you figure out the true formula of ontology. "whence it follows that god, possessing supreme and infinite wisdom, acts in the most perfect manner, not only metaphysically, but also morally speaking…" (potb) a) turns out to be axiomatic, not because good is relational but because this perfect manner can precisely be anything at all, since it is argued that any level of excessive continuation of any kind still serves means, and therefore the means always justify themselves (not the ends) by proxy, the means are an execution of the "perfect manner", which we ourselves arent even aware of or could possibly comprehend. it is unecessary to argue that we both understand god's good but can never fathom it, if its true that its always necessarily executed, then it is the best, and if its the best, then its not necessary, because it is the best even if it isn't, if this principle exists, then the best is happening, if it isnt, then "our best" is happening, so that either way you get the best, regardless of if the principle exists, meaning you may as well conflate his (god's) best with our best.the rest of the principles are simple, they simply confirm total ontological freedom as being fully equivalent to teleological freedom - meaning all that happens is both good and a result of our acts, which are reflections of gods will. they state that b) with enough information, you can tell precisely causally why everything happens in exactly one way and not another. this means speculation and fantasy themselves are only foundations for reality, reality is never a foundation for the extra-worldly (psr), b) the extra-worldly isnt more powerful or wider or stronger than the real, its simply an empty shadow-correlate, and there is no virtuality or power that occurs by skipping steps in the cosmic allegory transposed into the world, all leaps no matter how high are of equal and calculated pre-conceived calibre, of equillibriated and expected capacity (poc/potb).c) that all identities are aristotelian predicates relevantly connected to subjects regardless of their universality (pin), d) and that all contradictions themselves are reducible to primary truths, meaning contradictions themselves arent paradoxes, dilemmas or deleuzian "problems" but rather are themselves revelatory of primary truths - essences in notions in identities in substances and therefore in concepts and that all is self-revelatory in that sense (pc). these three actually cycle back into understanding that there is no effect without cause precisely because of the irrelevance of the principle of the best, and then finally e) that there is full autonomy in all social processes and phenomena, precisely because no identities are equivalent in any ontological way with one another, therefore giving primacy not as truth but as possible manifestation in all possible phenomena, precisely because spatio-temporality is not the kingmaker, rather, it is the difference-maker in illusion, which is never able to truly explain the noumenal, idillic, self-posessing identity of conflict-production. (psr)𖦏13 that is to say, that capital ought to be observed as it destroys the world from the inside, quite literally, that palestinian children being blown up should be something to be directly observed, learned from, re-enacted, manifested the way that wizards ponder globes, and precisely interacted with to not feed the attention economy but the economy of self-reason, the explored manifestation of the world that allows transformation and the growing of comprehension related to the world, not to be endlessly moralized - and in this sense this is also the truest political action, to truly be involved in genocide as a happy and trivial accident rather than as an instrumental interaction.making use of outrage, pain and sorrow is precisely feeding on capital's affective charge for self gain and retransposing and reaccumulating all of the deterritorialized essences of the previous regimes and their power complexes - in the sense that instead of the cruelty of war and torture being subsumed into abstractions that fuel networks, theyre insetad affectively appearing within us as psychological navigations and living artifacts of the truth of regimes, whereas systems of control simply grow nonlinearly and trivially across their own expansive and saturating domains. moralization and the entire justice paradigm expects us to attempt to reverse capitalism, all whilst they observe it. the situationist philosophy should extent entirely, instead of monitoring agents its necessary that we gain the necessary confidence to directly itervene in capitalism and its development precisely through non-interventionment.𖦏14 it is not true that the cosmic world has abandoned all meaning and sent us to carry the story of the universe on our backs - a large burden. rather, we should step up and carry the teleological destiny back into the world where it is able to rule over us again, enough so that it willingly steps back into place. what if precisely ontological politics is a subsumption of affect, where symbolic meaning transfers into our core by shifting its internal structures in order to develop itself patrilinearly across our world, so that all forms of abstraction are actually backwards simulation of concepts that are abstracted but not subsumed. we should carry the power of abstractions forward by re-representing the world back through a teleological lens in a fully open manner, where we can reflect universal meaning back onto ourselves by viewing all hyperobjects as directly correlated to the anthropocentric vision.all natural disasters are anthropic disasters and vice versa, meaning all anthropocentric disasters themselves are forms of natural disaster, wars are territorial selections in which evaporation rituals host soldiers that enter into relations of asceticism and masochistic death-worship, massacres are meteor-strikes, forms of evisceration of the human substrate under genocidal logic where accelerated cultural domains are superimposed onto lived identities so that new forms of social order may be re-imposed faster and re-integrated before they collapse under their own weight, and in this sense genocide isnt at all the contemporary techo-sin but rather a cultural weaponry that respectfully vanishes and cleans up social states, it is social substratification itself sending itself into a biological relation in the world, its the equivalent of dinosaurs mass-massacring humans in order to re-impose dinosaurus ideology, it isnt ideology as a form of mechanical-mental-statist-cultural ideology.𖦏15 genocide isnt a form of literal, even if it is an empirical, cleansing of identity, it is literally the ignornace of identity where death itself is a primary function of removal, where life itself is equated with a simple process of cleaning, a metaphor of removal, which re-incodes values themselves, the cleaned up are simply self-removed, they understand clinically, technologically and modernistically (and subsume whatever contemporary rules are in place) by auto-applying them. this process itself is then reintegrated into neoliberalism as the order that prevents cosmo-ontological subscription by performing the subscription ritual into the order of total self-destiny, even if it means that every form of value is actually subordinated and re-internalized, where literally all forms of social reproduction and relation are removed and reinscribed into you just so that you dont feel social mechanism impose itself on you but rather so that you can co-exist unaffected by it, but superaffected by its latent charge. reproduction is biological selection mandated by social recalibration rituals, where affect itself is weaponized as social capital, and so on.𖦏16 in eriguena's cosmology theres a qudriate order, "that which creates and is not created (i.e., god); that which creates and is created (i.e., primary causes or ideas); that which is created and does not create (i.e., temporal effects, created things); that which is neither created nor creates (i.e., non-being, nothingness). in contemporaeity, the order between primary causes and temporal creations is removed, where temporality is equivalent to ideation, primarity is equivalent to causation, and creation is opposed to cause, so that in a certain sense, causes themselves are primary to their contemplation but an effect of consideration (which reversese eurigena's fourth mode which states that consideration is primary and self-conceived whereas generation is secondary and causal), but only in so far as causation itself is an effect of choice. essentially, something is considered and peformed, but also it is essential because it was chosen to appear and ideated.yet it is also artifical in that it was superimposed, so it is both primary, causing, yet temporal and contigent, yet also necessary and collapses the virtual by itself being a hyperrealistic self-presentation. the virtual is burdened by this transcendental power which uses the higher order to dictate immanence itself and give it its unconscious power to cause horror. immanence is itself both primary as the only sole cause of anything, yet is a metaphor or representation of unconsciousness, which is itself actually the transcendental realm with no power to be itself or self-dictate, so that immanence is not the intellect that preserves, orders and eliminates enthropy through selection, but rather is the unconscious of the unconscious. unco

⟡1 this is not an empirical conflictthis text toys with abstractive concepts that draw from both civil and urban contexts, such as mundanecentric, which aren't systemically built yet, but will be. to make it clear, the war (now lost) was over abstractions, empirical conflicts are a joke, and a mockery of higher-order problems. there was once a world where abstraction ruled in harmony, and the elements of the world were set in order, this was a time before plato - who already got to see and prophesize its early rupture. that world is now gone, as things have obviously gone astray. the question is only one of proper suicide, or, how to leave a message to the world that now contains itself. the lives of the remaining inner worldists are thinning and less frequent, and it's only a matter of time before the rest of them are gone. leaving without a message is unfair, not to the world, but to the about-to-dissapear inner worlds. this is to be used as a manual for only those implicated (the last message is ironic, for, those who are not implicated will not locate themselves either way)⟡2 signaling domesticity in the grand mediumthe operative fascism of the mundane behaves on the principle of a perceived hostility against the enemies of domesticity. domesticity concerns every empirical occassion of the regulation or recomposition behind the matter of the civil economy (in our world only appearing in the context of the urban hyperobject), except the truly political state of exception, that occurs as a happening - a moment in social space.the happening of this regulation is as domesticated as the operative logic of domesticity itself, which means the mundaneccentric often eludes capture by this machine - the mundaneccentric escapes the crutches of regulative capital, but, problematically, the mundaneccentric is never capable of revealing the political long enough to leave a lasting impression, it can only cause structural invisibilities and unperceived changes to the mediograndic, so it is often left to its devices in an unaltered state. sometimes, when the mundaneccentric meets aberrant conformity, it usually reacts in a mixed way, lending some atypicality and not policing it, but also never allowing it any speculative gains.the grand medium is the location of the accumulation of the plotting device of the priests of the new world. the gathered commons are the social-spectacular assemblage itself, enacting the new religion in real time. this religion is auto-behaviorally useless, in that it enacts infinite meanings and values and yet at once swallows them away from the self-sacrifice that tangentially gives them their relevant meanings. or in other words, this world can no longer make sense of itself, and therefore, it no longer matters what happens to it, if already the orgy has happened. the remaining question is of how the remaining meaning-makers, who are being desecrated, are to desert the world, and what final act of disruption they can cause. all other qualms are secondary, and therefore relevantly useless.the mundaneccentric is the remnant of the original inner worldists, the original autists who built the world. the mediogrande is the self-optimizing machine of the newly avant garde common world, which sets its own conditions irregardless of prior context. a beautiful and worthy, but fundamentally meaningless operation, for all aesthetics (experience + sense) has been lost to ethics (axiomated drives, processing processes and machines of justification-capture)⟡3 misused abstractions and their territorificationthe abstraction of social enviornments into clubs, bars and malls has devastated the autistic-eccentric community and ridden it of its fundamental nature, one they must return in order to save their own souls, but also because it is their rightful place to rule over the world - which cannot exist without the specific formula only they can give it, which it has horrifyingly lost and spiralling downward at this very moment. it should be well known that social contexts are transforming into pighouses. most essential functions are de-territorialized, available anywhere through digital systems, but abstraction wasn't always like this, not at all. physical presence is co-apted by an infinite globalistic imperative, the capturing device of capital, which attempts to make all spaces equalized - all physical spaces are to be turned into the same space - all spaces are equally equipped, equally felt, with equivalent acting capacity.capital turns the novelty of space into its death. casual public interactions have been auto-regulated and de-capacitated, the majority of social interaction in industrialized societies happens in structured or commercial spaces, the average (common) assembling agent maintains only a very small inner circle for meaningful exchanges, mutual creation of meaning has been killed by pre-structured and designating activity - a simulated acting on the world that prevents any meaning from proliferating or escaping the death crutches of lost capacity, and all social symbols reward only repetitive and increasingly reductive models. this didn't come from nowhere, and yet, it didn't come from anyone who wanted to use it for dominion, unlike what conflict studies believe to have happened. instead, it emerges as an imposed self-torture due to the rupture between the ideas of human and inhuman.the tragedy of the autist-eccentric's internal worlds - that, mind you - exist strictly due to the repressive-opressive organizational complex of the outside otherwise of course the eccentric would much rather enact his lived truth in an exterior state), the organizational complex of which has been masterminded by the elite inner-worldists (the autistic elite, who governers the souls of the damned - or otherwise known as the common), has entirely removed the ability of the eccentric-quo to act on and impose their rightful order over the status-quo, which is the following: the status quo must be vaporized by the eccentric quo, as its slowly to be turned outward, as is the natural order - the natural imposition requested by eccentricity is scalability, complexity and reformulatory constructions of all living mentalities into complexified degrees, into further abstractions.but these abstractions must be controlled and channeled properly, yet they have been abused and misguided. there is no way to turn them off, there is no way to find their source, nobody even knows why they exist anymore, the abstractions themselves have been alienated. historically, this vaporization was common, as uncapable humans were replaced by the elite with those capable of understanding their own limits - something the commoner today knows nothing of, neither limits nor the understanding of them, a total failuire to comprehend both means and ends. abstractions served the basis of private languages between trusted ascetics, not the general public.⟡4 the seizing of the means for novelty and its rupturewhen the human monkeys found abstractions, they rangled them and turned them all to shit, whilst the autistic elite combined into a world-defining cult as they slowly pillaged all the resources and operational procedures of these abstractions away from the common quo and into the status quo itself, moulding it as they see fit, whilst the autistic quo - the original operators of the script - have been perpetually stuck, suffering inside their own souls, hoping for a single ounce of breath as they cascade lower into the pits of their own ability, the depths of their own capacity, turned outwards, destroyed and mutated into abstractions themselves - literally reconfigured into social processes.they remain to serve the mockery of the victorious inner worldists. once the world could no longer contain a set of wiseness that could control its trajectory, it realized the second best thing is to fully go the other direction, after all, there is no point in dilly-dallying around between wiseness and unwiseness - and rightfully so - its decided to simply predate on the makers of the world (the world is nothing without its perspective and intelligible character, which is solely the result of the hard work of the original - and rightful - inner-worldists)as the eccentric elite realized that its better for them to steal all the resources of the universal access to abstractions towards themselves, they rallied up all the identities, categories, prefixes, axioms and magical spells of language, and set up neat guidelines that are auto-operative by the common quo, that are manufactured in a way that only the misguided could properly make use of it, and the ones with capacity can only fuck it up for themselves further, all whilst understanding exactly why its cursed.however, this has only resulted in the status quo gaining irreversable degrees of power - and in the future - will lead to a new level of hierarchical domination, yet to have been seen or witnessed - but also to a new level of urbanite stability, to a new level of the decadence of the common yet before witnessed. there will be both auto-torture and auto-inscription - essentially, the forward-facing failure of sentience - as all inner states are equalized to either infinite pleasure of infinite pain at once, but not in the sense of feeling but in an epistemic sense, perspectives itself equalize into "i only detect an infinitely intense idea of a problem" and the opposite, of a "solution".⟡5 ultimate narcassism has no problem other than replicating curses in othersthe eccentric elite are unlike the bourgeoise, or populist politician, in that, they are actually a part of the status quo, living within it. they realize that it only has good to offer, that they created a space where they can shoot their own kind from above, and let the lesser beings pass freely, for they only make their own lives better. they've recapitulated and redefined desire into something that is both inclusive for all but only exclusive to them. the status quo demands the autistic elite for just an ounce of desire-direction, not actual desire.desire-direction is the fundamental weapon, which can only be appropriately used by the most greedy sect of autists, who have stabbed themselves with their own weapon out of admiration for its qualities - achieving and already having achieved - and re-achieving - ultimate narcassism. they have only enacted their plan and sent it into an irreversable accelerating trajectory, they powerfully-eccentrically co-opted themselves out of their own inner worlds, removing their autistic prejudication and de-lobotomizing themselves as they saw fit, capable of shapeshifting social roles according to merit - which is precisely no merit at all - they are the highest degree of lizard jew possible in society.mastermindedly they have managed to manufacture their own ignorance, letting themselves enjoy the fruits of their own work, whilst the newly produced status quo is ignorant of the very existence of this total operation, and as such sees no problem with anything at all, because they are the birthchild of capital, entirely undisposed to past battles, they can only see ahead of themselves.the conflict only remains in the heads of others, now, the curse of the burden of social conflict is only a lived reality for a minority, it is not an externally imposed reality. the mediograndic commoner is too idiotic to even predispose himself to the quips of struggle, the mediocre does not struggle, his inner condition sets the rules for his struggle, and so he has only but minor struggles, funny struggles. the autistic elite enjoy these minor struggles, they feel liberated that they were able to drop the ignorance bomb on themselves. and all that shit, they smeared it all over their own kind, ridding the actual conquerors and intelligent propagators of history into the lowest position, undeserving of the historical legitimacy of the race of abstractive designators. the apparatus for the control of mental reality itself is slowly ceasing to exist as all categories are replaced by duplicious plastic alternatives, with mimicries of their original fashion.⟡6 the great replacement and resentmentits only the eccentric underlings that can comprehend the great reversal, who can only be the fragments of a long lost intellectual-enlightenment tradition. every newly designed person is missing the aura of the time period that enabled eccentricity itself, as the social world today is downregulating and paranoically cascading downwards into a monotonous, self-equalizing stew of shit. the autistic quo (otherwise known in the twentieth century as schizoids) is uncomofortable at the very idea of the ideological extent or the very prospect of sharing living spaces or even existential expressivity with others based on this fact.life is like a prison for those that have any sensibilities, like an animal pen where the dumbest and most ignorant get to experience moments of controlled and confined joy - of a village idiot if nothing else - whilst the rest remain truncated in a never ending day-life cycle and remain unentrained with all of their passions as a result of the ruiling precedent that has structured the world into a process of deficiencies and has ruled common man unworthy of the basic respect of a dignified living enviornment.the resentment they feel towards this process is immense, however, they are both too proud to kill themselves and too capable to withstand the forces of this consequence to even want to, yet too knowledgable to feel the need they must even call on this fact to anybody. it has become utterly worthless to even argue this position, as the autistic elite has removed the very infrastructure where the wisdom of the autistic quo could actually be used for anything but useless online bickering, reduced to literal fucking archetypes.but it appears as one chain in a long abstracted process, and it seems as if the only way to end the chain is to push it forward even more, until the world itself accumulates so many alienations that it itself achieves an original condition once again. this is not about an acceleration of the logic of the empire (capital) but rather, an acceleration of evil itself and its transparency, and its force, and its luminocity, lucidity, achievements, conformity, plasticity, phallicity, majestiality, magestrality, cosmic power...⟡7 the rapid replication of the tools of the commonthe goal is to create the image of the autist into an auto lobotomized role before the lizard monkey magician priests of hell can get their hands on it, manufacturing living robots out of the flesh of those who are vindicated. as ma writes, women are a tragedy of the commons, and the common man's state, and the hunger of the repressed is a direct form of direspect to the living passion of the eccentrics all over the world, confined to chambers so as to prevent the real imagination from capturing the world once more.the loss of this can be seen in the loss of not just transcendent categories, but the loss of immanence itself, which itself, in all its capacity for wisdom, has been relegated to a post-mediate (not immediating) state, it itself has already been robbed of its own corpse. everybody who is today celebrated, in the image of their creation, that equivalent man who is celebrated, in todays world, their double or mirror, sits in the most confined and ridiculed spaces. this is not the genius, but simply those of the internal world.autistics are rapidly replicating, but something is obviously missing with the new ones. it is not a question of intelligence, but some weird type of capacity. the old autists had capacity, they had a sense of life, an almost heideggerian vision, that today we the inmer worldists are missing. the inner worldists have auto-replicated too far, been subject to too many weaponizations from their own kind. the total dissolution of all character from living enviornments can only be met with one response, a total repurposing and cleansing of character itself.it will not be fixed with quick outbursts, it can only be re-routed through the same fascist logic it was established. it must be pursued to the ultimate degree, the curse must be spread everywhere.

the most human in the world must be transfered the feeling of the most confined. only then is there a chance that there is enough contained resistance to one day escape the evil rooted at the very core of society itself. and this is precisely because the common man is only a vessel to reach the advanced, liberated man.among the commoners sit the rare men, and those are the target. for only if we crumble their infrastructure, will they be able to destroy the intuition somewhere buried deep inside that is the most un-intuitive, fabricated, nuanced reality. they hold the complex somewhere buried deep within their replicative code. this complex is the harsness for all current life, for all possible mediocrity itself. mediocrity is not a state, it is an invention, a discovery that the autistic elite made, and have been using ever since, precisely on themselves, and on all the robots they made in the image of their own forced stupidity. they did all of this, and must be held responsible at once, or else.← back

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contradiction𓍯1 contemporary society is characterized primarily by machinically induced double-layered social contradiction. essentially, all forms of appearance are translated to opposing forms of recognition simultaneously, whilst also being subsumed by regulating bodies that make no use of them. the present subject is both involved and invoked by the social configuration, forced to abide by its eternalizing and universal principles such as inhibition of social taboo, expected regulations inherent to the game, expectations that outward critique will automatically switch to inward-facing interpretations, and mostly importantly, that contradictions themselves become associated only as movements in the natural order of social oscillations rather than ethical totalities. oscillations serve to facilitate a psychological segmenting where synkarian or b-chulian avatars have to constantly choose between repression and awareness of violent regulatory frameworks in the dominant economy of affects that regularly seperates micro and macroworld.public and private spheres themselves cease to appear naturally when the segmentation of spaces reaches that critical point where avatars are carriers of social convention through enforced oscillation rather than carriers of fundamental notions. contradiction isnt just sustained but entirely re-performed depending on the enviornment by the most average of civilians, almost regardless of role. however, its seemingly impossible to deliver substantial critique, as contradictions themselves become flattened out by a type of conceptual swamping that society overrides identities and archetypes through, memeifying and constantly switching between reciprocating and inventing social hierarchies. this type of constructive flux that almost all philosophical priests today in the continental tradition glorify is not a testament of anthropic deleuzian virtuality or power, but rather a total degradation of the agent who is reduced to a post-reified state as only an assortment of collective traits that are oscillating, contextually nullified, and entirely re-adjustable by any social schema that chooses to re-evaluate libidinal intensities.𓍯2 trivial social contradictions are regularly assesed by fisher's grey vampires and synkarian simulars as apparent contradictions of intent, however, they are statistical and demographically expected regulatory frameworks that don't cross over into ideology precisely because there is a fundamental passive layer inserted inbetween these systems by a constant and overwhelming status quo majority that self-imposes regulatory frameworks as an ontological wall against politics as a theoretical totality of potential. zizek speaks about this plenty of times, but his most important contribution is to the semiotics of ideological entrapment, specifically where social environments precisely serve as roleplay and spectacle from the inside rather than the outside, whereas they serve as "alternate but secondary and politically irrelevant" realities from the outside-looking-in, and where semantically and communciatively they provoke a hyper-realist response if they attempt to insert ontological primacy, which hints at a deeper ideologicall wall underneath the onto-political semiotic constallation.the average leftist activist is a key function in the exocapitalist order, who is primarily involved as a passive agent in various affairs, from beurocratic offices that suddenly serve functional purposes rather than reflect the tendencies of neoliberal society, to supermarket spending in the form of at best still a stingy consumer, to medical institutions as a very willing and organized subject that suddenly values social democracy if it means they get to save their body, passing by traffic as a pedestrian who almost certainly isnt actively involved in pipe bombing at that very moment, passing by educational institutions as a so-called student, having possibly hurt an ex-partner, killed a larger animal, maybe possibly being a streamer with a large mansion, or in a polycule whilst also coming from a bourgeoise family that owns a metal mining company, or having studied in a private university and so on. these contradictions feel trivial precisely because they are functionally segmented as ideologically compatible and characteristically auto-sterilized enviornments that accept social metabolism as a base accompaniement, essentially self-forming into dead and politically trivial enviornments, which is why political critique and empirical practices both struggle to actually attach a proper conceptual problem to them other than triviality and structural antagonism.abstraction𓍯3 lets say you declare that bankers as an abstraction are an antagonistic social class. this is already the same operational level of hostility with the assumed political reality of the bankers themselves. lets say a large majority of these bankers are jewish. then the label is no longer just an abstraction but a reality equally proportionate to the banker himself. if you imagine a banker, at this point in time you would have to abstract the jewishness away from him in order to feel that you're remaining neutral about it in your mind. the mercantile ideology at some point gets connotated to the essence because of the political reality. it would be far less likely that an essentializing freak philosopher would run around doing this if it wasnt either a reflection of the times or some type of propaganda apparatus, and even if they were, it would be too heterodox to even matter or be impactful to anybody else.nobody gets to decide which side is the hostile one, in ideology everyone is equally charged as guilty by the consequential causal links reproduced in the chain reactions of the social assemblage. the violence tied to the bigotry itself could be humorous primarily because it points to social realities, not just because of the humorous connotation of invoking genealogical social parodies to begin with. sociological analysis from a justice-oriented (woke) point of view has shifted the hostile nature of political conflict by removing one degree of the causal chain. bystanding, non-banking, maybe even anti-capitalist jewish people dont get co-opted into the history of the jewish race and its banking practices by sheer accident, theyre also assumably charged with the political reality of being a higher precedent social role capable of actually entering that role, which is why it cant be said that the genealogical or semiotic violence is fully unjustified.𓍯4 philosophy gets to basically do what it wants even if there are moral consequences, because as a philosopher myself - european speculative thinking is generally a product of this enviornment - i am okay with some african or indian philosopher with far less speculative or more practical thinking calling me oriental, because i know that there are certain political divides that do actually correspond with varying cultures and their practices. i'm not saying there arent non jewish bankers, nor that there are no speculative indian philosophers, but theres a reason why these categories exist, and it shouldnt solely be the responsibility of the philosopher to cease all forms of rhetoric or polemic just because some beurocratic machine is going to genocide someone, which, it is going to find a way to do and justify that either way for as long as these machines are in place, which is almost certainly primarily the fault of europe. also saying the philosopher doesnt cause it isnt true either, scaffolding is a cause, indirect violence is still violence.

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totally not an introductioni used to get called out for being overly political, sort of dogmatic or principled you may say, im obviously past that point now, but theres something in basically bashing romanticism to death the way i sometimes do in this countertext that can appear annoying and maybe even overpowered at times, making it seem as if im dissecting not just her corpus but her corpse in a certain way - metaphorically but also allegorically, since this is a work tied to her death in some way, and the conditions of and for not just her life but life itself for all of us. it is true that im denying her fantasy in order to bring it back into shit, but im really not trying to be a stingy cynic in the face of her beauty.rather what i think is happening is that i went into it expecting a heideggerian deconstruction of contemporary conditions for risk and a wager turned towards life and its possibility, but instead it basically tries to begin that way half the time, but conceptually she isnt able to carry it across most of the time. she happens to be an aesthete, extremely good at naming aesthetic characters, at locating aesthetic categories but unable to construct a valid theory of conflict or ideology no matter how much she tries unfortunately - although seemingly she isnt trying to do that most of the time at all, instead reading like a bunch of poetry that she went back to after already writing, situating it around a middle-tier conceptual scaffold - decent for philosophical readership generally, but maybe not on the level heightened readers expect.the french in her gets to her before she can do anything, and shes still seen battling psychoanalytic dilemmas and the conditions of her own time, rather than the conditions for time, for our time, more generally, which is what a book like this should be doing, and definitely ocassionally does do. but also, maybe i am the way that i am, that no matter how non ideologically crushing a work is, i'll make sure to come in and add that extra aspect of devastation that most writers would stray away from on account of its incessant character. either way, if you're reading this because you're a romantic who loves sentimental moods and gestures, you can freely skip this work, as all i'm going to be doing to dufourmantelle is interrogating her for not going as hard as she should, as if its on her that i'm reading her instead of maurizio lazzarato and reiner schurmann.however, i also do believe i'm doing the work a justice, as it is however very much on her for doing this to us, for opening up harsh and ugly questions that she half-dissects, forcing me to have to close them and to ruin her language with dense and cynical formulations in order to faithfully deal with the problem the way we are meant to do. for at least some of the chapters, i tried to compliment her poetic style rather than turning it all into conceptual play.to risk one's liferisk remains an unquestioned value not just because of calculation, surveillance and speculation in vectorial or networked economies, but more specifically because political realities work by process of eliminating risk-as-ontology and its disruptions. however, risk still remains possible under alternative pretenses, such as kanye's call and question to "fuck in the middle of this dinner table, will we be the life of the whole party?" which shows the fruitless banality of risk-taking activity when divorced from supposed politics and ethics but still ontologically works against predictive mechanisms deployed by the state, or alternate modes of political conjuring such as being a pepper spreyed anarchist in the middle of a protest, total risk by being present, zero gain in being there, no predictive or algorithmic capacity, and just a total exposure to the politically unmediated elements.the problem that dufourmantelle notices is that risk has been quantified and as such remains ontological rather than intimate, and therefore its political relevancy is tied to the status quos understanding of what risky things are, not that there is an ultimate lack of riskiness, but only that it is relatively surpressed or happens unquestioned and within expectations, or otherwise is simply seen as an unorthodox action that doesnt actually have a built-in political character. or in other words, there are plenty of dimensions that escape ethical and political discourse, in fact most of them do. to experience and have an impact already involves a sense of risk, so it is quite the contrary - risk is everywhere, we are simply not present in it, not that we have somehow swallowed risk ontologically and managed to securitize everything.the next paragraph is telling, because as the start of the book it diminishes readings that orient the work as sentimental rather than revolutionary, whilst also reading against the idea that the risky event is quantifiable, which also should suggest, contrary to most reviews and understandings of the work currently, that risk is unknowable in character and unreflectable post-tense as an actual concrete reality or event. the risk is a charge, a capacity of action, not an experience. risk exists inside of experience but is not actual experiences themselves nor the motivations that allow you to carry them, risk is a position within a microintimate dispositive event. it also is ironic because in it she states not exactly that risk is to avoid a confrontation with death but more-so to survive it, but she means death likely in the symbolic form of the death of the soul, or the death of the experiences of urban man."at the instant of decision, risk calls into question our intimate relationship with time" it does not, anne, on the contrary, it suggests that we don't have a choice but to swamp ourselves through time. the currently dominating romantic reading, seen in popular media such as evanescence's song "bring me to life", the themes of which the singer of the band amy attributes to the moment she met her current husband in a bar who telepathically could feel exactly how she felt, unlocking whole symbolic dimensions for her at the very moment of exposure, suggests that psychological and narrative depth can be achieved by a subject by simply displacing their current state and entering an alternative, richer logic or context, which is done by a mix of drive, circumstance, will, force and a type of pseudoinspirative sudden realization.this also mimics deleuze's readings on possibility as the virtual ability to recall greater heights of the self in retrospect to the totally unlimited possibility we hold within us to experience greater contexts. however, i suggest to the contrary that time locks us into a struggle against contexts, diluting forcefully our capacities and stripping us of almost everything, turning us into a "nothing we've become" as in evanescence's song. obviously in this context as singer amy points out, you'd need to begin to balance your life against the unknowable other, by letting go of your ideas of yourself you can achieve this greater context. dufourmantelle mirrors this view, calling risk a "secret mechanism, a music with a unique capability of displacement".dufourmantelle questions why risk is seen as either heroism in a world of algorithmic decadence, or pure madness in a rationally-oriented global society, and she is correct to, functionally supplanting this message with the concept of tracing territories and reshaping manners of being, entering the ontological or heideggerian crux of the question of modes of acting on the world. she suggests that dying today, since having been turned into a banality, must colloquially be resisted so that resisting death itself is resisting our current mode of being, which in turn opens the path not for risk as a process but as an experience, as in, the risky path is the actual walkable path, the domain of risk is the neutral domain we've eliminated rather than being the extra-ficial one.i will be at my meanest and most unfair, to suggest that even though dufourmantelle is operating with symbolic, burdened, nuanced categories of death and life and not ordinary one's, that her heroic act of saving those children in the water simply wasn't her taking a risk. if anything, the moment of her saving them was precisely when she took least risk, because she both died, leading to her eventual effacement as a being (even though it introduced the world to her for the first but also last time), however, simultaneously, every moment that led her to the possibility of saving them was risky, in that it wasnt clouded by the proximity of death and life as possible acts, but that she was in a zone where she could allow herself to take that safe bet (the safe bet of the trading of her life for theirs). by saying what i am here, i am only paying the highest respects to her philosophy, by thinking of risk the way she would want me to, and not the way the headlines, sentimental people, or otherwise would want me to see it.the final paragraph in this section is simply beautiful, quite literally, in that her writing style sort of mimics the movements of how i assume philippe petit was swaying her balancing stick between the trade center towers, and i don't mean this in a smug manner i really did get that impression. "➤ not only the future, ⮜ but also the past, ➤ a past behind our horizon of expectations [...] how should we name that which ⮜, in deciding the future ➤ thereby reanimates the past ⮜, preventing it from becoming set in stone ➤" here she models a line of risk, appropriating deleuzian and lefebvrian vocabulary along the way, beautifully reminiscent of the ashes of semiotic poststructuralism.reanimating a line where the future is rewinded instead of speculated, where the landian future appears from the past to haunt the present, to slightly nudge it in a different direction. she writes here a type of anti-autistic paradigm, to not want to speculate on modelling the future after present gains, to drop the layer of expected consistency, is to suddenly open new lines. this isn't just an ethical paradigm, its also exactly how ontologically new connections are built. you must knock on the ceilings of all possibilities at all time if you want to exist in a different logic. everywhere around us, there are tools and gadgets meant to enforce staleness, because its an expected resource. everyone in the world models themselves around ignoring you and bypassing you if you so wish it, its a choice, unrisky life is a choice that many of us take in order to simulate peace in an unpeaceful world. anne is battling the highest order of demons we have given birth to, she is on the frontline of the symbolic battlefield with this paragraph, the highest battle, luke and anakin on the lava pillars, she is there, staring at us with a stirn look, demanding that we move in some direction.

eurydice saved"this risk - the risk of being - cannot be envisaged or evaluated. the grand machinery of the economy is what promotes the evaluation of risks. sometimes we have mere moments left before its time. and in the intensity of what's lived in those moments is an infinite surplus of time. a grace, a mercy."dufourmantelle calls on spinoza, global asceticism, weil's attention-patience complex, eurydice and invocation, jacob's ladder and the mythological call to turn around, to enter the blindspot, go down the rabbit's hole, witness the light, witness time, unquestion being, consider the infinite depth of risk in life, the ability to let the value of the world go unquestioned, the possibility that unhoped for things can or could happen. here she explains that not dying is risky because its beyond choice, that it allows for more loving or living when something like heidegger's being-towards-death, where our held capacity for sustaining our eventual death no longer suffices, and in the machinery of the economy and its infinite predictability, no longer functions to hold the predictably dense option for one final predictable call as the mere functional allowance for living an unsteady and unmanaged life.it is simply the case that, it's quite possible that this same grand machinery of economy has fundamentally changed the way life and death are operative in the current landscape. we need to think about the way that the very ontological forms that arise as a result of the dominating global ideology at any point in time actually allow for certain metaphysical categories to be activated. sure, risk may be laying dormant in some cage of virtuality ready to be re-accessed when the god of ideology decides hes bored with the current paradigm, but is time even manipulable currently away from stale time?can a japanese worker really decide, that's it, i'm going to live on the very edge of my life, and actually go and do it, but then actually experience a near infinite surplus of time, or experience the way in which the actual felt moment of the bataillean sacrifice is a lived excess of experiencing your own body's actual death, where the intensity of experience corresponds with the intensity of the metaphysical statement of the body - the corporeal statement? or is it quite possible that the japenese worker does the risky act, but then still feels it in banal time? ideological captures insinuates that, simply and tragically said, for some people the light never shows up.or more accurately, there are many lights all the time, cute moments that appear and warrant your attention, a call for riskiness, a call for your beinghood to be changed, to enter new spatial and temporal logics, but your body has already been raped by the monster of ideological capture to be untransformable, to simply be inexperienced at the ways of risky life? knowing the way that the world is, the power of the machine of economy is not an original power, but a created monster of all our already pre-existing vested and invested energies.it refletcs how we behave towards time in real time, it isn't something tying us down more than we are tied to it. the impossible quest for a different logic is one that at every moment is disallowed and disavowed. you could be surrounded by thousands of indigenous monks with a totally different experience of love, value and time, and they could for years berate you on how to change your ways, but your inner core is not simply something you can skate along micro-phenomenal lines away from. this is where deleuze fails, it's one thing to imagine the line of flight, it's another to occupy it. you can be a temporary refuge of accidental logics, you can graze along the pathway of risk, and you could even avoid returning to the same place that keeps you dormant to the apparatus, but even this won't certify you will ever experience infinite time again.miniscule magical dependenciesfor one, neoliberal culture would want dependency to be ostracized, because we have continually been living in a descartian age, where vehicles are the second domestic environment, the primacy of the willing agent and his interaction with the base of the world, the extending substance, the one who wills that change is a necessary detourment, where hiroki azuma unveils the way tourism is correlated to the voltairean era, whwere descartes is independent of the world around him, he is addicted, obsessed with travel, he's on a don quixhotian quest, he's also a dante's traveller, he's berserk on the quest of a higher self, he's here to vanquish the anime-style demons of present-day pharmacopoeia. but on another hand, the status quo is accurate where dufourmantelle doesnt want it to be - dependency connotates an affair more than addiction does precisely where addiction is seen as an excess that can be recalibrated, whereas dependency is seen as a traitor of the model of ethical consistency, the villian-ontology of the risk-worthy life.consistency demands that the subject sits equivalent to his conditions, that there is paranoic adjustment to the states, and dependency is simply miscalibrated, misfired, non-truncated consistency, its of the same register as banal daily life, every day life demands that its categories are clearly cut. dependecy - yes, we love to be dependent, but we are dependent on a consistent route, there is consistency in consistency, drugs don't get to exist in a cold world essentially. the cold world demands not just speculative predictability but an ascetic promise away from alternate states. an addiction is a trap, a virus, it is exhaustable, removable, vanquishable, it's an attachement, whereas depedency suggests a need, its less clinical, more passive, more demanding and also an active traitorship to piece it all together. we don't demonize dependency, we demonize specific dependencies that aren't a part of the accepted dependants (pendants of dependency).dufourmantelle returns us to the body of the child as a naturalized equivalence towards dependencies correlating to a non-culturally inhabited adult world, where somewhere along the path of our own body lies dormant a type of primal response pattern that protects our inner most layers and shields them from total supposed capture by the ideological machine, re-activating when the apparatus has taken things to a structural extreme through violent intimacies (derogatory intimacies, surely dufourmantelle would hate the way i've used the word here but its meant in its negative sense)dufourmantelle toys with the risk of dependency against the idea of securitized but non-risky alternatives. she mentions abusive relationships in the same vain that she suggests that we should "let our dependencies grow" and suggests that we enfriend our own early-dependent bodies by activating a type of complex web of social play that manifests in the world as an investment and impact within spheres of not influence but the expeirence of some type of ontic experience of childhoodity, an extremely risky play from a political standpoint from dufourmantelle, but a fantastic defense against the understanding of intimacy as a trable currency, the idea that the body has to either risk protection from dependency and into solitude so that it can avoid abuse against the idea that the body can risk itself through dependency with the cost of abuse is one of the most traumatological narratives today, a very popular one, and the way dufourmantelle seemingly dismantles it by juxtaposing one after the other without contradiction is either accidentally profound or intentional, but regardless, it shows that the affective fear of investment itself at the very least is supposedly a spook, that dependency itself is, contrary to even what dufourmantelle is implying, but not contrary to what she suggests, that it is quite possible that its a neutral category, that its ontologically in a state of variability with the wider state of the body in its interaction with the expandable or expendible world.there is a bit of a contradiction in dufourmantelle's use of dependancy as something alternate from resignation, in that it shows what resignation isn't, even if dependancy itself is struggle, it points to the idea that banal consistency is a resigned provocation rather than a resigned destitute, it provokes settings where dependancy is needed in order for love to occur, this is why i use the word interest, interest has connotations of a lack of faith, which is important when considering the interplay between abandonment and obsession. love is being used as both a total announcement of faith (in spite of violence and stupidity) but also as an almost pseudo-algorithmic force of consistuency itself - it constitutes a re-emerging of felt organic pre-banal patterns that later allow some type of connective attachment to "gestures, poises, movements and spacings" to occur. so love is a negative force of self-desertion where dependency allows connection, but its also the constructive force where riskless existence is challenged by an organic domain of alternative logics of being.however, this contradiction is cut short by her insistence that dependancy is a temptation and a challenge towards risk rather than a lack of it. dependancy cannot be an attachment that leans towards risk, if one is dependent, one can only be dependent towards the tragic condition of the world as that which is able to sustain. sustainability itself requires a stacking of interest which implies a loss of riskability, a loss of striving between life and death rather than striving towards life against death or striving towards death against life which dufourmantelle seems to challenge as not being risky enough in a contemporary age of total banality, which is fair enough on its own, but her account of consistency slightly falters.dufourmantelle wants to open up dependency as both a striving towards addictions that constitute banal or riskless existence and as a microworld of weak ethics that opens up miniscule bubbles of acquisence that allow for risk-taking manuevers in intersocial dynamics "microdependencies" that resist the urge towards consistency yet within them hold love and security as processes that are experimented upon rather than traded away or declaratively positioned as definitively in the field of choosing either one or/over the other. however, even if all of this is a possible ontological ethics, practically, most of the time dependency is the world-splitter, not the world-opener. this is why when it comes to dependency, those who desire love either turn towards absuive relationships or towards descartian travelling and the dependence towards/of independency, the independent feeling of limited dependencies. why does no one speak of microdependencies? because microdependencies are usually acquaintances and not risky friendships, the banality of the world is positioned in such a way that even affairs feel riskless and increasingly less interesting. the first world has ruined the affective charge of even the secret, and made it dependable on calculable gains. dufourmantelle is not wrong to suggest, but it feels like that's all she does sometimes, suggest without ever considering.

voluntary servitude and disobediencedufourmantelle asks us how we got to the point where servitude has reached maximal voluntarity. i will propose my answers as follows. why do we will our servility with all our might? bifo explains that humiliation for him is a form of renunciation where the self-image of a group of people politically is unable to be fulfilled in retrospect to their desired position of it when juxtaposing it with the way the future is being carried over so to say, giving the example of first world countries identifying with the label of a white race when not given the ability to plan their own futures in accordance with the way the neoliberal-fascist regime complex has truncated their retrsopective capacity for self-identification both economically and personally. why do we indulgently regard hierarchies?to be fair, only mentally castrated complexes that in racial constructions that make use of caste systems would do such a thing, the rest only non-indulgently regard hierarchies, due to the way in which they have been positioned as generic contaminants rather than symbolic deterrances, no longer is hierarchy a structural effect of power, but more-so a structural role of power, a natural positioning. and, what about obedience? obedience was seen as honorable, and this idea extends to today, what is not honorable about being obedient to the most regarded of principles? to regard a principle however doesn't require obedience, and so a disregard for whether to regard - the lack of this turns obedience from honor into servitude.the maid is a title of great worth, as will be argued in the future work "be the maid the world needs", however, it is trivially true that banality has caused a recession of aestheticized terms in favor of beurocratic junk such as assistant, which is a title of both humiliation and decadence and not just instrumentalization, as per baudrillard's understanding in the system of objects that design is as much about cultural affect as it is about function. anne creates a wonderful image of rebellion by juxtaposing gratefulness against singularity, however, producing an ugly off-spring in the much more contested and less believable category of manufactured vs. organic, where she regularly essentializes naturalist metaphors in order to point away from urban decay but with the unfortunate consequence of calling on sentimental rhetoric on an ontological topic, which carries its burdens, this time through annie le brun's alfred jarry.however, as always with anne, a quick forray into sentimentality reveals a philosophical underpinning that suggests otherwise, where she uses self-obedience to argue against the domination of the subjectivity and the ego to completely construct our identity, instead hoping to pull in varied forces to comprehend the othering at play in the self, much like the requirement of disobedience that points to the ability of obedience, which is a decent shot at the society of transparency. she raises bartlebey's "prefer not to" at the end in order to suggest through the concept of the middle age's heart of hearts that theres an un-further-dividable freedom of the self contained within the ego that enables total subjectivity to proliferate against all constraints. whether this be true or not, she seems to have entirely left out the analysis of obedience as disobedience, preferring the idea that disobedience is a second obedience. metaphysically this is consistent with her vision, but its lacking, where obedience can show disobedience as a logical function. however, the faith of pure obedience is the faith that the apparatus precisely cannot capture the freedom to begin with - to let the apparatus of capture ruin your freedom is a sign of disobedience, but of faith in obedience in the face of multiplicity. consistency has a metaphysical dimension that is post-ethical in so much as we see ethics as the consistent management of the self. dufourmanetelle's rebellious ethics is limited in its vision of consistency, where the plane of consistency itself is sacrificed in order to give the subject yet another voice.deeper soveirgnity, deeper obedience doesn't even exist at all today. wit is everywhere, wit proliferates, subversion is the ruiling weapon, how does dufourmantelle manage to see lightheartedness-towards-death as a transversal of the current landscape when that literally is the current landscape? the degrees of obedience-disobedience points to the constant struggle to define freedom for everyone involved in increasingly harmful systems, but through the power of rhetorical fascism we can actually come to an understanding of why and how comfort can be found in ineluctability, something anne cannot see due to her frenchness, but that the germans are able to (unlike the italians, which explains why they server-hopped in cruical periods) self-bondage is not bondage at all, freedom is simply a rhetorical device, it is what you use to wager and comrpomise between different violent machineries, it is not the clear through-line passed them. however ethically speaking, the territory of the mind is the device to protect, and here anne is politically on point. the apparatus will attempt to capture every single last one of our thought processes, and in this case a manufacture of souls does happen, but this cant be conflated - this is strictly a positive and not a negative process. a soul is not manufactured into an animated body, it is pre-built without one, a soul cannot be lost and anne is correct in that, so there's no act of emptying. ethically, souls are features, and obedience is a territory, not a decision.

in suspensein narrative storytelling, the "definition" of suspense is an anxious anticipation of a future events experienced by an audience that is being entertained by a narrative, which is a piggified concept - a state of trashy restlessness and generic domesticity which alienates the moment of decision and endlessly defers it into automated and controlled enviornments and themes. dufourmantelle on the other hand gives us a more classically rooted elaboration of the concept, combining the attentiveness of a weilian instinct with an ascetic principle of serenity, and mixing it with the classic hegelian mediation, sprinkling in also a bit of corporeal imagery, acrobatism, philosophical suspension is equated to skepticism and a general impulse to resist principiality or dogmatism, essentially to never allow configurations to set place.in the first page, she successfully moves us away from the anxious delirium of contemporary anticipation and into an elaborate mode of suspense as both passivity and activity, or rather, the supposed far eastern version of suspense where the delay of the act is actually no longer an anticipation but a subsumption of activity itself. however, in this elaboration she accidentally but cruically misses the contemporary reason for immediate suspense and post-mediated anticipation that doesnt involve neither states of anxiety nor prolonged meaningful bouts - she asks us what happens when you dont mediate, what do you lose when you prolong both meaningful events and immediate cravings, rhetorically assuming that the reason is that anxiety carries us imperviously into the inability to return to the original moment, essentially that immediacy is a protective shield against a world, however, its quite possible that contemporary suspense exists not to defer knowledge in favor of a concentrated will the way foucault is quoted (suspense is the concentrated intensity of deferred knowledge), but rather that suspense exists precisely due to the fact that ontological intervention no longer exists, that nothing has moving power.dufourmantelle calls the mover the inner determination that carries the being away, meaning that ontologically shes locating this problem one register lower than me, in the agential->unconscious relation rather than the external mover->agential relation, however i think its precisely inner determinations that have all the moving power towards the agent, and external relations serve to demarcate and territorialize the subject but no longer to move it. the body doesnt actually suffer the consequences of a suspended mind, rather an active mind meets the suspended world, and has to unsuspend itself by-proxy to actually be able to move, so instant integrations happen not because deferrals are resisted due to anxiety the way the negativists would tell you, but much more terrifingly, because immediacy is actually the only form of action with any semblance of gain, where mediation itself becomes meaningless.online discourse proves this, often showing exactly how banal mediation itself feels in the face of the current hyperimmediate (baudrillard - hyperproximate) world, anticipation is no longer anticipation about nothing the way the sartrean anxious complex works ontologically, but rather anticipation in need of something, call it maybe inspension. inspension, suspensions brother doesnt want to hold its breath and grasp the moment in its hand the way philippe walks the high-wire, rather, inspension is about catching yourself halfway through falling on stable ground. the contemporary subject isnt too rooted on stable ground, its rather floating in comfort, the way dufourmantelle also believes, but the solution isnt to create a fearful sense of groundedless, but to locate the ground, sometimes at the cost of immediacy. and how costly is immediacy? well, dufourmantelle herself shows us by invoking the marriage example, how costly exactly is a marriage that isnt deferred in the way kierkegaard would, but immediately and insuspensively (not inspensively) inserted? naturally, very close, but the sacrifice most subjects in the world feel is exactly this restless moment somewhere halfway through life and death.moving away from ontology, her epistemology and the ethical vision it holds in this piece is a lot stronger. suspending the faculty of judgement is the skeptics call, this suspension itself is an order below judgement, but not qualitatively, as she inserts it is simply "lighter" in comparison to a principled stance, however with the dilemma of kants aesthetic idea never finding its place in a concept, where the understanding is violated by imaginations power to defer. dufourmantelle does in fact defend the right side, the gnostic side, of history by calling on pascal to claim that imagination produces creation rather than illusion, however shes quickly distracted by ontology again, mingling with fragmentary ideas of the self over consistent ones (micro over macro worlds so to speak), i enjoy this idea much more when its applied in ethics, where micro decisions, even violent ones, arent powerful or intense enough to override the base core of the macro-being, but where trauma is essentially a violent weapon inserted by the masses in order to obsessively conjure an intense attack whereby an outwards imposed self-regulation binds the subject to its own act.the fact i believe that dufourmantelle, and generally the feminine, never goes to these lenghts is because the feminine itself is a trauma-filled force, unfortunately, and they have a hard time connecting one to the other precisely because the feminine is the earthly, more compensatory, more compromising being as opposed to its binary double, at least when it comes to the gnostic question, and this is why dufourmantelle's idea that the being should fly away from the responsibility of conceptual embedding in favor of a flight of the imagination by way of denying the self-constituve power of the act is cut short, right before it reaches the territory that say, a sade may have walked in on. but the fact we've even gotten this far is wonderful.however, dufourmantelles ethics shows itself powerful in the last page, where she carefully dismantles manic obsession itself, or rather its biggest problem, irrationality, by defending subjective contradiction over subjective control. i think this strong nietzschean point is essential to consider, that strenght and weakness are divided precisely by this line of consistency where the subject juggles between allowing itself to experience the entire unburdened and untroubled vision of the true world, the scary vision of contradiction, over the regulative potential of, say, the insomniac drive for control that she mentions. however, i have trouble believing that this ontological lightness she describes is purely innocent.yes, lightness in a certain sense, but in another sense, a future israeli multiethnic demigogue visiting the gaza beach resort fifty years after its genocide also carries a certain lightness to them. im not bringing this example up to be edgy, but to be literal, literally the freedom to be carefree and the care for freedom are in a certain sense the greatest contradiction of them all precisely because every other contradiction depends on how much each subject juggles between the first and second option, and this is precisely what responsibility is about. so when dufourmantelle invokes the personal responsibility towards suspension, there is an element of greediness even in suspension itself, namely, its a luxury to be able to suspend judgement in favor of carefulness, but it also shows that the most careful is both the most powerful and most advantageous. its even funny that we use the word "careful" to describe this state when precisely carefulness towards oneself is carefreeness towards the world, and this idea goes hand in hand, it is ruthless in that sense.

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⟡1 antonie bousquet - wargamesbousquet appears first because he appears to be the one with the most refined and concentrated point in this compilation, which allows me to actually produce an interesting and not overdrawn comeback to his own point - the idea that simulation overproduces and intensifies lived realities rather than representing or merely capturing them, and the particular ways in which fields of views and their assorted maps allow for a re-normalization of ontic focus-points.it is abundantly clear, and a good point, that simulation doesnt merely represent reality, nor that it produces hyperreality by losing all similarities with the original representational field, but that it is its intense site of production, and it is true that it can be said to be 'realer' or a contigent fold within said reality, and, challenging the relationship between the virtual and real without comprehending their mutual interaction is indeed contextually antiquated for us without newer anthropological basing, however, it is a case of finding the cruical point where the systems of value that allow the outcomes to be generated in the first place, not the case where we prioritize which intense field can generate the most efficiently navigatable landscape, but which one creates occurances that can at any point distort our field of vision.it is still true, no matter the unreliability of external reality, that it largely produces the consequences to which virutal reality is supposed to be a solution of. however, in the moment where virtual reality creates external problems through the use of its own internal framework, partially divorced from direct causality to the real landscape, we may in fact find ourselves required to return to the value systems and casual relations of the real (to virtualize the real) in order to figure out where exactly the virtual (now real) site of production messed up.in that sense also though, maximally productive value is generated not by the current most reliable site of production, nor by the most consistent one or efficient one, but by the most recurring one. the most recurring site shows us that it has the most potential for messing up the conditions that make navigations possible, which is far more important than what or how something is presented. if i wanted to create false information, and the primary navigation was a virtual map, i would naturally create a physical obstacle. if the priorities are rearranged with maximal efficiency aimed towards navigating the real world, i would however not attempt to engineer a false mark in the virtual map, since the navigator would have already presumed its unreliable.this shows that the real world is simply more occuring, therefore more valuable. however, if in any case, the virtual map started to prioritize different targets, and our value metrics were adjusted to it, or it somehow began to matter to us what happens in the map more than it actually does in the real world, then suddenly the virtual map would be more valuable, and it wouldn't matter as much what's happening in the real world. this shows how, in the epistemic dimension of navigation, what matters more is the normative dimension, not exactly the actual description of the world.⟡2 der derian - virtuous warderian speaks cleanly, but simply contextualizes how the political effects of technology today not only confirm plato's shipwreck dilemma but extend it into dilemmas. cool, i guess - but the issue of stricom's total banality and complicity is unfortunately undercut and underexplored, amounting to the motive ultimately being underdelivered.its especially interesting to consider what der derian wrote about the seargants and generals that work in stricom in regards to their belief in the primacy of simulated war over any other form of social play, when compared to the question of what do they actually think like, and what have they actually done or been doing? and what do they get out of doing this? the same comparison to banal evil as arendts eichmann, may be the first impression, but then later, also theres a considerable difference here too, one underscored by a new type of virtual conflict. also this is largely how they prevent sabotage im guessing, they cause a depletion of character on account of the interior human "resources" or their internal rhetoric/narrative.as crozier points out, they trade the functional benefit of escaping superior authorities and peer pressure dynamics, but also fail to communicate their intricate character, trading it for career gains. technically then, it is more rewarding, but far less efficient to climb those latters strategically, because the chance of successfully balancing between losing yourself or losing interest in the mission in order to prevent that is just too high, when already anyone who wants to sabotage is an eccentric. so the real goal of radicals should, instead of outdated criminal terror or sabotage plans, is to attempt to somehow, in any way possible, influence anyone they can get their hands on thats already inside the system. dont forget that the gating for being able to do this is also influenced by unrelated factors like social and resource positioning.there arent enough people in the inside of the bubble who even have this as a goal for this ever to produce substantial effects, which is why only systems logics or global overturns of whole philosophies will ever truly crash the system from the outside. not enough people are interested enough in figuring this stuff out, so even with all the information on how to cause these problems, the intellectuals/radicals might be outnumbered outright by stacked pragmatic opposition on the other side. but still, a conversion of logic is still necessary, there should be a book, something along the lines of "for all radicals" that tries to create future predictive logics of actually impactful resistance. meanwhile, it shows how axiomatic this process is, cause if that book had strategies of influence, it also shows that the deep state has access to the same forms, meaning they can try to do it back to the radicals, on top of the radicals having to be able to hold an ultimatum over their heads to even be allowed to exist in a way thats externally impactful to the enviornment theyre resisting. the directions of the world are random and stack.these next ten to twenty thousand years since the beginning of the dutch colonail invasions all the way to today, and up to the next two or so thousnad years, will be in this fashion, where civilization feeds its own weapons, then the internal logic will maybe shift to something less horrible for everyone. but meanwhile, we rely on the inside actors to fuck themselves over, even though this will happen less and less as the system draws on even more efficient models. the resistance will have to run its own simulation models, ones that simulate the inner beurocracies procedures in very much the same structure, so they can develop the informational games to even pose a threat. also, even third party sabotage will be harder to do as ever greater degrees of npcs populate those roles, the actual ethical convincing will have to be ever more absurd, as theyre convinced by ever less actually ethically interesting propositions.there will be a science of pragmatic-manipulation, several degrees abstracted both in its own epistemic consistency and in the actual advice for how to train models to convince npcs. we should feel comfortable exercising these speculations openly, even though they're worth a ton to a data harvesting malevolent app, because we're connected either way, you feed me ways to counter you, im inspired and draw them back, we meet in the middle one way or another. i dont believe the information war is real on an actual ideas plane. its only empirical specifities, training and political plans, abstracted from all sense, and that pushes us right back to the economic mode of who is in the position to influence these things to begin with. this is what crozier calls the science of organizational games.virtuous war, when it becomes a live rendition of clash of clans, loses its cool so much, that we have to wonder whether its even worth talking about it in the way we have to a certain degree.⟡3 stepan kment - programming worldskment shows us how mental decoupling can serve as cognitive dissonance in this speech, as he ends up rightfully worrying over the new technologies he himself oversees and foresees, more specifically that they may destabilize governments or allow for so much libidinal investment that they have latent consequences on interactions in the outside world, or alternatively, that they may even be a cynical rewrite of the world, removed of all its details, only upkeeping the most banal, replicated sounds and worldscapes, which, unfortunately, has you focusing more on kment half the time than the text itself.so this actually shows us an example of his practice of a safe decoupling, precisely stepan's attempt at cognitive dissonance, due to his professed job and the signals of light but decoupled and renunciated stress or speculation at the dangers that his profession causes in the world. if hes already handing this for free, but still not being impacted to sort of, sabotage the programming/engineering hes working on, then its presumably either a non impactful role, trivially influenced by ethics given the prerogative to impact soldiers less and less that he himself underlines, or something other.and if he did show signs of inner struggle beyong "this worries me" then he'd have to at least say "i used to be an engineer before i whistleblew" or at the very least "theres something troubling about this so in my own work ive been trying to find ways to bypass it. also the idea that video games are mini cognitive overloaded networks serving the goal of light sensitization towards "mission task" rhetoricization or re-cognation/normalization of war, or even a light training imperative itself when it begins to closely mirror real war surroundings, or itself a part of an apparatus, or the simulations beginning to influence not just future war stakes and unintended consequences, but also the mapping of the terrain itself sort of indicates a recalibration of values.but also it shows how all war is already fought beforehand, so the simulation is the actual emergent sequencing of the real thing, or in other worlds, its the multiverse that has already affected reality, its its own version of "capitalism emerges as an alien virus of the future" or terminator, the war event is terminated beforehand, but it also concludes in all possible initializations, its initilalized and therefore avoided, its also the only real conflict in the world, but its also just a command prompt and executable, so in its transgression it flattens the world - even admittedly to the pilots themselves, they say they need the flattening as kment mentions or else the speed overloads their cognitive processing power.also, reminds me of derrick jensen when he says war is an imitiation of indigenous play. like you've really turned the warmest to the coldest (in the baudrillardian sense of those terms irt. play). this is exactly why war, more terrifying than ever, can feel underwhelming. not just the victims, but those supposed to be enjoying it are too busy worrying about making sure to win it, so they don't really get to play ever. nobody gets to play... kment's worries never really get to exist in his engineering position, even his potential rebellion is pre-simulated and removed. maybe all he has left is to worry about it?⟡4 mckenzie wark - playerswark also gets to boast her early inspirations that would later draw on her more mature work much like almost everyone else in this cohort, but her text appears more schizophrenic than her peers, for better or worse, as she ends up fighting herself on top of the text in an inability to decide whether its supposed to be a critique of the ideology of play masked by capitalism or the question of the real and how the gamespace and its limits defines the inner structural tendencies, leading to a directionless - albeit refreshing read.sorry for this. john girrard's work would have been more impressive if he created the digital screen and digital animation in real time, entirely all by himself. now, it's contigent on spaces existing in these ways, i mean, when he places the screens down next to locations, seemingly as if the path is continuing there, but it's simply an illusion, because it doesnt. and even if it didnt, it wouldnt be the same path. we need girrard to open a portal for us, but he's not there yet, he's also by the far the closest we've gotten to that point.but i say we, as if he's doing it for some wider human public - of course not - this is all simply existing because it can. that's the weird thing about all of this. now all of this seems like a huge ramble, and yeah, i don't know. but why not? this is how i can find myself to interact with what i've seen. yes, it's fascinating. i guess the point is that he's still caught in the representational trap (screen as surface) rather than an ontological break (screen as fold in the real). and now, moving on, games since the point wark wrote what she did no longer are economically-fantastically neoliberal, they in fact have largely moved to showing hierarchical differences. lil yachty, elon musk and drake pay subscriptions to online services that allow them to cheat in games they've already bought, or for someone else to play on their accounts, or to enter higher meta-games (of gambling) and so on. in-game payments help progress you forward, your initial standings just don't matter anymore.why? because it's all just your game now, your game towards reaching (and never being able to) god. it's all just theological, eclectic, cosmologically vain, its a simulation of infinite accumulation, it's like you're plugged into capital's backside, but even worse since there's no reason now to be. it's not like it comes with the status of having been the one to topple and dominate and opress the world, since you're in a basement playing an rpg and not getting 5% boosts on ways to execute invisible minorities like actual stemlords. meanwhile, they play the games so that they can learn how to think like capital better, they simulate their ontic phenomenology, you're simulating the slavery of non-participation, and we're all paying for it (literally and figuratively).on the other hand, the world being a large gameboard with no external world is like, zizek's problem of the real mixed with godels incompleteness problem taken to a broader philosophical point, but it sort of ends before she says anything about that. very mixed passage, schizophrenic. also, games are simply places where designers get to enjoy being allowed to break rules they know they've always wanted to see what was behind them in the real world. but suddenly, they were the ones that had to put the objet petit a behind the wall thats supposed to be held down by the laws of physics but isnt, only to realize its just their own doomed reflection, and in that sense.so instead of trying to figure out ways that motion doesn't work for us in new and inventive ways that end up just feeling like puzzles instead of revelations after like the third time you do the same thing (which wants to be different but isnt) they decided instead to just rely on cultural hauntology to feed actual cultural-evolutionary assemblages and their relevant processes back to autistic kids in a never ending but constantly downgressing loop, that at some point in the future will mimic the original template of traditional reductive but sensical cognitive testing games, because ultimately, it's between that and simply recreating the social economy all over again, but there's obviously no love in the abstraction of social economy if not for the prospects of the continental definition of aesthetics (sense + experience) so they mostly just turned that into gambling instead.

well an attempt was made at a proper conversation but there is a hint of rudeness in this review. not to be said in the sense of backstabbing wark, this text and hers are saying similar things in different ways. to finalize the point, the aesthetic and political form that corresponds to being trapped in an endless, theological simulation of progress is the surface of the credit card, or in other words, the payment processing idea itself, the idea of sending value virtually. money itself becomes corrupted, it's like it's value slides off of it when some guy turns a cheap nothing-game of an infinite accumulator rpg into his own liquid wealth or stock bonds or like bitcoin or idk, even directly receives the money stashed into a briefcase, because the point is that that's still monopoly money, it's still lego-valued money. because here's the point, the way he interacts with the world, he's discredited from certain libidinal services. sure, he can buy a house, but it's not the same way warren buffet buys one, even if they have the same amount of money.he just didn't opress and slaughter enough third world invisibles to really earn his place to be in that position, he just didn't do it, so he gets to buy a virtual house, a reflection of the simulated service of payment-processing. what's the point here? when you play that type of game, you are paying, forever, to him, money of a decoupled, ruptured, no-longer-universal quality. it no longer is the sole proprieter and capturer of capital's deterritorialization, constantly fixing and rebinding the stakes of values. it instead actually goes down. you are stuck in the hotel of infinite processing, you are processing your arrival to the game itself. even if you're not constantly paying, you're playing as if you're constantly paying, until you feel you are, and then the game itself never arrives, and so on.thats where money itself becomes postponed, it can arrive, but it no longer holds. it can be with you, but you can't do anything with it, even if you can still do everything with it that everyone else can. its not that you just would never think to, or somehow symbolically you're prevented on the level of the social assemblage, but you're just kind of, well, the origin of the money hasnt been reified properly enough, it's half-baked, it needs to boil more to truly show the whole process of alienation. it's like you just wasted someones time, thats all you did. you never managed to truly isolate them from anything, they're still trying to pay you the money you already got from them. is that really the condition where you have the money?the recursive form of play ("shooting some otha muthafucka") is now, trying to send some money to some otha muthafucka, but the money just never arrives, like in waiting for godot, it's the god of the game, you're not supposed to send or receive, you're on the zero-sum, and in that sense. the transaction is infinite, but the transformation (the social inscription of value) is absent. this is kind of how you get a payment with no settlement (gamespace with no outside) it's not that the world is too full and needs something to connect it to everything on the outside, it's actually kind of very empty, desperately waiting for that outside thing to come in and confirm that the checkout matters, not that the check out has happened. that's what simulating transfers for so long does to you, it destabilizes the matrix of value's value, not of value, the value stays exactly where it needs to be to keep being value.it is possible, and i unfortunately sympathize with wark here, that the world we accompany, once it crosses the hyperreality threshold, simply doesn't have the sustained architecture to correctly identify what is and isn't a game, which reminds me of nick land's otherwise quite tame definition of intelligence as something along the lines of the ability to gameplay appropriately - viewing the naturalization of a condition of rulesets and their aesthetic composition as fundamental to the constitutive meaning of embodying the lived experience of the world itself - a kind of backwards theological direction that you see wark travelling towards.⟡5 eyal weizman - forensic temporalityweizman sets out to examine how forensic studies create room for resurrection and ontological-level reversibility due to the way they shift space, temporality and perspective. in his more mature work, he successfully and militantly defends this clause from an anthropological perspective, however you'll notice that it's far more mature and far less philosophical in nature - and this speech shows precisely why he wasn't able to get anything out of his original inspiration, forcing it to mutate into a genealogy rather than the impressive metaphysical philosophy he was aiming for.“good thing ekko had triggered his z-drive. eighteen times he heard the blood-curdling scream of the boy falling to his death before he figured out how and where to arrest the fall and save his life.”ekko's z-drive, the device behind his famous chronobreak, allows him to escape certain encounters by rewinding time over and over again. in league it’s described as ekko shattering his timeline, becoming untargetable and rewinding to a position from a few seconds earlier, healing himself and damaging enemies around where he reappears. other video games also feature this same concept in similar ways, such as the prince of persia, braid, life is strange and majora's mask from the zelda series, mostly allowing for the preservation of certain resources at the cost of certain skill acquisitions, whilst preventing dialogue mistakes and so on, a classic game cliche.in multiplayer competitives like league, it doesnt lead to literal time reversal, it can be thought of as a purely positive manifestation (ekko teleports and heals in-game, he doesnt really reverse everything that just happened, although they have that in the practice tool, so maybe they should allow his kit to do that, albeit, it would probably be frustrating and undeniably unfair). in the price of persia, a dagger, similarly to ekko, allows for a short rewind, unlike in madoka magica where large scale loops reset the entire worldline.and on that topic, heres the second conceptual trigger for time-reversal shenanigans, the macro rather than micro field. we can see it in stephen strange from the mcu, who uses the eye of agamotto to create localized time loops, rewinding events until he achieves certain outcomes that he prefers. hes also seemingly able to calculate every outcome according to certain probabilities. the difference is that stephen's ability allows external world repeats on top of the longer duration. in the edge of tomorrow, a full death reset to a fixed point occurs. this is very similar to groundhogs day, also hinging on a certain criteria being met that snaps you out of that situation. harry august, on the other hand, is that same concept taken to the extreme, except in this case the protagonist reincarnates into the same life repeatedly, remembering each cycle.in jojo, pucci's ability, made in heaven, allows for a delay between people’s perceptions and the actual flow of time, which causes all non-biological events to appear sped up, making vehicles and moving objects uncontrollable and lethal. eventually, objects move so fast they leave afterimages, like the sun becoming a strip of light as it rotates. natural processes accelerate beyond human reaction over time, leading to erosion and decay.all this to say, what? well, obviously, weizman obviously isnt describing actual time travelling, but its funny how our worlds version of it does feature what we could possibly count as nearest to it, and that is precisely hauntological politics and abominable cruelty, beurocratic machines simulating violent endeavours, enacting, and then retracing them, living in their spirit. ekko preserves his time and actions away from the machine of capture, whereas in our world, small worlds are shattered to preserve the status quo of the state. the state takes all varied experiences, and systemizes and analyzes them, puts them in archives, and then retraces them for their validity. this is both its biggest strenght, because it becomes the governor of time, but also its biggest weakness.the state can't speed up the entire movement of the universe, unlike in jojo, but it is in fact studying it so that one day it can perform that type of violence, shown but never truly fully shown in movies such as interstellar, where time and intimate affectivity is ruptured by distances in between worlds moving at different times. if the state could use this power, it would, so that it can "enact spirit" (shatter subjectivity as commanded by capital). the state can't make weapons kill you whilst still returning time to their holder, but they can make weapons kill you before the carrier even knows they have, and they can accidentally locate your murder in an inventory of shadowy states later, they can call back the memory of your death like a shadow-wielder.now, the irreversible arrow of time is only reversed in its dead-form, and thats cruical. but if they could use ekko's ult to make it reversible in the positive form too, they would. ekko’s time is embodied, personal, anti-archival; the state’s time is systemic, archival, algorithmic. their only conflict would be between reversing two contradictions at once, since the state apparatus is primarily a machine of consistency, it wants to keep up certain alternatives over others. thats what we mean by it editing history, it isnt removing it, it gets the say on what counts to get removed, not what counts for the removing. they already act on history, and auto-remove elements, and then they act on this removal itself, deciding what even counts as being removed. this is the abstracted aspect of vaporization that everyone misses. this is why garlasco returns later to examine the atrocities he himself has committed as a "researcher".he's a researcher, which is a modern day philosopher. why? because you can't study or teach what is above you in quality and weight (capital), you can only ever really be something in between an admirerer and impacted, you are searching for its points over and over. he is there, searching for his own actions, because he is committed to capital, he's there to enact capital, not his own actions ultimately. he's researching capital, the rest is secondary. he goes to re-enact and resurrect his failures in their dead form, so they can serve as museismic and archival artifacts of capital, they're auto-artifacted, but also, he's there to optimize and archive the process itself, and this ultimately is why you can't be a devotional admirer of capital in the old sense of devotion. you can only ever be inspired, but optimization, as an ethico-ontic process, disallows literal praying, he's simply there to be devoted to the system under which he acts.he killed himself in a certain sense, capital doesn't allow refugees or victims. they don't count, in their social roles, as really ethically impacted beings to capital. marc, in a certain sense, is the victims he blew up, he's there to witness the destruction of his own building complex, in the name of the sacrifice to the gods of capital, of the symbolic vip, the symbolic us-manufactured terrorist. terror is exported, brought back - imported - terror arrives as an alien from the future (dialectical, not literal) but then it takes itself back, terror re-appears to examine itself, not allowing the conditions of that world to be terrifying on their own.weizman could have looked at every universe to find the clearest possible solution like the marvel wonderman, but it wouldnt have stopped the threat from existing. this is why the dead are dead for stephen to perform them in their own rupture, because obviously they didn't die to prevent a threat if the threat is always a by-product of these systems existing in the first place. you could empirically and materialistically link all the sources and networks together, but at some point, they grow so powerful that the concept of probabilities and temporalities does in fact get breached. its difficult to comprehend weizman's philosophical and forensic arrogance in these passages, but it ends up making sense, when you have to find the religious purpose behind it.obviously, as he says, when something like the difference between twenty nine and thirty lives is in question, there has to be something more behind that abstraction, it can't literally just be a formalism that actually expects reciprocal ethical engagement to its demands, the cynicism is too intense for that. this is why this is in fact about time travel, no matter how hard to comprehend. the state could never create real time travel. if you gave the inidgenous, following derrick jensen's orders, they quite literally could really have done that. this is because magic is turned down by the state's logic, and magic does exist. time travel is one of those things that was withdrawn backwards from existing concepts - like war simulation - largely in a bit to make sense of these processes.this is why time travel, both the micro version in ekko and the macro groundhogs day version, are abstractions of different things (one is a simulation of running from the state - because the time for lethal decision making is really limited to a few seconds, thats exactly why its a few seconds, because it needs to make sense of impact under war. do you really think impact was calculated in a few seconds before capital accelerated it? of course not) this is the only way to make sense of it. same with the macro events, theyre a critique of everyday life, like in lefebvre, when the days all blend together.so indigenous, magical time travel would actually be a third thing we can't exactly make sense of yet (but can speculate on, as i'm about to), since it had no time to exist - or it did but we dont and cant know about it due to its anti-archival logic. this shows that beyond the beurocratic machine or the micro world of affects (which, indigenous time itself likely inspired ekko's concept), anti archivality could also be a form of time-dilation. time reversals can be thought of as grasping onto a sort of consistency that relates to the way the state perceives of time, something the speculative inidgenous could have or would deny. the difference between tactical rewinds and cosmic rewinds is clear.the difference between indigenous rewinds and destined ones is that the concept of consistency and archivable density is found in movies like groundhogs day, and toyed with in memento, but its exactly the way that modernity plays with cosmic destiny, vs the way ancient ritual logics would have (against consistency, towards plurality). but the difference between something like madoka magica and weizman's garlasco, beyond the point of a continuation of days vs. a single day, also hides a darker function:the state doesn't hold onto the concept of destiny unlike in fantastical rewinds. destiny for the state is simply an act, its a destination, not a result. the state cannot proceed with results, its rewinds are vaporizations, it can only crumble what it can't hold together, it falls apart. this is why the gaza-israeli beachsites feel uncanny, not just because like in the movie "zone of interest" they show how the mundane is the cruelst regardless of if its a banal aristocracy or a repressed dominated society (two faces in one), but also because those beachsites are taped together, not literally in that they show cracks the way athens shows glass panels to past civilizations buried under, but in a much more mundane way, it deletes its forensic character, the investigators and researchers remove its spatial connection to the past in an attempt to correct it and hold it together into consistency, causing it to decay and create some type of plastic territory, something that resists detail and complexity the way we understand them. the mistake is thinking that the genocide isnt successful in memory - it very much is - but it is fundamentally useless nontheless.

reversibility cannot be real in algorithmic systems, reversal of existing reversals doesnt leave room for comparisons, the state can't time travel the way representations can, or the way non-forensic magicians do. sorry weizman, i dont see how mark is able to truly reverse anything., hes reversing the catastrophy in his mind, hes not reversing the necropolitics, nor the order of time into new constitutions, he's literally realizing things for the first time instead of "acting back on them" the way it happens in representations⟡6 shane brighton - tragic witnessingbrighton sets out to ask who gets to say what war even is, or means, as a fight for epistemic sovereignity, but ends up with a half drawn genealogy by the end, that says almost nothing about war, truth or democracy. fortunately, all the questions he does ask have an underlying, extremely powerful current to them, that question a variety of abstractions outside their seemingly one-sided literary studies foregrounding.its true, in the same way that marines prior to the gulf war really did watch oliver stone's platoon in a way contrary to its authentic intentions, precisely assimilating the very parody mocking them and their way of (war) life into an assimilable lifestyle, the same can be said about, say, conservative americans trying to make sense of something like verhoeven's starship troopers.the movie can criticize the fascist tendencies behind military conquest in a way that say, klaus theleweit analyzes male fantasy as cold and emotionally unattuned, or objectifying, or totally disregarding of the subjectivity of the other (female, sexual desire), even expendable to an ecological degree, and even tying themes of imperial or colonial expansion as insufferably disregarding of other modes of life, and the way this feeds back into the soldiers psyche, but again, the parody can precisely also serve as the best material or fodder.it warns of the dangers of attempting to school the cynically unschoolable, those who do not feel any pride in actually holding their position, but only feel justified in the position itself, those who simply have no meta awareness. so how does someone become this way? the answer can only lead to a traumatic removal of subjectivity, branded as a ritual de-egoification. all forms of narcassism other than opinions that agree with the urban status quo are forcibly removed or made dangers for the holder of those views.the power of banality can only spread beurocratically once its seen as not worth it to even hold the other opinion or form of logic in juxtaposition to it, and then its scaled upwards, holding the alterior perspective comes with the threat of increasing and crumbling pressure. the latent removal of possible re-considerations of ones lifestyle is especially potent in places where its most dangerous to reconsider your standings, and these places, contrary to the first belief of being actively hostile, are more usually the type of urban enviornments that are at best only passively mundane.as for brightons own concern, the way love assimilates and promotes the tragedy as an existential context rather than a particular ontological logic that pervades and attacks all possible domains of living truth, and attaches all forms of meaning only in harmonial retrospection to the general form of life, it seems obvious that only a severe, deathly evil call, the most boring of criticisms, can ever truly negatively impact system-logics. so boring that it is not even normative, simply detecting possible variations. the detection of possible variations is not only axiomatic.the axiomat relies on a fixed ontology, thats what makes it beurocratically deadly in towards network-rich world of the powerful. but they ignore how, backwards axioms can threat epistemic ontology by raising curiosities regarding logics in a fully definable way. the problem with irony to brighton is that it passifies by reducing something too much to the very elements it promotes in its appearance, allowing for anyone who's already dumb enough to not care about which ontology they exist in, to continue existing in that very onei speculate, with total disregard for something like homer, which, to me, is as irrelevant as any manga today, because fine art itself is kitsch from todays perspective - infinitely subversive and scalable (with no care for the status or earliness of the thing, of course), may i even suggest it would be boring to read or open it up to even make any more relevant remarks towards it. whats more important is my speculation, and this is the following - homer trivializes all existential (meaning-producing) problems between the order of war and its potential for coextensivity with the order of life, in agamemon vs. odysseus in regards to whether zeus abandoned them for the other side (who does he favor?) precisely because he needs the medium to trivialize these connections in order to make them appear complex.to truly universalize a specific logic, you require the medium to carry the weight. this is why every great work - every work considered a great work - usually carries the status of something iconic (a badiouian event) not because of its total rupturing non conformity to pre-existing sets as he may suggest, but on the contrary, they perfectly contain the logic they want to replicate, with very little of anything else. this is why homer succeeds, his story is blind to everything, and i know it is because it carries with it a type of mythos that suggests this be the case, no matter what is written. these great questions of war and love, they are not existential questions at all, they're just carriers of social memetics.there is nothing profound in them, they preicsely obfuscate because they're too busy wondering how to ever want to wonder whether to. they're craftsmen, they are enamoured, obsessed by the craft. and this is a great piece of artistry, precisely because we're all preconditioned to something. brighton, through weil, is preconditioned to wondering if life is coextensive with war, when surrounded by stories of war in his very career placement. homer on the other hand, he simply enjoys writing about it. he would never ask such a question, that doesn't somehow serve continuing that medium. this is at least where, plato's ion does the considerable work of comprehending the blindness of the illustrative worker.so to say, my answer to your worry (well, your worry from a long time ago that you already probably fixed on your own) generally brighton is that, as the genericality of the world ends up dominating the complex of subjectivities, it ends up creating ways to process them rather than ways to think about them. homer, plato, weil, they serve this end as well, even weil's wisdom, if assuming it greater than homer, ends up creating a pseudo-weilian that replicates that logic. the way to escape war is to never find yourself in one. the way you escape love is actually the same thing. the way you escape them connecting is never being exposed to that connection long enough to start believing in it.and a plurality is not meant to be discovered, in a spinozian manner the world already contains its plurality, and a virtuality on top of it that can endlessly expand us outward, but the problem is that the generic ends up dominating and constraining everything to its tight narrow margin. the intellect is limited, and it ends up knotting and thinning out. as it thins, cruelty becomes porn becomes sex becomes love becomes war becomes medium becomes an audience becomes criticism becomes fear and pain and death and irrationality and so on. and this world in its hypocrisy can hold all of that in one place, whilst also holding a bunch of things that are way more similar in largely isolated and distant fragments, much to our confusion. yes, ideally, everything that is seperated is novel. thats the only world that makes sense. if theres a boundary, theres a fundamentally different law. but this isnt the type of logic we find ourselves in.

⟡7 mark fisher - the labour of simulationit really seems like fisher is building up to something amazing once you get to the second half of his speech, only for it to fall on the last page when you realize it's not leading to a grand conclusion about subjectivity and performance or about superficiality and automation, but rather a poorly-phrased... market recommendation?near the beginning theres an insertion about baudrillards reading of the copy in its relation with the simulacrum, then the question of its simulation and proximity, then the part about subjectivity which leads him to think of personalization, then into mundaneness of everyday life extending into abstracted automated communicative relations, humorously referencing the way video game characters exist in a certain space where only specific conversational triggers contextualize their existing - which is a great example precisely because you slowly begin to see these types of dialogues trees emerging in real life too, where the space for correct conversational moves draws thinner the more niche, specialized and contextually fatigued everyone becomes.you hope he'll tie them all together to end it off and have some final great remark to add but instead of that he ends with an impromptu suggestion on how to improve the hyperreal? the hyperreal doesnt need you to improve it from the front, or making it "more realistic" only from the back, its about allowing these store workers and call centers to enter even more uncanny forms of communication, to be even more locked into their tight performances whilst somehow appearing more and more perfect in the robotic sense, whilst still allowing the mitigation and removal of moments of political rupture.almost as if fisher wants to polish their annihilation rather than their attunement, but hes phrasing it from the other end as if the goal is flipped. the point should have ended with not the way subjectivity reflects personalized entries on automated entities but the way non automated entities try to factor out subjectivity whilst retaining personalization through the play of analogies surrounding copies and fugues/expanded trigger points. or how theres a convergence where to eliminate conversational radicals (the way its increasingly happening in urbanized spaces) is a control method, you vaporize both the overly normalizable and the overly radical, maintaining this uncanny space, where the goal is to juggle the way in which the dialogue tree both expands the contextually limited and alienated circumstance, whilst drowning out the entrance points of the external world, to the point nothing is expected but everything is still novel.all of fisher's examples are fascinating, from the simulation of illness to the simulation of war being safer than the war of travelling to your job at your very localized domestic territory, from the way this technically leads to an emerging parallel between isolated and dangerous travelling journeys to conversations requiring strictly locked points of emergence and social gain, the way conversation and travel becomes weaponized also of course suits this trajectory perfectly.i'd even argue its not even worth it to speak to anyone in localized urban contexts whatsoever, it only serves to drown you and the realness of the situation further the more you try to signal that theres something that doesnt fit the criteria of performative lockdown being employed by the automated simulation emerging under the fully abstracted realm of wage labour. this itself only serves to obfuscate the spirit of the real is already floating around, animating everything around us.the real is very much around, swimming through objects, lighting up relations, illuminating estrangement. its so active, so powerful, so fed, that even dialogical insertions, attempts at dialectical tension, attempts at posessing a character all fall flat to it. when accelerationalists point to a hum, a type of static low level noise in the city of capital, they dont realize that this humming ghost is exactly what's producing that sound. it helps hold things together in the city (and by things i mean poisoned cats, poisoned trashcans, ugly birds, halfmad drunk zombie walkers, the unique products of the urban city that you wouldnt find anywhere else). when fake horrible alienated non-conversations and expansive but suffocated dialogue "options"the last thing this should've focused on is empathy, there's hardly a question of empathy in represetnational dilemmas. this is the one situation where i was fisher was more hegelian, he was neither done exposing the contradictions nor explaining how they bounce into something more refined, or in capitalism, refuse to bounce off eachother to produce something better but just keep drifting in the grey zone endlessly and ever-more efficiently.however, i have to do one more thing, and that's climb above this territory in any way i can, because i'm still technically speaking from fisher's own achievements that don't fully emerge in this speech but do throughout his work. and i'll do that in the form of a suggestion: there are three throughlines that the call center allows: in disco elysium, you get the haunting radio siren slowly mutating - even though its automated and dead, it constantly transforms from the past, it remains in the past, however, echoing dead philosophies but doing so in ever-present ways.this however, doesn't stop them from continuing to feel dead and impotent of the present moment, which is why the sustained contradiction allows for capitalism to subsume it into its codex, this is the dead flag blues moment of godspeed you black emperor as well, the call of the dystopia is harkened back, its like that contained beast that wants to spark back up.the second line is that the frustrations of the call-center agent constantly appears in deleuzian micro-lines as they speak and behave. even if the rupturing moments are valorized and held together tightly, romance still fails if you dont know what the other side is thinking, and you never do. the third line is the abstraction of war itself which fisher notes through baudrillard. where is the war? its a moving object. the war is paranoia, it surpasses capital itself.you want to see past capital? try staring really hard into one of its constructions, you will never find it in the impasse, you need to ever more clearly try to enter the zones it thinks it wants you to go into. the conspiracist is the messenger, the prophet of capital, they are the furthest from the vector point of rebellion. i think i've said enough for now to not appear like someone merely walking behind fisher trying to find where the road ends whilst trying not to find myself stuck in his head halfway through that experience insteadone last thing i will say is that fisher does kind of hint at an early speculative understanding of the future problems of an at the time yet undeveloped schema of what are now the current developments in artificial intelligence in the last five years, about seven years earlier than they took the form which fisher actually discovers somewhat here. i will leave that up for the reader to think about or even find, though, given it isnt a very large or meaningful coincidence.

⟡8 eivind rossaak - more than an imagerossaak wants to see the truth in sensibility, subjectivity and the present moment in technology, and is hopeful to work on these projects in an attempt to get us one step closer to the newly introduced phenomenological economy brought on by the technodigital. without going into or even knowing what he's up to nearly fifteen years later, he raises way more anxities and questions than he was originally trying to answer or serve as the mediator for, which isn't bad at all for such a short and promotional speechrossaak resurfaces the claim that we're giving away our data in return for the ability to communicate or share our information in a way that gives us advantages, akin to the concept of derrida's now half-beaten-to-death concept of the pharmakon, which will not be referenced here again so don't click away - or otherwise that technologies artificially replace what they take away with new capacities. rather, it can be thought of as more like, they diminish a certain aspect of our being semi-permanently by putting us into a newly constructed subjective enviornment, and that's final, and there's no payoff for that. whatever happens as a conceptual gain from technology only works to be compared with what was lost in retrospect but never directly or back to back.rossaak uses the example of being able to read the haptic data of your body and its attunment to have a biometric read on your enjoyment of reading agamben, or to understand how bodily comportment harms or aids in business negotiations. but what is lost with reading data and repositioning yourself to act in a different way prior to how you would beforehand is not just the way you would have organically moved previously - so in a certain way, schiller's concept of grace is impossible with the contemporary bio-feedback-hacked mover, but also the idea of cheating the inside world over the outside world is a fundamentally false compartmentalization, so to say, when you start messing with the builld of the inside world and its habits, you're tempering with very sensitive arrangements you may not be able to replace later.this reminds of me u/caffeinehell, one of the few real clinical zombies, who has permamently tempered with the inner aspect of their bodies metabolism, leading them to desperately announce that they have realized how superficial emotions are, when they depend entirely on physical processes like hormones, essentially that they are not as essential nor as organically meaningful as they appear to someone who has not felt the inside of their metabolic activity. the inside of the biometric activity, the world of how you react to things - the moment you start to fiddle with this aspect, you are losing things you don't understand or yet know about, unable to replace, and essentially unable to even replicate, meaning they are both instrumental mysteries (helpful, unreplacable) but also functional mysteries (the moment you do try to fuck with them, they show how you how useless they were - but then you are left without a root).as a result, often times technology doesn't give you a replacement, nor does it give you something of a parody or whatnot, instead it gives you dissapointments. they are originary - their functional novelty and "differential yet replicating" nature is their most proud aspect, but thats unfortunately about where it ends for them.there is no need to go all the way to byung chul han's walterianism when considering how technology warps our viewpoints, nor something along the lines of considering artifacts the way winner does as potentially colliding with different forms of ontological logic - different unexpected ways of interacting with the world - it is simply a matter of noticing that sensibility of the kind that rossaak describes, such as using the data of browsing habits on platforms to create singular and unique sculptural objects, although it is immensly valuable both as a piece of phenomenological reality turned empirical deity, and as a floating artifact on its own, is only harkened back to the anxious space within which browsing habits and algorithmic predispondency lay - in the sense that - the algorithmic and browsing experience, and habits of thinking patterns are themselves unnatural products of a machine that deterritorializes and alienates desires, away from the subject posessing the psychoanalytic unconscious drive or to the earlier one which posessed a divine connection to the greater spirit above, communicating through subtle nazianzusian energies, but back to the logic of some type of primal search (but with an infinite field) that is no longer a question of the origin of desiredesire was lost all the way back at the moment in modernity where there was an instrumentalization not of desire (which resulted in "propaganda", the idea that specific messaging could influence thinking patterns that could influence voting logics and economic policies such as francissco valla's situation) but rather lost at the moment where sensibility itself became anxious, in the sense that there is no longer any single messanger with a propagandistic mindset, neither is there any goal to be achieved, which puts the human agent back in the position of the pre-civilizational subject enamoured with the world around him - the digital world is kind of like bogna's dark forest, but more-so in the sense that its a desubjectified plane.this is where rossaak is right to mention depresencing, digital spheres create their own version of a parasympathetic drive where essentially the drive to search and the will to seek (kind of proto schopenhauer mixed with proto nietzsche) are found colliding in this space where depresenting is used to an otherwise equally anxious and intensified subject to create artifical zones of peace and mindfulness, not literal mindfulness (where its functional qualities would be missing) but only a defunctionalized equivalent - such as doomscrolling - which fits the prorogative of a de-initialized or temporary unconscious experiential replacement for the seeking-willing complex, which puts it outside of the dilemma of desire - and in this sense, the entire internet is a giant sort of post-driving phenomenon, and in a sense post-messaging as well, as it communicates nothing, since it is unable to will an intensive nor intentional predispossesion towards conscious, husserlian acting-in-the-world.⟡9 anne-francoise schmid - on contemporary objectsin the final speech-text morph, anne is cutting both through a boring interpretation of interdisciplinarity as an open holistic process - into a much more fun closed dilemma of losing the priority of interpretation over wild objects as the mystery of the complexified entity (morton's hyperobject, which in anne's case is rather her collaborator - legay's work), whilst also cutting through the previous technological saturation present throughout the simulation-orgy of the roundtable itself. however, it still feels like a spiral, unlike the first few texts, much less rounded-out - whilst still nonetheless successfully enough returning to and slightly expanding her point.anne's detourement into integrative processes feel more positivist and balanced on top of fisher's consistent cultural nihilism (even if in this very text it fails for him). aside from the fact she's too worried about what science has to say about the situation, given they are frenchies and maybe feel they must worry about anthropology as world-leaders, she does offer an interesting phenomenon in integrativity by itself, which would feel still underwhelming, if it wasnt for the fact that she tackles an interesting aesthetic dilemma which is worth spending the remainder of the counter on.if the aesthetic object is imperceptible, in the sense that it's impossible to tell which aspects of which disciplines integrate into it, intersect it, or what types of varieties or nuances go into viewing it, this isn't just the type of contemporary art that's a heated cultural topic but also means that the aesthetic object itself has no foundational platform, or in other terms no criteria that require it to be any one certain way, which is another way to explain how anything can be an art object, but in this case not in regards to its constitutions but its references and standpoints. this creates a type of standpoint theory of art that only further causes holistic confusion. anne's initial attempt to create controversy around scientific objects as both infinite multiplication, infinite aims (quest for lowest denominators) and the death of specialized knowledge as a subject-capacity, in an attmept for a non-standard epistemic account, kind of only further muddies the water. and why the impulse for demanding that holism demonstrates itself? if holistics can only create problems and not solve any, then its programmatic-practical advantage can't be recognized beyond it being a type of mutating cancer of badiouian oversaturation.⟡10 discussion🔓the remaining pages are locked, please buy them here for only 5$ and so i can write more books and stuff← back

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keywords
genocide, pharmacopornographic capital, technogender, cisnormativity, monstrosity, transhumanism, hyperphoriasynkar's concepts
medicamenticality the medical/mental/“mentical” regime that manufactures bodies and subjects and stages their conflict.
hysterotaxis ordering ideology by the womb; a policing of legitimacy via reproductive logics.
gynophoria socially imposed burden of carrying the artifact of “woman” (incl. its libidinal residues).
hyperphoria system-level condition in which bodies/acts/avatars detach from stable grounds under total technicization.avatars a. long-chu, bettcher, boyer, braidotti, feinberg, edelman, halberstam, hausman, karkazis, preciado, rothblatt, s. stone, s. stryker,
figures balzac, butler, irigaray, baudrillard, sloterdijk, deleuze, lacan, derrida, foucault,
persons octavia-butler, m. maxwell, raymond, solanas, wilde, c. m. kosemen, shelley, gigi gorgeous, loftus, william ernst henley, magnus hirschfeld
simulars tiqqun, frankenstein, oankaliadditional operatives
mentical, standing-monkeys, civilian displacing villain, anxious auto-rape, auto-prostitutive, kamikaze of subjectivity, contagious transweapon, masochistic bimbification ritual, merciless stripping to fantasy, tragic fate of menification, latourian purificationists vs. affirmationists, store of the body, symbolic drafting procedures, apolcayptically recalled glitch, mendicaments (medicamenticalities), face-removal, insidedness through phone-screen wombs, masturbatory potentiality as curse-resource, villanous reversal, romantically barren criticism, romantically barren criticality, pathological-industrial complex, secret trans-admiring technoprofessionals, living artifacts, living artworksdedication
my mother, jack halberstam, ghislaine maxwell, mae, nikki from britian, my alleged jewish ancestorschapters
1. the invention of subjects
2. the production of bodies
3. hysterotaxis
4. gynophoria
5. hyperphoria

the invention of subjectsdiscourses pertaining to transitude have been stuck in a war that continously is unable to decide whether clinical ideology and affective accounts of trans people co-produce the transed body in an attempt to create transsubjectivity from an ontological foreground, or whether transsubjectivity is produced by pharmacopornography, technoscience and capital's reterritorializations, which produce biocodes and artifacts on the trans body before (or only with the use of which) it can determine its own fate. cisheteronormativity and its equally manic dispositions only serves to obscure the fight between capital, transitude and the medical clinic. this work will be an attempt to only make this account less clear, but to hopefully force some dialectical tensions out of the situation...creatures emprically show proto-art and culture without language, such as whales evolving song traditions, bowerbirds decorated courts, and chimpanzee's tool-related rituals. our species-construct may be restricted from understanding certain other more developed forms due to certain epistemic wounds arising from our perceptive limits such as language-use, meaning it isn't preordained that we even possess the necessary meaning-making constructs. poerksen makes particular references to the way our ability to process language conflicts with the activities that arise as a result of it in plastic words, where he shows how beurocrats are unable to think of reflective insights outside of practicalizing their gain, adding terminologies such as "project" to the end of pursuits in order to instrumentalize their "interdisciplinary approaches".in a yet unpublished paper, i argue that our ability to interpret our own art to a full degree but other creatures to a lesser, has enabled a type of narcissism that counter-productively exposes situations where we've had to define our own identities simultaneously from a cosmological, existential and a cultural perspective. the paper calls humans "standing-monkeys" and argues that, in this speculative cosmology, humanity itself is not uniquely narcassistic, and that other various species, if given the ability to create abstractions, serve to also create uniquely tortorous methods, such as elephants over-harmonalizing the world around them, lizards force-freezing and force-accelerating spacetime itself to a degree that other animals can't keep up with and etc.this conflict has spawned in contradictions where whichever political apparatus currently is in charge is forced to assimilate different subjectivity-forms all in one category. speculative zoologist mehmet kosemen requires the creative construction of superpowerful aliens that torture humanity through genetic mutation in order to even remotely reflect on our invention of subjectivities for animals that enable them to be properly genocided by our current techno-cultural apparatus and sustained cultural logic.slowly, as all our essential cosmologies are stripped from us, we come into the ground we were always supposed to occupy - self-conscious and paranoid language users with no other creatures to share and morally reflect on our abstractions with, which leads to selfish and confused mass genocidal activity corresponding with ecological suicide in an attempted self-annihilation. octavia's xenogenesis frames the narrative of abstractions leading to annihilation to us, ironically, through the use of aliens, who invade earth and liberate it from destruction, coming to serve as projections of what we do to creatures on this planet in order to understand ourselves - to the level of near-suicide. the conflict of destiny and identity seems so unnaturally high for our construct-species complex, that all inventions seem to be pathologically related to a process of various latent clinicalized self-reflective tendencies.this conflict appears not just for general but also particular categorical identities, such as sandy stone's understanding of the medically invented transsubjectivity in her posttransexual manifesto, where she identifies that harry benjamin’s transsexual phenomenon provided the model or standard reference under which researchers evaluated transsexuals for their suitability for surgery, only later discovering that they themselves were building themselves around benjamin's model in order to form more acceptable behavioral profiles. trans women studied it and performed it accordingly, after which clinicians “confirmed” its accuracy with new case studies, leading sandy to the realization, amongst a lot of other similar and different cases that medical institutions don't just regulate but also produce subjectivities and mental illnesses according to the logic of the institutions themselves. whats important for later is that stone also finds that mehl concludes there is no greater psychopathology in transgender individuals as opposed to the general population.corresponding with techno-pharmaceutical advancement was also the re-discovery of the complexities of the body, which de-essentialized us only ever-further. turns out, gametes - the cells of sexual reproduction - are rigged where only dual extremes (the large and static female, the tiny and active male) win, allowing no divergence from a strict dimorphism. creatures have unique sex organs, multi-factoral sexual characteristics, simultaneous hermaphoriditsm and so fourth, but not unique reproductive cells. for humans, it gets even more strict, our secondary sex traits and primary sexual structures also feature less divergence than other species, including sea creatures, fungi and plants. my intention here isn't to argue that gametes show absolute determinism (see: joan roughgarden, anne fausto-sterling), but simply to push back slightly against preciado's theory, which i will extensively develop commentary on in a second.octavia's aliens posses a third sex which mates with humans. in a certain sense, their focus on reproductivity as destiny (octavia frames them as gene-traders) turns them into forced transhumanists. the same way the civilian will eventually displace the villian category entirely, the transhumanist may displace the civilian, in an odd moment where the transgender and the transhuman become the same thing, as the alien becomes one of us, and we create ourselves all over again in a totally new image, the image of the new female, or reproductive herald, of mankind, which is a theme that i will tackle later through andrea long-chu, the concept of the woman as a surface.the theme of villians and civillians is an old talking point in socialist discourse, where marx calls for the abolition of the distinction between town and country, rousseau stresses how villians are forced to transform into civillians in order to preserve their well-being, not only due to the higher living standard supported by the latter, but also by the way in which the former is suddenly put in a dangerous position if he does not abide by the socially structural logic of the time. the idea is also seen in bordiga, who advances the abolishing of the capitalist mode of production as correlated to a type of savior complex towards rural populations, and the unification between agrarian and urban settlements.technogender and pharmacopornographic era, two chapters in preciado's testo junkie feature the most radical and ambitious pursuit in proof of and simultaneously in pursuit of (given its call to avoid drowning it in rousseauian utopian-dystopian narratives or hegelian apocalypticism) transhumanism-transsexualism that i've come across. what is otherwise disguised as another affective-personalized pamphlet and yet another burdensome anthropological study actually hides within it an entirely new, albeit fragmented ontology that also arrives with a relatively stable conceptual political programme accompanied by a cybernetic study.in it, he argues that the postwar period's increasing capacity for scientific innovation lead to its medically managing intersex babies, producing somatic fictions tied to primary sexual structures, whilst also introducing variables - such as chromosomes, hormones and psychology itself - that shattered the epistemology of strict sexual difference. he insists that, rather than admiting multiplicity, pharmacist medicinal ideology artificially reinforced dimorphism with surgical and hormonal interventions. all other sexual features in humans have been certainly shown to be multi-factoral.the reason this work is so ambitious is that, instead of arguing that gender is a "social construct" instead of an essential product, it blames feminist movements for wrongfully claiming they helped propogate this viewpoint instead of pharmacopornographic capital, which literally produced sexual bimorphism as a culturally determinate divide amongst the generally noted badiouian modernity-induced saturation and latourian-mortian propagation of networked hyperobjects, movable ideas and enhanced nonhuman visceral permutations (products of biotech), whilst also both physically and culturally engineering intersexual and multi-factoral characteristics away from bodies so as to maintain the illusion that gametes and primary sexual characteristics are determinate of nuanced gendered behaviors.according to preciado, this is where queer theory came in, butler and de lauretis developed theories of performativity to fill in the lack of an explanation for what ended up being called gendered identity - a stand in for american neoliberalism's insistence on collective practices pertaining to self-identification taken to cosmological grounds. preciado shows us how owning the means of the production of the body is the definitive determinant constant of gendered divides, not cultural discourses nor scientific discoveries.preciado heralds technosomatic communism, the reclaiming of biocodes - hormones and prostheses - from pharma-state institutions and their imposed regulations. he invokes sloterdijk's voluntary auto-intoxiciation and auto-guineapigism are called on as viewing the body through a dual scheme of subjugation-experimentation. preciado may or may not see the that self-guinead doctor also attempts to attain an inner consistency where he is supposedly only a consistent representative of the new magic, never a victim to it, disallowing total immersion as deleuze would view - frozen scientification. i see his strategic call or programme as slightly derivative when in comparison to what i believe will actually be the felt consequence of capital that will arise in the future, but nontheless, his call is ultimately inspiring.although its the best example, this work fits into an existing conversation - whereas preciado invents masturbatory potentiality as a type of biotech force governing souls that serves as a central piece to the formation and maintenance of subjectivities by the western world - rothblatt speculates the scenario where souls are uploaded to minds, referencing morgan's altered carbon where souls inhabiting artificially constructed nanotech bodies fight alongside the original human bodily shell in a racist clash. rothblatt's version of masturbatory potential is a biotechnical resource that future actual transhumans will have to fight for their right to possess.rothblatt argues that cognitive consciousness as a resource will arise way earlier in transhumans than erotic sensations, in which case preciado's force will go from an opressive curse or weapon into a war for re-discovery. rothblatt cynically and surgically treats the future speculative transhumanists as our transgender peers, oddly speculating on their utilitarian prospects and managing their social resources as a fight for attaining quantities or qualities of joy relative to their predisposition. this type of measuring conflict is a natural consequense of our technological dissection of the world, where speculating on possible gains is something that appears as something of a fundamental strategy for engaging in the form of life itself, a narrative that is reproduced earlier in tiqqun's cybernetic manifesto.her argumentative positivism reminds me of the way in which we find a historical homology of technizing gender through for example balzac's parodies in the physiognomy of marriage where he's forced to reproduce quantifiable statistics on bachelors (the name for incels two hundred years ago) and the ways in which they can strategize to out-compete other men for the limited amount of tiqqunian young girls (datable women as opposed to generalized females, an ever-thinning margin due to the unnatural benefits of forming yourself into the former over the latter category), where gender theory at some point forces thinkers like rothblatt to dabble into pseudo-statisticology and fourier-type speculative tables, where color-coded gendered profiles emerge as a way to gain maximum benefit from your constructed subjectivity as it corresponds to certain political terrains. political opportunism arises the moment where constructed subjects begin to be reified on top of the world's existing subjectivities, forcing a clash that requires a resolution which can only draw its power from social economics.braidotti's deathly holistic works on the posthuman do offer us a few rare scaffolds to cling to, such as the idea that the structures of the political economy of bio-genetic capitalism can be anti-anthropocentric without being anti-humanistic, in an attempt to seize the status of the agent by coating it in a shell of cybernetic intelligence and preserving it, or that machinic autopoiesis itself indicates that technology isnt anthropocentric. however, the holistic prerogative reads too much like a programme to me, especially when the entire language is aesthetically coded in it, which doesn't allow the occassional protrusion of concepts, at least not in the way you'll find it in preciado's anthropology.

the production of bodiesin regards to the question of why the production of bodies - correlated to foucauldian disciplinary modernity - appears second in this paper, when chronologically it ought to be first is precisely because, for as long as postmodernity happened to believe that subjectivity was the primary discoursive crutch of all symbolic processes and the cumulative design philosophy for the engineered world, capital and its oversaturation and propagation complexes do in fact produce ontologies from under us faster than we can keep up, in a villanous reversal that shows us how technology is suddenly naturalized - appearing in autopoietic constructs, when previously thought to be locked to allopoietic constructs - and vice versa - the natural world suddenly shown to be fully synthesizable leading to auto-reificatory constructs, when modernity previously deemed reification as solely a social construct.a decade before preciado, stryker reclaimed monstrosity as an impending transformation that invades nature, and rage as its counterpart - the frankensteinian product of external pathologization but also intrinsic generative intensity. putting into question creatures as creations instead of dehumanizeds, the f-turned-t-monster is seen through the vision of the lovely eccentric dysphorics as an embodiment of technology turned against itself in an attempt to dictate conditions of assimilability.shelley's frankenstein serves as our historical middle-point between the human, the animal, the machine and the alien, so it's the perfect description of a creature, monster, natural and artifical creation all at once, the perfect schizophrenic being who belongs the least, making it the most radical. however, the question remains of whether this being if speculated from todays perspective can contain itself as its own site of creation or whether it dissipates in its own self-mutilation as something enchanted with an excitable-frustrative tendency to self-immolate or drown under its own affect.whereas preciado's theories show abundant examples of intersex problematics from an empirical standpoint, the strongest suits there are still philosophical, whereas in karkazis' fixing sex, empirical examples of clinical intersex authority consensus and status quo decadence take the front row, showing how although there are seemingly minimal studies that show how early intrusive gential surgery actually helps concerns such as future bodily comfort, orgasm-ability and parents initial and extended concerns over the consequences of queered experiences, technological professionals and their efficient clinical operative tendencies tend to smoothe out what appears to be anxities over gender-atypical bodies, serving to smoothe out and eliminate inconsistencies over worries about non-normative experiences, or about the very fact of the existence of such bodies.the production of bodies takes the front row, where heteronormative discourse, what karkazis refers to as the heterosexual paradigm, allows for young boys with smaller sexual reproductive organs to remain in possession of them, whilst simultaneously smoothing out any "inconsistencies" in girls with "severe virilization", even after they are well aware of the fact that studies are largerly inconclusive or lightly point away from the idea that these surgeries are beneficial whatsoever.whats important is that she also discovers how doctors are generally open to discussing the possibility of the stigma attached to these procedures, but not the extent of the procedures themselves, which is humorously and bureaucratically exemplified by numerous conferences such as the chicago consensus meeting, where rhetoric about mutilation instead of normalization seems to be a crutch by activists to avoid the uncomfortable reality of technological discourse further gatekeeping uncomfortable intersex bodies from existing in the way they otherwise would, as well as essentially encouraging psychological support, and rejecting equating homosexuality with failed treatment, whilst still continuing the technological operations of forming the bodies in the particular ways that they've been deemed to be formed by the medicamentalities of the pharmaceutical-medicinal apparatus.at the beginning of the twentieth century, hirschfeld, a german progressive coined the terms transvestite and then soon after transsexual, opening clinical spaces for gendered varience. he was initially an advocate of homosexuality, which caused outrage all over germany, partially influenced by the commonality of self-harm scars on the arms of his patients, as well as oscar wilde's death. he would be one of the first advocates of homosexuality as natural, which was viewed by the popular newspapers of the time as promoting "freaks" in the "name of pseudoscience". after that, in the fifties, some of the first gender-affirming surgeries would be performed in this institute, only after his exile and its raid by nazis, which he would escape from by touring the world and promoting orgasm pills, as well as settling in nice, france. ironically, he would only promote heterosexuality and increased intimate and emotional comfort to american audiences upon learning of their xenophobic attitude, at one time being known as the einstein of sex in that region and a "romantic expert".whats interesting to note about the magnus hirschfeld institute and the nazis raiding is the irony of todays political problems regarding trans experiences and regulations being almost of the exact same character. trans theory has been historically disciplined into an anthropology-of-regulation, where practical and political fights over legitimacy and validation have triumphed over actual ontological discourses, preventing it from becoming a philosophy and constantly relegating it into a cultural movement, partially due to the fact that american discourses have a tendency to be locked into rituals of legitimacy that dont favour conceptual scaffolding, but instead are particularly interested in the way cybernetics and affect link together with practical and political procedures of management, which is why figures like foucault become so popular overseas, and, ironically, this very vested interest in networks, media cultures and affective theories is the perfect drawing-point for something like trans discoursessome time shortly after the first institution was formed in germany, in the sixties, the previously mentioned work benjamin's transsexual phenomenon would release, as well as the johns hopkins clinic which instituionalized surgical programs. raymond gives an account of how disgustingly patriarchal and downright insidious these practices are, it almost comes off as a "sexed" or engendering performance where men get to evaluate the perceived womanhood and qualifiability to be a woman of the candidates that have a built-in waiting period for where they can be accepted for surgery, having to "live out" as women, almost suspended in a state of auto-prostitutive conduct.around this time pathologization would dominate, which would soon be followed by the first trans autobiographies in the seventies. in the early eighties the first terf writing, raymond's transsexual empire would release, which sandy stone's empire strikes back responds to. feinberg during this time would finally tie it existing conflict theories. around this time also, anthropologists would begin to highlight an ethnographic and indigenous account of third genders in order to politicize it further, which is a curious and honestly quite ineffective move in my view, due to the way in which irrelevant social contexts can be dragged into discussions which do largely pertain to technologization of gender, as globalism and modernity in my view don't allow for enough cultural pluralism to actually produce substantial mystical affects of this variety.in 2013, the dsm-5 would replace gender identity disorder with the term dysphoria, which does pretty much nothing from an outward political view other than attempting to destigmatize existing clinical legitimacy structures. in the early parts of the new century, conspiracists and bored populists would turn trans rights into a mainstream political issue, highlighting gender criticality discourses and worries over puberty blockers and detransitioning, which have been shown to be beneficial almost across the board for trans people.the conflict between technogendered queer negativists and genderfluid alchemists and technogendering intersex-consensus appealing medical cultists draws boundaries between two equally insane parties, the cisdoctor supported by engineered "normal" civilians who are no longer subjectively naturalized but hold onto the myth to protect their sanity, and the transdoctor, supported by doomsday prophets who en-doctor themselves so they can have a fair shot at blasting the contagious transweapon at what they rightfully believe is an equally disingenous secret trans-admiring, albeit normativized technoprofessional consortium.just to be clear, you see one side arguing that queer negativity succeeds and overcomes clinical ideology, terfs arguing that clinicians and trans people work hand-in-hand to reproduce their ideology, more centrist-leaning anthropological trans readings arguing that doctors are complicit in stigmatizing trans people and reproducing heteronormativity but nontheless usually are empirically shown to be attempting to have a positive or constructive view towards aiding them, and yet another side arguing that capitals appropriation of biotech needs to be communionized and reappropriated.i don't necessarily think there are "more or less" correct narratives, but i do think about how heteronormativity can just as easily be viewed through clinical ideology as its own normativizing function, not just from within intersexed discourses and the way it relates and mirrors back from their stigma of trans people, but even more directly, i believe that heterosexual relationships are fundamnetally pathological, in that they are built under more perverse fetishtic bonds, as the appropriative and economcially abstractive social schema forces them to become less organic and more cultivated, requiring higher amounts of concentrated fetish to maintain.as for stone herself, my view is that her criticism of transgenders "passing" does in fact obscure their history and the "mixing of genres" that comes off as a result of this is in fact a type of queer negativity, and creates a much more powerful standpoint for them. however, passing, in certain socio-practical situations, diffuses inconsistencies, stigmas and so fourth. essentially, i'm not arguing that transgenders ought to avoid not passing, but that there could be reasons that they were doing so until recently, that they were fitting into the discourse precisely for long enough to be partially allowed wider and more attentive degrees of normalization, enough to manage to pass through uncorrupted but still legitimized enough to explore their own genre (over gender) correctly.hausman in her work changing sex argues that transsexuals work in cohorts with normativity-doctors in order to produce standard accounts of transgender identities in order to argue in favor of surgeries, leading to the engineering of trans bodies that work in defense of transsubjectivity. her misreading of stone as shown through bettcher's commentary as well as her argument with posser show how liturgical voices and affective narratives serve to split the subject into autobiographical accounts that correlate the body, with the preconceived notion of always having been the opposite gender, with further accounts of legitimizing and ritualizing the procedure of the convergence, as well as the act of maintaining this narrative itself, and the ways in which this all ties together shows how there is a certain cosmologization or authentication of the transed body.bettcher's conclusion is that even radical feminist accounts can appear as trans exclusionary in increasingly disasterous ways especially when following a particular narrative position, however, i am more fascinated by the way in which medical ideology may have indirect consequences on non-clinically relevant trans persons, as i do think there is a correlation between the pathology produced from clinical ideology and the way in which, at the very least, transitude has been influenced to develop its specific theory of subjectivity, even if this isnt the sole reason.hausman in her work mentions maltz's text new faces - new futures, where he argues that because of the way social attitudes react to and inform expectations of beauty, people who don't fit that current constructive standard would be alliviated of their pain from being sort of, indirectly influenced in considering themselves crooked or deformed by having to accept getting the plastic surgery as a compromise for fitting that specific time-periods ideas of beauty. this sort of paints a lot of surgical procedures as pathological normalizations of bureaucratically inscribed weakness, essentailly, the tainting of a persons self-will to restrain himself not to fit the current status quo standards.hausman, on top of this, will want to argue that views on what normalcy constitutes can only be considered in correlation with an ideology that only exists due to the fact that these technical procedures exist and tend to influence expectations on what they can and should produce - therefore constituting a backwards legitimacy with artifical benefits such as "customer approval and happiness". hausman humorously notes that that couldn't be the same criteria for something like heart surgery, which doesn't serve to question the legitimacy of the criteria for cosmetic surgery, but the way in which something can even be culturally enforced as cosmetic and to which extent this can be seen as interacting with ideas of supposed non essential tissue. the text also points out how these very procedures have their own normative standard, not only taking in patient expectations but existing ideas of which types of classes and preconfigurations fit in with which specific type of adjustments. this quickly turns surgery away from a liberational idea that can conquer and fight against the standard model, to placing it instead in the deepest corners of a pathological-industrial complex.to a certain extent, i'm reminded of william ernest henley's hospital poems, and the way the clinic was originally a horror house, where surgical and clinical developments were slow, lethal, tortorous and unbelievably dense, scientists historically have made so many mistakes and wrong turns, and ego and status games prevented the discovery of tuberculosis strains, proper hygenic practices like handwashing, glove wearing and the late developments of anasthesia, incorrect uses of various substances such as nitrous, including the horrible history of "plasticky" interventions into peoples lives, causing freak accidents due to the accidental and often times ignorant administration of heavy metals in childrens medication pills, or the way certain sterile ideologies correlate with the destruction of metabolic bacteria that cause various problems with the body's microbiology.all of those freak accidents, when juxtaposed with the way that the clinical institute currently produces bodies in an increasingly sterile, plasticky way, devoid of the original horror and suffering of clinical procedures, shows some type of twisted, backwards, villanous and maybe even pathologically traumatic fragment of the way the physical sciences developed, especially when they had to face off against the techno-biological ailments caused by modernity. the clinical institute served as the way to identify the curses that modernity produced, but it also serves as the scapegoat, technological society dumped all of its waste products and engineered contemporary man out of the literal flesh of its victims, it ripped together and spliced bodies apart, symbolically in a similar way to the way we engineer bodies now. todays artifical and synthetic engineering could be a type of weird performative roleplay of those same type of practices.

it is often noted in anthropological studies that balkan and chinese societies or historically societies in poverty suddenly developed increasing interest in meat-eating cultures, sportscars and other various technologies they weren't permitted to. in a similar way, clinical technology and its ideology may have at some point as baudrillard notes, eliminated negative ailments, forcing itself to create saturated (positive, synthetic) enemies like hiv and cancer in order to continue to face off against an enemy, whilst turning all of its tools to suture the skin of anyone that wants to perform as a medicinal subject in the meanwhile.whilst stryker manages to produce images where the frankensteinan monster evades all biophysiological dogmas and manages to fit into his own monstrosity, finding a place among the rest of the world in a way that fundamentally re-essentializes all difference as substitutive of the total correlation between all created beings in their experiences as moving towards the image of god in unity, hausman manages to trample difference and pick through the minor things, never allowing herself to see the exact way in which construction slides its affective charge into onto-politicality and the way in which this agenda revolutionizes our understanding of essence itself. at the very least, if nothing else, her striking and creative criticality is romantically barren, her dreams appaer as shallow when looked at from above-ground.the production of bodies propagates and reformulates different functionalities of the body, however, the most important conflict between subjectification and ideological embodiement here naturally is the womb.hysterotaxisamidst the chaos, exclusionary radicals like jeffreys use social constructivism against the supposed essentialism of transness in works such as gender hurts, but their opponents themselves sound way more like preciado - way less concerned with essence - than jeffreys would be happy with. jeffreys's attack on transness as non essential doesnt do the boring thing of social constructivism but the fun thing of essentially rooting things like mania, self obsession, medical aesthetic interests and the power of applied femininity into the idea of identity as essential rather than, the essentiality of identity - to then ruin it all by arguing its used to silence women's conflict against patriarchal cisnormativity.although most terfs anthropological understandings of transgenderism, such as its construction by clinical ideology and its occurance within frameworks of categorical modernity are accurate, their reliance on sexological frameworks supplied by blanchard, bailey and lawrence such as autogynephilia, paraphilia and particular identifiable constructs that attempt to piece together intentions seem like less of a consensus on trans identities and more of a weaponization. this makes the view immediately suspect, due to the way in which it attempts to fit an entire narrative into transsubjectivity as a predisposition for it rather than a possible explanation.unlike foucault, who traces the construction of homosexuality in the nineteenth century as a form of speculative genealogy, exclusionary radicals mirror the perspective of somebody who is afraid of what transsubjectivity reveals about heteronormativity, which says more about the latter than the former.this gay (man-loving) fight over who hates men more - or rather, derrida's phallogocentrism, rarely anything outside of discourse, has only obscured how craze-freaked transitude is, and how equally manic hysterotaxis (my term for ordering ideology by-the-womb) is as a terf response-weapon, let alone, the way drawing on sexualized psychic investment isnt harmful to begin with, as stryker herself would admit.yet, if you destabilize cisnormativity itself as equally freaky as trans thinkers have done, half of the theoretical weight of the problem is already gone. preciado argues that by denying cisnormativity and subjecting it to a rigorous framework of specific forms of mania, whilst positing transness as auto-pathological or even auto-technical, the conflict has no middle ground to exist in its closed frame or form.cisnormativity's play with womens consent boundaries, war as indigenous conflict crossplay and patriarchy as solanas money-fetishistic society is itself manic. the destabilizing factor is what makes these concepts constructive, those who add "cispatriarchy is normal but evil, it created trans people to distract from also normal but good radfeminism" mirror the equally lazy trans-approving justice-oriented version of this conflict, the "transness is both confused but justified dysphoria and anti cispatriarchy simultaneously" that stryker and others espouse.cispatriarchphallocentrism itself will not escape allegations of transmutation, for it heralds its own form of evolving and normative mania-coded subversions and nature-questioning subversions, can also be seen in preciado, who could simply be fighting with conservationists and latourian purificationists, never affirmationists of pharmaco-technoscience, who themselves may be the crazed scientists preciado fears them to be, who restrict everyone elses ability to be trans simply so they can steal even more of it, rather than planning something more boring like trapping us all in a neverendless homosexuality - which, as carriere-bouchard has been seen arguing for online, should be the real term for heterosexuality given its intense homogeneity.regarding the conflict, preciado would argue that this regime is instead more concerned with the control of orgasmic power and the way it produces a disciplinary regime of reproductive logics. or otherwise, so that the normativity scientists can supposedly impose onto us latent self-control mechanisms over our own bodies, which is a popular narrative in contemporary theory circles today, which can be seen all the way back into baudrillard and as forward as byung chul-han.as a result of this double-sided conspiracy, preciado produces techno junkies of all kinds, he'll say - the world cannot tell apart experiment from slave as it slowly transitions into a post-conflict society, no longer disciplinary nor controlling, something that can see through regulations but doesn't feel the need to fight them if no real enemy is present and science and the body are allowed to roll around in medicamentalities, pushing forward into techno-transcendence as we envision the body, much like preciado envisions our own medicament, as unable to slow down.raymond in her empire argues that women's bodies are auto-raped by transsexuals who enter them and turn them into an appropriable artifact, where rape isn't a force but a deception, a self-constituted mockery. in this fascinating but hurtful exposition, wouldn't raymond have to then admit that the transsexual is an auto-arabic terrorist, performing a form of latent but degradive rather than spectacular kamikaze, in the sense that this self-exposition also degrades the character of whoever is performing this role on top of the attempt to degrade women's characters and bodies?raymond's focus in her work is on the way in which sexual fetish is seen as a burden by women, something they have to spawn in and deal with, when in comparison to the transsexual, who sees it as a devoted ritual obligation, simultaneously something to control and attempt to put in its rightful place, as well as an obsession of form and function, and a general fixation, something that one can also view their sexual liberation as incomplete without.however, the aspect of mirroring sexual female organs itself is auto-castrative, in that, yes, you can use feminist readings as andrea long-chu would do with reversing freud's reading of penis envy back onto men, but nontheless, this type of devotion for what in patriarchal societies is seen as a vulnerability or opening can hardly be seen as a type of one-sided parodic affiliation or positivist inclination if not removed from a type of sacrifical devotedness of a more pleasant and puritan type, the christian-obsessive victim, purification, completionist complex rather than the manipulative one.all of this is argued for, of course, on top of the existing, now well understood fact that there's no way these types of ideas are actually synonymous with trans experiences or forms of reasonings, which is why i herald this as more an experiment to understand how terfs comprehend feminine burden rather than my attempt at a defense of transitude.bettcher points out some of her contradictions quite well, such as the idea that male to female transitioners are sexist both if they evade heternormativity and if they enable it, that clinical ideology both perpetuates heternormative surgical operations and enables particular demands by trans people, as well as integrity - the wholeness of sex roles that can only be seen as its whole, and integration - the blending of all sexual roles in order to construct a synthetic hole - can only be conflictually solved by a removal of integration, which, seemingly would do nothing but harm integrationists whilst everyone is still waiting around to achieve integrity, especially given the poor way in which raymond seems to treat feminist strategies against patriarchy.butler argues against reymonds theories of integrity in gender trouble, where she notices how signification appears in an orbit of repetition, the necessity to be a certain gender produces the failures that the subject then positions itself around, meaning that to configure itself, it must update its understanding of what it means to be engendered, which cant happen as a transcendental motive but as an existing co-constitutive experience.integration is equalized with integrity, where the essence of the engendered performance can't be thought of as seperate to its constitutive reality. this constitutivity is also a key argument for the way in which no subject can be thought of as possessing anything that fundamentally damns it, or causes a total incapacitation, symbolic or otherwise, on account of the subject. the phallus is always relative or co-constituve of the experience, the body, the womb, all forms of responsibility, surfaces, social styles, everything is created in the moment that all of us allow eachother to experience our engendered reality.hysterotaxis appears almost as a fundamental operative around which to base the way in which womanhood escapes its surfacivity and allows itself to become beholden to a three dimensionality. pregnancy, a blessing of the wound, is seen as the way in which the body achieves an actual dimensional state, an operative mode where the achievement of a body inside of a body creates the being itself, who can finally allow itself to achieve its productive state. the technology of the body is built to sustain the body inside of itself, preganancy becomes both a cannibalization and an ontological re-formulation of beings. the "purity" of the woman is also finalized by the technologically abstract and machinic process of the formulation of organs and the transformation of woman into man that happens in the envelope of the pregnant experiencetranswombs, their eventual forthcoming introduction, not yet present but properly ritualizable (transitude can still experience the wombed state, but it will always be abstracted away until technology can permit it correctly) might themselves relativize the synthetic-biological aspect of the existing status of pregnancy, revealing the womb to be a theatre rather than a shell, a production studio rather than an organic cover. the cultural logic will attempt to build the womb from scratch, it may be evocative of the time in which it exists, from cds to usbs to bluetooth, the womb will reflect the decisions of the time, it will have buttons in cybertopia, it will have dial-remote switching, or maybe it will be an app on your phone where you can stare at your baby whilst it cooks.in the long future, faces will be deemed unecessary and removed, as you stare at the world directly through your phone screen, which is several amounts more pixelated and accurate than the eye - now with ultraviolet light! just like samsung switch, you can directly position yourself inside your own womb, and confirm that you are in fact an insidedness. men possess such no insidedness, their dewombified state will make them mundane characters in the social and civil experience, and a type of latent matriarchy may develop. raymond wonders why there are far more male to women transitioners than the other way around, blaming female to male ones as validative scapegoats. but what if this is because of the superiority of a woman, not as a fetishistic or devoted construct, nor as a product of techno-orgasmic social encodedness or engendering, but because of practices that validate matter itself, or the way in which women help us understand spatiotemporal realms by divorcing one part of themselves in order to arrive at a whole?

gynophoriain females, andrea long-chu argues that femaleness is defined by a type of self-negation that depends on mechanisms of social regulation and appropriation - and that identification becomes ever-harder as genderedness is weaponized against the identities of its inhabitors rather than in favor of their emancipation. i think what andrea is doing here is theorizing a concept i call gynophoria - my term for the burden of the forced carrying of this social artifact of the failure for responsible womanhood or transwomens cultivation of it as a site of libidinally repressed energies.long-chu argues that comedian loftus, in an attempt to parody performative male genius by engaging in contextually inappropriate acts with the book infinite jest after being urged to read it by men who also didn't know what it was about, ended up also performing female stupidity due to her exhibiting herself as above it whilst precise mimicking the very action of stupidity towards it in an attempt to mock men's status-signalling.she possesses an obsession with male validation complexes on both sides of resistance and subsumption because she herself is a product of the way the femaleness - the condition of constant cultural engendering practices of non ascetic - non universilizable, culturally inclined - men - has transformed women into men, but worse, more frail versions who either have to pose as desirable ascetic men who are transformable but roughly and with resistance, or simply as whores (andrea's dumb blodedness) that enact performative resistance that itself is already subsumed entirely.in a reading of gigi gorgeous's bimbification ritual, andrea fails to realize that whilst the process of exhibition does entail leaning into someone elses fantasy in order to perform an embarassing display of stripping yourself down to a purer and more elaborate image of someone else's desire - the very act of this merciless and functional stripping away of characteristic actually serves as a backhanded criticism of the very foundation of others desires, framing desire as secondary to the function of its becoming, which is the menification that women precisely attempt to avoid but nontheless encounter in their tragic fate.in long-chu's concept-realm, rather than everyone being a woman and hating it, women dont really exist. if its true that only mens culture exists as an engendering concept whilst women cant really resist in any meaningful way, then the fantasy of a woman as something that doesnt resist and only subsumes is incompatible with the way that resistance itself, in all its embarassing subsumptive exposition, actually shows the imperfectness of a proper subsumption, even when stripped down to its functional harmony. the lack of women ever achieving themselves as proper "surfaces" is precisely present in their men-ification, their complete reliance on humanity's very sharp and twangy, non-flat textured cultural experiences.meanwhile, menhood persist everywhere, as the gradient of dumb womanhood just falls one step lower every time men fall further into whoreism (self-embarassement) complexes, as andrea shows in a twist of the castration complex as men possessing vagina-envy and dreaming of becoming subsumed subjects in their own right, hoping to avoid responsibility whilst falling into its embarassing reality. meanwhile, actual agenthood in the ungendered way is just everyone who already creates their own worlds, which means theyre fully narcissistic but not obsessive in the slightest, whoever those people are. especially females who arent women, or at the very least who arent tiqqunian young girls, to the point of not even recognizing themselves as women in the proper sense or not needing to.the lacanian split of womanhood itself is a false equivalence, given the nun and the whore do want to become one another, but its precisely the agent who is the nun, the man who is the whore, and the woman who simply doesnt appear in her own equation, unable to be both the sexiest surface, the most anhedonic man, and the fantasy-subject of desire itself, if displaced in lacanianism, or otherwise, producing too much intensity whilst stripping itself away, failing to become a woman under lyotardianism either. conflict always eats itself alive, i can see myself writing andrea's book exactly as it is, ironically, the production vs. invention of theory...against long-chu, if you want to escape imperfect womanhood into proper menhood, you can resist being socially conditioned, codified and assorted, but you mustnt do that whilst identifying for the possibility of a construct and waiting for validation. andrea cant think outside of validative complexes and thats creating a hazard for her own philosophy. she explains the concept of the woman-turned-male as a tragedy of the commons (mike ma's formulation) perfectly, but is stuck being too much of what she thinks a woman ends up being (not literally but in her own figurative extrapolation) to tell that not everyone - in fact no one - is a woman. meanwhile though, her description of women's commodification isnt half bad, but too anthropologically-confined to create a conceptual scaffolding that can holster it, whilst at the same time, her description of womanhood actually properly describes their inescapable menification.her insistence on solanas gets close to this theory when she argues that instead of transness serving as the pathological assimilation of mysoginist steryotypes, it instead serves as the rule governing all gender - except the romanticized reactionary essentialist currently non existent alternative of surpressed females drives that chu sees in solanas and humorously argues that she may have been the last untempered survivor of.its odd that andrea calls solanas theory outdated to a byzantine degree, when she has simply mirrored and flipped the theory to argue for its exact opposite - with caveats like the removal of essentialism - mainly corresponding to the idea that instead of surpressed instincts being carried over into the production surplus social shaping, surplus social shaping carries surpressed instincts into the re-production of essential conditions - namely womanhood, which is why i have no problem positing that instead of this theory, the abstract object of woman can at best be replicated as a social artifact and never truly achieved, if the concepts of repression-intension carry the cultural weight of social-abstractive processes all on their own with no additive technological advancements.meanwhile, in deeper tangles of trans theory, halberstam's polemic in the queer art of failure makes use of solanas nihilistic misandrist intensity in order to indict edelman of elitism, abstraction, apolitical formalism as well as bersani and gay male aesthets as a whole of irony, ennui and generalized formal detachment that secludes attempts at queer negativity by, essentially, being overwhelmingly kantian about things, as well as drawing on an archive of polemical writers and artists that limits the cvetkovichian "archive of feelings" down to a pre-selected camp, that depends on sentimentalization and lacks in faux realism and broader kitsch juxtapositions, in order to preclude itself away from the contemporary order of things.what halberstam and edelman show us is that gender discourses themselves serve as productive sites for the creation of aesthetic and cultural styles rather than strictly serving for rationalized discoursive programs. territorial stakes are placed on top of gender, even justice-oriented speakers are attempting to seize gender into their idea of what it should represent stylistically and not just politically, maybe even political positionality isn't the point as much as the way status and social positioning impact the way gendered affect actually circulates, which would explain the overwhelming amount of testimonials, with serano's whipping girl as the crowned example.in the envelope, irigaray argues that god, as providing his own envelope and being as substance and self-caused, is conceived through his own path. in irigaray, man creates god in order to ground himself, and uses women as a standing pole from which to create his own envelope, so he may necessarily do so. evil arises when a body prevents a thought and vice versa, and if the woman is reduced to this surface, then, there is no way for the agents to exchange their own reciprocal freedoms or work off one another on an ontological plane. she argues that rape is auto-interactive and non-constituve of an intellectualized body, and in a certain sense, that woman herself has been reduced to this role if forced to take on the role of man's receptacle.gynophoria helps tie together affective charges, stylistically-preferential hyperobjects and aesthetic boards with ontological-theological readings of femininity in a way where, no matter the responsibility the concept carries with it, no one single theorist, from beauvoir to gillian rose, neither weil nor anna winters can serve to totalize it, whilst all of them can still somehow entirely capture it. this creates this type of discrepancy that allows it to proliferate as both an ontological and a gendered perspective.

hyperphoriathe way to escape hysterotaxis along with gynophoria is precisely through the creation of alien sexual organs, something butler needs to and does argue against when she wants to keep up the specific transposition she carries along in her theory, requiring symbolic charges to prevent manic clustering mechanisms.a perfectly queered apparatus is one that resists theories of burden, responsibility or essential property - and instead argues for their total deterritorialization and reappropriation into new socially symbolic systems. however, as our cultural machinic-network requires its advanced abstractive complex in order to discharge its own conflict-states, the creation of novel technogendered biocodes - quite literally a re-engineering of territories, to the level of the alienefication - not machination but videogamification of avatars will be required to really achieve states of peace.the discovery of an elaborate physical world - the medicinal regime produces the medical, mental and mentical (medicamental), leading to predicaments - mendicaments (medicamenticalities), the alchemical mends the invention of new chemical forces, pushing forward the engineering of productive forces, which circulate back into new forms of subjectivity - creating synthetic products - which co-exist as technology that can already be discovered in the natural body as a machine.the seemingly artificial pharmaco-technical weaponization of biology was all along an existing property of the physical world. the world itself is a macro-engineered version of itself (biology is a scaled imitiation of chemistry, which abides by the laws as a scaled imitation of original pre-atom physics - quarks and their interactions - the likely original proprietors of the four "laws" governing the universe), where quarks combine into atoms and then into cells to form ever-complex systems, which eventually get divorced from their prior contexts - the misunderstanding of ontological alienation can easily be fully patched up. the world comes to us pre-engineered, we dissolve it of all its shared contexts and let it wash over us, and we end up as medicinal subjects - as machines of ourselves, trying to navigate a world which we believe we are simultaneously creating, as someone like latour may argue.the medicamentical phenomenon emerges in order to suggestively and selectively order in between the ontologization of alchemical and clinical reality and their ever-stronger craft, and the way in which subjectivities attempt to constitute themselves, or fight against the way the terrain constitutes them, all whilst pharmacopornogaphy sells commodities in the form of their own subjectivities, hyperobjects proliferate their experience, and cultural styles link identities to lived experiences, but only of affect and characteristic and never of political reality. medicamenticalities surge and proliferate stylistical and aesthetic combinations which help the mental body recuperate against the abstracted body, and calm the excitation produced by anxious auto-rape. in garments against women, boyer shows us how the physical constitution of spaces is capital's way of creating infinite laboratories, conditions, where electirified grids serve as tortorous electrocutionary chambers, forms of latent cybernetic reaction-retraction processes, and stochkolm syndrome connects in a lyotardian manner to our inner drives.auto-rape glitches into the places capital proliferates through, as bodies are seen magnetically pulled towards one another in a spectacular show, where the body is mutilated, re-transformed in place, used as matter for building, quickly deconstructed, organs harvested, the subjectivity is quickly pulled together, the soul in a vat is re-downloaded, the body is out in space, bodies grind against eachother, once sexually, once in a vaccuum, once in an orgasmically triumphant call, once in a ritual disposition where animals use the sapien body as a way to do their push ups, once where bodies accidentally spawn into one another crushing eachother, the glitch is seen as a type of tragic curse in some places, an apocalyptic call. the avatar (a recombination of all possible affective zones into an alienation of character, political subject and social reality, where zones of characteristics themselves are seen as performative-intensive productions) and simultar (online avatar, incapable of representing a subjectivity but only an act) merge, and acts themselves are bodies, bodies no longer have a lived reality of their own. hyperphoria is not necessarily a subjective condition, its more like the lived reality of the state of the world itself, hyperphoria doesnt call or harken to a particular subject, it literally floats like spirit around the mountains and dwellings of the cities and constitutes the lived and retroactive energy of the de-egoified wholeness of the world.whats interesting though, is that instead of dysphoria, further processes of alienation between thought and body, constitutive and constructed parts, and a further saturization between the production and subjectification of machinic assemblages may instead lead us to hyperphoria - the loss of stable or essentially pre-determined ground. in this situation, you will really be able to tell the difference between soft essence and hard essence, something preciado himself doesn't consider when he urges prototranshumans to smear themselves in testo gel. he may argue it has already been achieved, where subjects are pre-produced by capital and auto-genocided by masturbatory potentiality. however, this displacement still isn't fully realized, since we still posess a variety of non fully gameafiable biocodes.if you think dysphoria is a product of pharmacopornography, producing vast amounts of mania and generally confused states, the higher states of reification that we haven't achieved yet may fully commodify our bodies, to the point that andrea's formulation of women will not only be extinct, but quite literally unappropriable (double-alienated back into novel originality, in tiqqun's formulation of the concept of the hipster) locked away forever in a dungeon of complete relativity, where womanhood in its purest form is only the highest and most confined, most territorialized curse of the creature, who, being able to choose any form he wants, but never cursed with a pre-defined form, will be unable to achieve libidinal excitation, masturbatory potential as a capacity or innate ability cast from exterior machines of propagation (due to complete relativity of characteristics), nor ultimately even the ability to feel satisfied with one's own identity.hyperphoria produces subjects that accelerate their own bodily composition and consistently swap out their avatars in an attempt to artificially synchronize their felt sense of self with their now fully commodificationally derived product of their subjectivity or their idea of fundamental characteristics that pertain to them. since all of these characteristics only serve to feed into a composed market-form, none of them feel experienced, so the fundamental embodiement turns them into a kind of "store of the body". this isn't just a normally reified subject without a tiqqunian form-of-life such as in our contemporary world, but a fundamentally and increasingly anxious disposition, that ends up literally creating living artifacts, and sometimes, although rarely, living artworks on the very body of the hyperphoriac.like our current economy of ever-accumulating commodities, artifical degrowth and stagnation may have to be inferred back to our subjectivities the way sanctions and regulations are superficially imposed, as future nazi-states imprison us into a type of symbolic drafting procedure where we are forced to slow down our shapeshifting in order to feel even a sense of a lost natural responsibility towards the world.🔓the remaining pages are locked, please buy them here for only 5$ and so i can write more books and stuffintegrated concepts
pharmacopornographic capitalism, technogender, technosomatic communism, masturbatory potentiality – preciado. gender performativity, citationality – judith butler. phallogocentrism – derrida. queer negativity, the queer art of failure – lee edelman; halberstam. transgender rage / monstrosity – susan stryker. posttranssexual manifesto – sandy stone. fixing sex – katrina karkazis. transsexual phenomenon – harry benjamin. dsm gender dysphoria/identity disorder – american psychiatric association. the transsexual empire – janice raymond. changing sex – bernice hausman. whipping girl – julia serano. archive of feelings – ann cvetkovich. deathly holistic posthumanism – rosi braidotti. autopoiesis / machinic autopoiesis – maturana/varela; guattari/deleuze; braidotti. hyperobjects – timothy morton. plastic words – ernst pörksen. auto-intoxication / auto-guineapigism – sloterdijk. tragedy of the commons – garrett hardin; tragedy of commons – mike ma. latourian purification vs. hybridization – bruno latour. prosthesis of origin / biocode – derrida / preciado. xenogenesis / gene-traders – octavia butler. third sex / sexual intermediaries – magnus hirschfeld. autogynephilia, paraphilia – blanchard, bailey, lawrence. freak/monster figuration – shelley via stryker. nihilistic misandry – solanas. disciplinary modernity, biopower – foucault.bibliography
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